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ABSTRACT 
This thesis studies the institutional foundations and micro-mechanisms by which social 
order is regulated and public goods are delivered in China’s urban grassroots communities. 
This study is motivated by the seemingly deviant phenomenon that massive internal 
migration and rapid urbanisation during China’s market reforms have not resulted in 
chaotic and familiar third world urban diseases. Instead, relatively governed, less 
contentious, highly dynamic yet ultimately soft migrant enclaves contrast sharply with 
what often feature most developing countries. Based on the case studies of four urban 
villages – which categorically housed the majority of China’s 274 million rural migrants – 
I trace the interplay among the remaining socialist institutions, dominant market forces and 
various intermediaries in managing migrant contestation and serving state functions. I 
consider both objective criteria and migrants’ perceptions to explain why China’s migrant 
enclaves demonstrate distinct characteristics compared with the migrant enclaves in many 
developing countries. I also consider why China’s migrant enclaves share similar patterns 
of transformation with its formal cities. The findings contest the conventional approaches 
that are used to explain China’s structural stability and territorial cohesion despite local 
disturbances and conflicts, which are mainly attributable to the authoritarian regime, state 
corporatism or an underdeveloped civil society. Although China’s land, danwei and hukou 
systems are nationally configured, I argue that these institutions are also conducive to 
protecting an intermediate realm that comprises residential committees, joint-stock 
companies and clan associations by providing a safety valve and nurturing localised 
engagements. I then examine how these intermediaries have adopted coercion, patronage 
and exit-point mechanisms to deliver public goods, enforce communal order and broker 
urban renewal through less coercive and predatory means. I further assess the ways in 
which these engaging but parochial, resourceful but dependent, and exclusive rather than 
inclusive intermediaries have mediated the boundaries between despotic power and 
infrastructural power and among state agenda, market forces and grassroots interests. This 
thesis thus re-visits China’s authoritarian resilience concerning not only how migrant 
contestation is managed but also what institutions and mechanisms are most effective to 
articulate multiple interests and ensure social compliance during the processes of 
urbanisation and decentralisation in the absence of electoral politics. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
DEVELOPMENT AND SLUMS 
 
Rapid rural-urban migration and urbanisation tend to produce massive city slums in which 
rural migrants and the urban poor find substandard shelter and form socio-political 
enclaves.1 This phenomenon has travelled across time and space. Slums emerged and 
spread across Victorian London, in Paris before Haussmann’s renovation, and throughout 
pre-war Boston, New York and San Francisco as the urban centres of the early developers 
underwent industrialisation and modernisation.2 
 
When many developing countries followed the Western development model in the second 
half of the 20th century, they fell into similar patterns of social disorder and spatial 
contestation. Urbanisation has become both the symbol and measure of such modernity 
because the movement of labourers from rural areas of low marginal productivity to urban 
areas of high marginal productivity enables efficient allocation of resources and increases 
total economic output. 3  But apart from enabling economic growth, rapid rural-urban 
migration also intensifies spatial and political contestation, from which shoddy 
neighbourhoods, organised gangs and enduring inequality have always emerged as by-
products. 4  Jakarta, Johannesburg, Mumbai, Mexico City and Sao Paulo are typical 
examples of cities where slums, ghettos or shantytowns became contested but also 
permanent structures that have emerged, expanded and diffused along with the growth of 
these cities.5 Such a phenomenon, in association with inequalities and chaos, is therefore 
categorised by Mike Davis as a trajectory towards “the planet of slums” and is recognised 
by UN-Habitat as one of the most severe human development challenges confronted by 
developing countries in the 21st century.6 
 
                                                
1 Cf. Park and Burgess, 1984: 54-56, 108-111, 189-193; Whyte, 1993: xv-xx. 
2 Jordon, 1995:13-40; Hall, 2002: 404-486; Yelling, 2007. 
3 Bradshaw, 1987: 224-225; Lewis, 1952. 
4 Thrasher, 2013:3-44; Zorbaugh, 1983:9-16. 
5 Neuwirth, 2006; Fischer et al., 2014. 
6 Davis, 2006; UN-habitat, 2003, 2010. 
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East Asian developmental states, which were strictly repressive of wages and unions yet 
demonstrated relative social equity in economic growth while overcoming the “middle-
income trap” between the 1960s and the 1980s, are no exception to this transnational 
phenomenon. Despite their unique track record, cities in these countries did not escape the 
spread of massive slums or ghettos during their take-off periods and after their neoliberal 
turn.7  These developmental states somehow distinguished themselves not by retarding 
slum formation but by combating it: irregular and substandard migrant enclaves were 
subsequently cleared by massive urban renewal projects in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan 
and effectively managed by comprehensive public housing schemes in Hong Kong and 
Singapore.8 
 
 
Figure 1 A slum settlement in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. © The Gelmi Art Studio. 
This temporal-spatial pattern of urban transformation implies that once the late developers 
are integrated into the orbit of global capitalism, control over production factors will 
precede concerns regarding order and equity in the sequence of development. In other 
words, as long as migrant enclaves enable the influx of cheap and abundant labour for 
                                                
7 Park et al., 2012: 209-211; Mathews, 2012: 16-21:  
8 Chiu and Lui, 2009: 46-47; Roy and Ong, 2011; 6-7, 111-113. 
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industrial growth and urban development as well as exempt the state from providing public 
security and public goods, their associated crimes, vice, poverty and social disorder will be 
disregarded or accepted as inevitable externalities resulting from economic transition. The 
trade-off between economic development and unregulated spatial governance has long 
been evident.  
 
 
CHINA’S DEVIANT PHENOMENON  
 
Figure 2 An urban village settlement in Shenzhen, China. © Sze Tsung Leong. 
However, this pattern does not fit the development trajectory of China. On the one hand, 
various international regimes regard China’s internal migration and urbanisation since 
1978 as the most extensive and unprecedented in human history.9 By 2013, China had 
experienced an increase of 550 million in its urban population, of which 265 million were 
considered “floating”, as most migrants remain formally unsettled and many still travel 
back and forth between urban and rural works.10 The total floating population rose to 274 
million in 2014, of which about 168 million were working in the urban centres in other 
provinces while the rest in smaller cities and county towns closer to their home villages.11 
These figures suggest that rural migrants without urban household registration (hukou) are 
                                                
9 Internal Labour Organization, 2006; UN-habitat, 2011. 
10 National Bureau of Statistics, 2014a; National Health and Family Planning Commission, 2014: preface. 
11 China Labour Bulletin, 2015.  
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the primary source of actual urban population growth. China’s rural migrants thus 
constitute the most potentially contentious group in cities; they are deemed necessary for 
export-oriented industrial growth but are perpetually denied citizenship because of the 
associated financial burden.  
 
On the other hand, hundreds of thousands of urban villages (chengzhongcun) –literally 
village amidst the city– in these booming cities have provided affordable shelters and 
regulated settlements to the majority of rural migrants. The valuable land in or adjacent to 
the city centres is thus ironically reserved for the most disadvantaged groups. Crime and 
overcrowding are not uncommon, but the majority of these enclaves have not been 
controlled by gangs or entrenched in despair, as observed in many developing countries. 
Moreover, private, club and public goods are periodically produced, differentiated and 
distributed between various non-state intermediaries and different social groupings. Finally, 
these enclaves have nevertheless been rather soft in the wake of urban renewal in recent 
years. Negotiations among landlords, tenants and developers can be lengthy but seldom 
result in violent contention; during the process, intermediaries have functioned as 
regulators, brokers or practitioners, resembling features of – while also adding nuances to – 
the thesis of local state corporatism.12 In addition, while other megacities from the North to 
the South have cultivated a series of massive strikes, insurgencies and social movements in 
recent years, Chinese cities have remained extremely stable. 13   The majority of the 
contention or “mass incidents” (qunti shijian) that have occurred in China – with the 
exception of labour, health and environment-related protests – have largely been clustered 
in rural areas.14 
 
In summary, China’s migrant enclaves are more governed, less contentious, and highly 
dynamic but ultimately soft compared with their counterparts in other developing countries. 
Some observers would highlight the model’s potential to control externalities: consuming 
cheap labour, regulating socio-spatial contestation and retarding political anarchy. Others 
suspect that the absence of slums conceals social exclusion and deprives these rural 
migrants of an arena for resistance. Some would even refer to this situation as an indicator 
of enduring political conformity. In other words, the preconditions for the emergence of 
                                                
12 Oi, 1999; Unger and Chan, 2008. 
13 See Tarrow, 2005; Harvey, 2012; Wallace, 2014. 
14 Cf. O’Brien and Li, 2006; Cai, 2010; Chen. 2013. 
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slums were observed in China, but the outcomes were not. This negative situation brings 
attention to the relations between development and governance along with the interactions 
between different institutions and agencies in China’s urban grassroots. 
   
Certainly, even the most established theories in the social sciences have had exceptions for 
which no single case can offer confirmation of a theory.15 However, Gerring and Mahoney 
and Goetz noted that one crucial case or negative case that is rigorously designed and 
thoroughly deliberated could disprove a theory or identify an overlooked variable or 
mechanism.16 Emigh and George and Bennett also respectively affirmed the merits of 
investigating a negative case for its potential theoretical expansion and heuristic 
purposes.17 The appraisal of China’s “development without slums” phenomenon would 
thus indicate the conditions for deviating from this common trajectory and enrich our 
understanding of how state, market and non-state actors interact with one another in the 
midst of the most unprecedented episode of urban transformation. 
 
 
THEORETICAL APPROACH AND DEBATES 
 
Historical Institutionalism 
This thesis is embedded in historical institutionalism, which employs a historic orientation 
to study changes and attends to the ways in which institutions shape behaviours and 
outcomes.18 This approach rejects rational choice theory, which assumes that individuals 
are self-interest maximisers making choices with perfect information; the approach also 
transcends structural functionalism, which deems social actors bred in a specific context or 
with an idiosyncratic history to be similar in responding to structurally constituted 
situations. 19  Instead, this approach aims to bring temporal dimensions into political 
analysis, insisting that “political development is often punctuated by critical moments” in 
which “specific patterns of timing and sequence matter and a wide range of social 
outcomes may be possible”. 20 
 
                                                
15 King et al., 1994: 66-70. 
16 Gerring, 2007:236; Mahoney and Goertz, 2004:653. 
17 Emigh, 1997; George and Bennett, 2005:81-82. 
18 Hall and Taylor, 1996. 
19 Thelen, 1999; Steinmon, 2008. 
20 Pierson, 2000:251. 
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Because historical institutionalism concerns interactive relations and recurring mechanisms, 
concepts such as increasing returns and path dependence and methods such as micro-
narrative and process tracing are considered vital. This view of history is not deterministic 
and is not a calculative sum of intentions. Historical-institutionalists, in contrast to 
rationalists, do not merely serve to reduce uncertainty and inform decisions, and they are 
not potent in sanctioning actions, as assumed by the structuralists. 21  Rather, initial 
conditions shape critical junctures, but outcomes, intended or unintended, are determined 
by the interplay between institutions and actors within a bounded territory. Actors are both 
the objects and agents of events, whereas “institutions configure strategies, strategies can 
remake institutions”.22 
 
This spatial-temporal orientation enables us to examine the changing dynamics through 
which Chinese cities have been able to manage the unprecedented migrant contestation. 
One concern pertains to the ways in which China’s migrant enclaves differ from those in 
the developing world, along with the implications for social inequality and political 
stability. I thus examine the historical and institutional foundations for the living space of 
different social groups and for the different ways in which public goods are produced, 
differentiated and distributed in urban villages during decentralisation and privatisation. 
Another concern is the impetus for grassroots agencies to maintain, regulate or 
contemplate socio-political order in the migrant enclaves as well as their relations with 
state apparatuses. I thus reveal the coercion, patronage and exit point mechanisms by 
which collective compliance dominates organised resistance during everyday trades, land 
appropriation and urban renewal.23 The changes and continuity in formal institutions are 
emphasised as much as the informal exchanges among grassroots officials, village bosses, 
clan chiefs, native villagers and rural migrants. This study hence aims to describe the 
complexity of these interactions and to consider the recurring pattern within them. It 
analyses how regime shapes the boundaries of contestation and is, in turn, shaped by the 
repertoires of the agency. It also explains why diverse patterns of regime resilience are 
conditioned by the contrasting identities, strengths and cohesion of their capitalist class or 
                                                
21 Pierson, 2004: 10-16. 
22 Hay and Wincott, 1998:954-955; Ma, 2007:64. It has been noted that neo-institutionalism is galvanised by 
both formal theory and applied economics to explain human behaviour, and thus cannot be fully detached 
from rational choice theory. See Bates, 2014. 
23 See Hirschman, 1978 on the exit-voice strategies in reaction to discontents with the state.  
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political elite.24 This analysis inevitably invites us to examine the nature of the Chinese 
regime at central and various local levels in relations to its nuanced form of grassroots 
politics during rapid socioeconomic transition.  
 
Authoritarian Resilience and Its Boundaries 
China’s increasing integration with the global economy and its continuous exchange with 
other open societies while at times preserving its uncontested one-party rule are not only 
challenging the theory of democratisation but also reinvigorating the conceptualisation of 
effective governance, independent of rigid regime typology. With the collapse of 
“enduring authoritarianism” in the Middle East after the Arab Spring, China’s communist 
regime stands alone as the most visible and salient deviation. Various new typologies have 
emerged to capture the old regime’s robustness in adapting to waves of internal crises and 
external challenges.25 Central to these classifications are the capacity and flexibility of the 
Chinese state in absorbing social grievances, enforcing decrees and policies and ensuring 
continuous economic growth. The use of fear and the appeal to ideology have not been 
altogether abandoned, but they are no longer the dominant ruling strategies.  
 
Although observers agree on the transformation of the Chinese regime, they disagree on its 
sources of resilience. 26  One school of thought emphasises the power of institutional 
adaptation, which is capable of recruiting meritocratic civil servants, ensuring government 
accountability, stabilising political elite succession and incorporating collaborative 
corporatism.27 These accounts imply that democracy is prohibited but substituted with 
effective governance. Another school of thought highlights the robustness of an interactive 
realm in which rightful resistance is tolerated, policy deliberation is encouraged and social 
organisations are absorbed.28 Implicit in these arguments is the claim that despite the lack 
of competitive and liberal institutions, the essence of deliberative or consultative 
governance has been practised or at least the seeds of pluralism have been sown.  
 
In recent years, the divergence discussed above has contributed to contradictory 
assessments of the durability of the regime. Some observers insist on the resilient 
                                                
24 See Tilly, 2006; Sidel, 2008; Slater, 2010. 
25 Posusney, 2004; Bellin, 2012; Levitsky and Way, 2010. 
26 Nathan, 2003. 
27 Yang, 2004: 187-192; Tsai, 2007:188-191; Shambaugh, 2008; 161-181; Heinemann and Perry, 2011:8-15. 
28 O’Brien and Li, 2006: 123-129; He and Warren, 2011:269-270; Wang, 2011:126-129. 
16 
 
weaknesses of this model, including a weakened but increasingly predatory state, political 
instability generated by factional politics and endemic corruption. 29  Other observers, 
including Nathan and Shambaugh who initiated the concepts of authoritarian resilience and 
party-state adaptation, reach the same conclusion but emphasise structural and exogenous 
challenges, such as the staggering increase in “mass incidents”, the dilemma of 
simultaneously maintaining economic growth and addressing environmental pollution, an 
increasingly informed public and new channels of mobilisation under the digital revolution 
and greater financial uncertainty following China’s further integration into the global 
economy. 30 
 
The above claims share the assumption that the Chinese state is a monolithic entity 
working against society. However, this assumption, which builds on the division between 
the state and civil society, has been criticised as extraneous. Several anthropological and 
organisational studies reveal that state apparatuses and nongovernmental organisations 
(NGOs) in China have interdependent rather than antagonist relationships.31 Furthermore, 
the claim that China is resting on a social volcano is contradicted by results obtained in 
large-scale nationwide and citywide surveys. 32  Rather, non-zero-sum outcomes have 
emerged from dynamic interactions at the grassroots level. The periodic occurrence of 
resistance is interpreted not as critical threat to the regime but as valuable source of 
information. The nature of the Chinese regime is thus referred to as “deliberative 
authoritarianism”, “bargained authoritarianism” or “contentious authoritarianism”33 
 
In fact, these disagreements are both normative and methodological. The structural 
tradition implies that an uncompetitive and corrupt system, regardless of how adaptive it is, 
has institutional and structural limits in its response to momentous changes in the Chinese 
economy and society. Such observers also have good reasons to doubt the reliability of the 
survey results obtained in an authoritarian regime. Public support for the former Soviet 
states or communist ideology was as high as 85 per cent in the late 1980s, but these 
                                                
29 Pei, 2006; Li, 2012. 
30 Friedman, 2009; Diamond, 2012; Nathan, 2013, Shambaugh, 2013.  
31 Hsu, 2010; Teets, 2013. 
32 Wright, 2010:162-180; Whyte, 2012:181-191. 
33 He and Warren, 2011; Lee and Zhang, 2013; Chen, 2013. 
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regimes collapsed several years later, thus illustrating the entrenched phenomenon of 
public lies, private truths, and false consciousness under totalitarianism.34 
 
By contrast, the rational choice tradition finds persistent support for and informed 
acceptance of the existing socio-political order, which are dynamic products of China’s 
idiosyncratic history, socialist legacies and adaptive mechanisms. Because of the 
expansion of the private sphere, these observers consider survey data to be more authentic 
and reliable than data in the Cold War era. These observers also insist that it is impossible 
to discuss domination, subordination, or false consciousness without thoroughly describing 
and challenging the interplay at the grassroots level, where contingency is frequent in 
everyday politics and negotiation is conductive to governance.35 Regime matters because it 
embodies “a set of formal and informal rules that that determine what interests are 
represented” and whether such interests can constrain the leadership; however, regime type 
is often not determinative as the trajectories and outcomes are subjected to each regime’s 
origins, linkage and leverage. 36 
 
These analyses consider China’s post-socialist transition as largely a zero-sum game 
between the state and the market or between the state and civil society. Economic 
development and political stability have been attributed to the efficient market and 
underdeveloped civil society, respectively, beneath the coercive state. Often lacking in 
these static accounts are the interplay between institutional adaptations and social changes, 
the mechanisms through which formal institutions shape informal agencies’ self-perception, 
and the process through which informal exchanges reveal loopholes and trigger 
adjustments. Recently, several cutting-edge comparative studies of China’s local states 
have proven the merits of adopting a relational approach to examining the changing 
penetration of China’s state power, through which it contingently defends, offends or 
interacts with the grassroots agencies or civil society.  The turn towards the dynamics of 
local politics consolidates new concepts such as bargained policymaking or resilient 
governance, through which the contestations between state and grassroots society along 
with their recurring patterns can be better described and analysed. 
 
                                                
34 Kuran, 1991:37. 
35 Zhang, 2001; Hsu, 2007; Perry and Goldman, 2007. 
36 Geddes et al. 2014:313; Levitsky and Way, 2010: 37-39. 
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The debate over the nature and limits of China’s adaptive governance will continue. I aim 
to contribute to this debate by offering a rigorous contextual analysis that traces the 
dynamics of grassroots governance under immense contestation and in semi-enclosed 
urban enclaves. Power, as theorised by Bourdieu, Foucault, Gramsci and Lefebvre, is 
relational by nature and is important when it is operational in a given territory. Based on 
this understanding, this study examines the relational capacity of the grassroots regime and 
its non-state collaborators under constant challenges. By relational capacity, I refer to the 
processes or mechanisms that enable grassroots agencies to adjust their public and social 
functions during the course of market reforms. Emphasis is given to the micro-mechanisms 
of public goods provision, allocation and maintenance in the migrant enclaves, as well as 
to assess the evolving boundaries of despotic power and infrastructural power. The former 
refers to the state’s coercive authority over society whereas the latter refers to the state’s 
capacity to penetrate society to enforce its policies. According to Michael Mann, these two 
forms of power though coexist, are often in conflict with one another in an authoritarian 
context where the regime aims to maximise dominance and control. 
 
Beyond the Lens of Civil Society and State Corporatism 
Few scholars dispute that there has been an emergence or – resurgence – of intermediate 
associations in post-1978 China. Yet, they often disagree on which theoretical framework 
is most applicable to understanding and conceptualising the development of this 
intermediate realm along with the associated changes in China’s state-society relations. 
The debate not only involves which theoretical lens better describes and analyses this 
social reality, but also whether the intermediaries have stimulated significant changes in 
China’s polity that may lead to democratisation. 
 
At the one end, civil society theory affirms the rise of an intermediate level of organisation. 
Rooted in the liberal tradition, civil society theorists, such as John Keane and Robert 
Putnam, describe society as independent from and in opposition with the state.37 With the 
collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe, China’s dissenters in exile and 
Western observers also hoped for a civil society that fostered democracy and encouraged 
regime changes. Joel Migdal and Robert Miller, who admit the concept’s European 
orientation, recognised that it is applicable to the study of regime transition in developing 
                                                
37 Keane, 1998; Putnam, 1993. 
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countries. 38  This intellectual and historical origin is reflective of why China’s socio-
political transition is frequently contrasted with post-Soviet states rather than Southeast 
Asian competitive authoritarianism, despite the latter’s greater dependence on the state and 
similar institutional and cultural conditions to China.  
 
Certainly, the growth and the role of nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) are evident in 
China. The number of registered organisations rose from 4,446 in 1988 to 319,762 in 2005. 
Of these organisations 171,150 are social organisations, 147,637 are non-profits and 975 
are foundations.39 Many grassroots and foreign NGOs have indeed committed to providing 
medical services and education to the disadvantaged, easing poverty, promoting human 
rights and engaging in environmental protection – thus fulfilling functions abandoned by 
the state and meeting new challenges generated by marketisation.40  Apart from these 
welfare and social functions, some scholars also stress the democratic practices through 
voluntary contribution and horizontal engagements. Green activism in coastal cities in the 
early 2000s is regarded as the “sites and agents of democratic social change in China”. 41  
Labour-NGOs are associated with the empowerment of migrant workers and the 
accountability of local governments in labour protection.42 The rise in and spread of civic 
networks, home-grown associations and relief efforts during and after the Sichuan 
Earthquake in 2008 is framed as the beginning of an “independent and nascent civil society” 
in China. 43  
 
Although these transformations have depended on citizens’ participation in public affairs, 
China’s NGOs are considered to be poorly structured, lacking of internal trust and heavily 
regulated by the state. 44  Since 2010, repeated crackdowns on NGOs and independent 
activists have occurred. As of 2015, the second draft of the Law on Administration of 
Overseas NGOs reaffirmed the system’s control over influential NGOs in which the 
Ministry of Public Security has replaced the Ministry of Civil Affairs to regulate foreign 
NGOs, which are subjected to rigid protocols for registering, accepting donations and 
operating in sensitive domains. Whereas the state’s capacity and determination to swiftly 
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alter its reliance on certain non-state agents is telling, the inability or reluctance of 
supposedly independent NGOs to challenge such restrictions and censorship calls into 
question the applicability of the civil society framework.  
 
At the end of the theoretical spectrum is the notion of corporatism that regards intermediate 
associations as primarily serving organised and statist interests. Schmitter defines state 
corporatism as a form of interest representation featuring monopolistic, centralised and 
non-democratic associations that organised around or imposed by the state.45  Anita Chan 
and Johnathan Unger contend that the spread of intermediate associations should not be 
mistaken as the vigour of civil society in China. Despite the increase in individual 
autonomy and the expansion of the market sphere, the great majority of these social 
organisations are endorsed by, subsidised through or dependent upon the state. The state 
has continued to designate and regulate the associations between different sectorial groups, 
allowing for their interests to be properly represented and relying on them to maintain 
stability through surrogates within each segment or organisation.46    
 
Collaborating interests and using non-state actors has since then strengthened, not 
weakened, the authoritarian state in terms of its despotic and infrastructural power. Rather 
than promoting an independent agenda and solidifying horizontal networks, most of these 
social associations, GONGOs and even grassroots NGOs, are largely performing essential 
but costly social functions during privatisation and enabling the state to re-infiltrate the 
grassroots society during decentralisation. Above all, they are always prohibited from 
organising migrant workers into unions, representing the rights of ethnic minorities and 
advocating religious freedom and freedom of the press – domains that are monopolised and 
handled exclusively by the state. State corporatism in this regard “provides a more accurate 
description of what has been emerging [in contemporary China]”.47 
 
Several studies have further extended the particularity of China’s corporatism. Compared 
with other East Asian states, where state-corporate collaboration is embedded in the central 
government or seasoned bureaucrats and sectorial associations or conglomerates, China’s 
model of corporatism is said to be relatively fragmented and localised. Over the course of 
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privatisation and decentralisation, business-minded local states have fulfilled the dual role 
of regulator and player. Township-village enterprises (xiangzhen qiye or TVEs), which 
have a strong state presence and collective shares, are identified as the source of China’s 
improved agricultural efficiency, reduced rural-urban inequality and rapid economic 
growth from 1978 to the mid-1990s.48  Recently, Jennifer and Hsu reaffirmed the validity 
of local state corporatism by correlating the success of certain NGOs in Shanghai to their 
connections and interactions with local state systems.49 
 
Although the notion of local state corporatism is well developed, its analyses present 
potential shortcomings. First, the majority of these studies are oriented in rural areas where 
local state and collective enterprises are relatively coercive and autonomous, are subjected 
to moderate public scrutiny and encounter fewer challenges from competitive interests.  It 
becomes imperative to examine whether the theory applies equally well to urban areas with 
more severe spatial, social and economic contestations that extend across diverse 
communities and multiple divisions. 50  Second, many of these studies are devoted to 
examining and revealing the growing economic roles of grassroots regime, such as 
township governments, VCs and TVEs, during market transitions. They, logically or 
unintentionally, underplay and underestimate the public and persistent functions of the 
urban grassroots regime and its relations with the intermediaries. However, comparative 
evidence suggests that corporatist interests, no matter how powerful, do not always 
dominate the realm of public goods provision and welfare service management. Instead, 
the political process is often governed by recurrent bargaining between the state and the 
society, rather than in the form of mandated concessions assigned by the state. 
 
Intermediaries between the State and Society 
Some scholars insist that these theories are frequently at odds with China’s social reality.51  
Philip Huang proposes a “trinary conception” that goes beyond state-centred corporatism 
or society-oriented civil society theory. His research on civil justice mediation and the 
survival of small peasant communities in both imperial and Republican China reveals the 
existence of an intermediate space between state and society in which both parties 
participate. This third realm or an in-between space is where the twin processes of state 
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intervention in society and societal assumption of state authority interact, negotiate and 
operate. While privatisation weakened central power vis-à-vis local power in contemporary 
China, the local government and local society have worked together to expand their 
communal networks and public functions.52 In this light, Huang is proposing a multifaceted, 
dynamic, and intertwined concept of state-society relations in which the intermediate realm 
is mediating conflicts, deepening networks and modernising changes. 
 
Similarly, Prasenjit Duara’s study of state-strengthening efforts in Republican China also 
suggests a “cultural nexus” in which the autonomy of rural leaders is produced and 
capitalised into formal and informal groups. Although these groups enable the state to 
collect taxes and maintain social order, their authority is dependent on their constant 
response to social needs and their ability to negotiate for diverse communities.53  In short, 
both Huang and Duara reject the binary opposition between state and society, which is 
heavily shaped by the state-making process and bourgeois public sphere in early modern 
European historical context. This defies the complex, prismatic and sometimes paradoxical 
processes involved in the making of communal power and grassroots order.  
 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, this intermediate realm has endured in communist China. 
In her widely acclaimed study, Vivienne Shue delineates Mao’s China’s evolution polity 
during which state penetration was less widespread and highly uneven. By introducing the 
“honeycomb” structure of rural society, Shue challenges the concept of a state-versus-
society dichotomy and exhibits the limits of the reach of the state countered by merged 
associations and everyday norms of the grassroots.54 Instead of being blind followers of 
Chairman Mao, Shaoguang Wang suggests that the red guards of the Cultural Revolution 
were embedded but “rational actors” who calculated, either consciously or subconsciously, 
their risks and rewards. By linking the political elite and institutionalising fractional 
struggles, these social actors managed to filter top-down orders and defend the existing 
distribution of local power.55 Shue and Wang thus provide a coherent yet multifaceted 
description of reality in urban and rural China, and at normal and contentious periods 
during which the state and society worked concurrently to institutionalise their conflicts 
and to secure their interests. 
                                                
52 Huang, 1993. 
53 Duara, 1988:39-40. 
54 Shue, 1988; 123-154. 
55 Wang, 1995: 5-17. 
23 
 
 
In recent years, these understudied and nuanced realms have begun to draw more scholarly 
attention. Benjamin Read reveals how neighbourhood associations in reforming China are 
not mere creations of the state but are embedded in the society. By accommodating both 
the state and the market, they are fulfilling public roles and meeting community 
expectations. While hierarchy does exist in the urban grassroots, intermediary associations’ 
dependency towards to local state apparatuses does not necessarily entail clientelism. 
Instead, the difference in economic resources, institutional alternatives, and communal 
norms or discretional authority between the “superior” and “subordinates” are factors that 
truly distinguish the logics of horizontal solidarity and the power dynamics in each 
locality.56  Similarly, Li Zhang, David Bray and You-tien Hsing in their respective studies 
explain why kinship networks, danwei legacies and socialist land masters in urban China 
occupy the intermediate space through which local apparatuses, offend, defend and interact 
with the masses.57 As demonstrated by my fieldwork in the urban villages, these reciprocal 
relations or circular negotiation have not disappeared but proliferated through privatisation 
and decentralisation. In a similar vein but different lens, Vanessa Fong and Rachel Murphy 
defy the state-centred perspective of discounting the dilemma and complexity at the 
margins of Chinese society. Peasants and migrants, despite being discriminated by the 
hukou system and denied of certain political and civil rights, are proven to have 
productively engaged in the making of their social citizenship and becoming an integral 
part of Chinese cities. 58  By referring to such multifaceted developments, this thesis 
examines the dynamics in which certain state agendas are neutralised and absorbed by 
society, whereas others are not. 
 
Certainly, one should not underestimate the more structural inequalities in relations to 
resources and power beneath this synergy of state power and social forces. These 
inequalities have been increasingly rationalised in high-modern planning and legitimated 
through global capitalism. Nor does this thesis aim to showcase a “harmonious society” 
specific to China. Instead, it describes the mechanisms and reasons underlying conditions 
in which conflicts have emerged and have been reproduced and institutionalised over the 
course of rapid urbanisation and intensified privatisation. By taking advantage of the 
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tensions and collaboration between the different segments of the local states and among the 
non-state agents, intermediaries bargain with the regime without comprising their roles or 
purposes. As the Chinese context exhibits particular qualities for checking urban diseases, 
providing public goods and managing social order, it is also of practical relevance to 
students studying development and modernisation. 
 
Admittedly, social scientists, like natural scientists, often appreciate the ability of simple 
theories to illustrate and conceptualise the complex world. However, as the proverb says, 
“Everything should be as simple as possible, but not simpler”. This thesis thus stresses the 
particular manifestations but also analyses the prevailing contractions within the context of 
China’s social transformation, namely between surviving socialist institutions and new 
market forces, despotic power and infrastructural power, and landed peasants and migrant 
workers. This process of multifaceted, intertwined and evolving state-society relations 
demands a more nuanced description and middle-range theorisation. In this light, China’s 
“development without slums” phenomenon is by no means isolated from many developing 
countries that have experienced similar stages of urbanisation and capital accumulation. 
 
State-Society Relations in Urban Grassroots 
In recent years, the Chinese government has regarded the need to provide more and better-
quality public goods and services in urban communities as an urgent task to alleviate social 
tensions and enhance political legitimacy. One of the crucial impetuses of reform comes 
from the transition from work-unit (danwei) to community (shequ) governance.59 As the 
market has gradually replaced the state in terms of economic production and social service 
distribution, the danwei’s administrative and residential units could no longer dominate 
and regulate the urban landscape. Two major policy initiatives have been implemented to 
address this socio-political vacuum. In 2004, the central government reinvigorated resident 
committees (jumin weiyuanhui) to institutionalise a nationwide community building 
process. This process aimed to restructure and empower the urban community as a 
resourceful, efficient and dynamic grassroots regime that is capable of coordinated and 
effective governance. In 2008, the central government further adopted “social management” 
(shehui guanli) or “community governance” (shequ zhili) as the overarching governing 
framework. This framework aimed to foster flexibility and diversity in social service 
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provision by decentralising state functions to private and non-state actors while 
simultaneously allowing the state to maintain distant control under a regulatory and 
corporatist framework.60 
  
These urban governance initiatives have generated contrasting views of the nature of state-
society relations in contemporary China. One school of research refers to these schemes as 
an indicator of administrative modernisation that promotes impartiality and rationality, 
injects pluralism into public policy formulations, and ultimately alters traditional state-
society relations. The creation of social welfare intermediaries is regarded either as 
independent and institutionalised space towards a more dynamic and assertive civil society 
or as a cohesive and resourceful realm that can nurture connection with social actors.61 
Another group of scholars, however, argues that state control is evident across China’s 
neighbourhood governance. These researchers claim that state-led governance has allowed 
the state to penetrate the grassroots, to strengthen their social control and to reduce their 
costs of governance.62 The production of community building is viewed as an indicator of 
an increasingly empowered and confident grassroots regime that is capable of turning 
challenges into inform governance.  
 
As Alagappa notes, “[t]here is no necessary connection between civil society and 
democracy; civil society can have both democratic and antidemocratic effects”. 63 From 
this perspective, civil society is neither a vehicle conductive to civil employment and 
pluralism nor a realm that is fully created and controlled by the party-state. Rather, civil 
society is regarded not an entity ontologically distinct from the state, and both often form 
collaborative and symbiotic – but contingent – partnerships with one another. 64  This 
trajectory raises a central question regarding the concurrent triumphs of both non-state 
actors and the party-state, which has generated an extensive range scholarship in the 
literature on civil society in general and in China in particular. Less prevalent in the 
discussion is the grassroots politics in China’s transitional space and hybrid enclave. This 
political realm has not been fully explored, as students of political economy are driven to 
assess the corporatist nature of local states, of contentious politics to analyse how rightful 
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resistance is conducted in rural areas, of migrant studies to examine how inequality and 
control is reproduced in factory dormitories, and of urban politics to reveal how state 
power is penetrated through RCs. 
 
However, migrant enclaves represent a dynamic socio-political space where contestation is 
potentially vast but the outcome is surprisingly stable: their inhabitants are not completely 
urban, but they are supported by their rural systems and networks; their grassroots regimes 
are not merely an extension of the state, but they are not entirely the creation of society; the 
inhabitants of urban villages are included in cities for the purpose of sustaining the export-
oriented economy, but the land upon which urban villages are built is essential for 
fostering further urban development. Although some scholars have studied the dependence 
of RCs in urban governance, the roles of joint-stock companies (gufen gongsi) in TVEs, 
and the nature of informal migrant settlements in separate studies, few researchers have 
studied these aspects within a combined political process in which the grassroots regime 
and non-state actors defend, offend and interact with one another. These state-society 
interactions reveal the conditions under which an intermediate grassroots realm can be 
maintained and the trajectory on which it can endure.  
 
 
RESEARCH QUESTION AND OBJECTIVES 
 
The literature review above situates the “development without slums” phenomenon in the 
existing theoretical debates and explains the need for nuanced empirical data. First of all, 
despite the institutional discrimination and social exclusion of rural migrants, urban 
villages that accommodate more than two-thirds of China’s 274 million migrants have 
been relatively regulated and minimally contentious. An explanation in terms of the 
authoritarian regime is insufficient, as open, periodic and popular protests have emerged in 
rural China since the late 1990s.65 Organised labour strikes have also become increasingly 
apparent in the industrial zones and factories since the mid-2000s.66 In recent years, the 
urban middle class has periodically resorted to protests to voice their discontent over issues 
in the environment and health security. Why are the migrant enclaves, which are 
supposedly more contentious during the course of the economic and geographical 
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transitions, an exception? More precisely, why do these migrants mainly go on strike for 
their working conditions but not for their living conditions? These dynamics of collective 
action may be explained by the idea that these rural migrants (nongmingong) are 
constrained to becoming semi-proletariat: neither peasants (nongming) nor workers 
(gongren) under various institutions; earning wages but retain access to land as a means of 
subsistence; residing in sporadic urban villages instead of common workers communities; 
and trapped in a growth pattern in which capital is highly exploitative, yet relative poverty 
rather than absolute poverty appears to be a gain.67 This type of negative or particular 
phenomenon in China focuses our attention on how political power is exercised and social 
order is maintained in these arenas of contestation occupied by the floating population.  
 
Although a number of sociological or ethnological studies provide contextual and lucid 
accounts of the form and power of specific urban villages in the 1990s, no existing studies 
have acknowledged the implications of the absence of slums. Most of these studies are also 
situated in North China and in relatively homogenous villages. 68 A single case study with 
four embedded and heterogeneous urban villages consisting of dynamic institutions and 
multiple actors would enable us to survey how urban villages are formed and prevented 
from developing into massive slums, to examine the specific power dynamics within a 
semi-enclosed space, and to explain urban China’s spatial-political arrangements through a 
negative lens. Having been trained as a political scientist, I am particularly interested in 
exploring how grassroots interests are articulated and how patronage is sustained when 
electoral machine and competition are absent.   
 
Although all city planners and mainstream developmental scholars would regard the 
absence of slums as a success, the phenomenon is actually more complicated. From a 
normative perspective, slums, housing the most disadvantaged members of society, should 
not be perceived merely as hotbeds of poverty or as symbols of vice. Rather, slums might 
constitute a space for everyday assimilation and resistance, function as an inclusive 
political community, and depict a pattern of disenfranchisement and inequality prevalent 
under global capitalism. 69  This perspective requires an interactive approach to 
documenting and understanding migrants’ perceptions of the governed space and their 
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relationships with the state and other social actors. Motivated by these empirical and 
theoretical concerns, my primary research question is framed as follows:  
What types of institutions and mechanisms have enabled China’s grassroots regime to 
manage its migrant contestation and to regulate its socio-political order during 
privatisation and urbanisation and in the absence of electoral politics?  
This question involves the following components or objectives: 1) describing China’s 
urban development and institutional changes from a historic and comparative perspective; 
2) tracing the pattern of migrant contestation along with assimilation, integration or 
resistance in the formal city; 3) examining the patronage relationships among city officials 
who possess coercive power, village bosses who seize economic resources and clan chiefs 
who enjoy communal authority and between native villagers as landlords and rural 
migrants as tenants; 4) explaining the role and capacity of intermediaries in providing 
public goods and regulating social order; and 5) assessing the changing dynamics of 
China’s grassroots politics during the course of decentralisation, privatisation and urban 
rationalisation in the absence of electoral machines and competition. 
 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The fieldwork for this study was conducted between March 2012 and August 2014, 
covering four urban villages in Shenzhen’s dual administrative structure. This design 
depicts a representative urban trajectory in a sunbelt city in China that is both the symbol 
and the frontier of market reforms. This design also controls for demographic, economic 
and institutional factors in the field sites to reveal the temporal change in grassroots 
interactions and to capture the recurring pattern of grassroots negotiations.  
 
In China, affiliation with a local university is an important first step when conducting 
intense fieldwork. This affiliation avoids intervention from street-level cadres and enables 
societal cooperation.70 My affiliations with the University of Science and Technology of 
China and Sun Yat-sen University granted me access to the relevant official archives, 
social organisations and target populations. My personal connections and three months of 
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residence in the field sites are also vital to earn the trust of the local bosses, villagers and 
migrants. 
  
A Single Case Study with Embedded Subunits  
As China’s first Special Economic Zone (SEZ) and a hub for rural-urban migration, 
Shenzhen exhibits a typical trajectory of spatial contestation during market reforms. 
Shenzhen, along with Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, is now ranked as one of four 
first-tier cities (yixian chengshi) in China. Between 1979 and 2011, Shenzhen maintained 
an average annual GDP growth rate of 24.8 per cent, and it evolved from a county of fewer 
than 314,000 people to a metropolis with an urban population of more than 10 million, of 
whom 75 per cent are rural migrants, representing our primary unit of analysis.71 But in 
order to examine the interplay of power and resources and between different agencies, the 
voices and behaviours of streel-level officials, village bosses, clan chiefs and native 
villagers are also attended and examined.    
 
Until 2010, Shenzhen retained a dual administrative structure that divided the municipality 
into two divisions. Figure 3 illustrates the boundary of these divisions along with the land 
occupied by urban village settlements. One administration governed the districts of Luohu, 
Futian, Nanshan, Yantian, and several early industrial zones designated as the inner city 
(guannei). The territorial jurisdiction of the SEZ was restricted to this 395 km2 of land and 
included 91 administrative villages. The other administration governed the districts of 
Bao’an and Longgang as well as the new high-tech zones in the suburbs. This area 
included 239 administrative villages spread across 1,553 km2 of land in the outskirts 
districts (guanwai).72 
 
Figure 3 Distribution of Urban Villages in Shenzhen Administrative Divisions 
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Source: Compiled from Shenzhen Urban Planning Bureau, 2005: 14-15 
These villages share several similarities. All of these villages have transformed into 
heterogeneous communities as a result of intensive rural-urban migration, illustrating the 
dynamic contestations between native villagers and different groups of rural migrants. 
They are also large urban villages of comparable size whose demands for public goods are 
immediate and immense. Each village except one has been informally governed by a joint-
stock company (JC gufen gongshi) that is a privatised village committee (VC cunmin 
weiyuanhui). The shareholders of each company are the native villagers, who range in 
number from 800 to 1,150. One to three resident committees (RC jumin weiyuanhui) 
formally govern each of the urban villages, which are de jure self-governing bodies but de 
facto roots of the state.73 The official number of staff for each RC has been capped at 7 
personnel, with additional funding for recruiting approximately 20 helpers.  
 
However, these urban villages also differ from one another in several ways. The four field 
sites are dispersed among the districts of Luohu, Futian, Bao’an and Longgang; hence, the 
city government governs two of them, and two county governments govern the other pair. 
Another difference lies in the tenants of these urban villages. Office workers and small 
entrepreneurs primarily reside in the guannei urban villages, whereas factory workers, 
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janitors and guards primarily cluster in the guanwai urban villages. A third difference is 
the business networks of the villages: although their customers include migrants and 
urbanites, the guannei urban villages concentrate on both retailing and wholesaling, 
whereas urban guanwai villages primarily serve individual households. The combined 
effect is a divergence in wealth that conditions the ability and willingness to provide public 
goods and regulate public space. 
 
The similarities and differences constitute a research design that is referred to as an 
“embedded case study”. A total of four urban villages across four districts are selected as 
the subunits of analysis for the situation in Shenzhen, where migrant contention is strong 
and continuous. This research design allows for a thick description of the order, trades and 
residents of the four villages. Multiple data are used, and replicated conditions are 
identified for comparison with our operational definition of “slums” and to reveal the 
complexity of the grassroots order in urban China. Moreover, the research design helps to 
verify whether the robustness of macro-institutions and intermediary associations are direct 
and wide-reaching, despite the differences in administration, demographics and economics. 
The inclusion of embedded subunits thus increases the possibility that the inferences 
obtained from a single case study reflect “replication rather than sampling logic”.74 
 
Quantitative Data  
This thesis aims to measure the micro-mechanisms involved in managing migrant 
contestation and reinforcing reciprocal relations. This objective involves both quantitative 
and qualitative data collection because the boundaries of such dynamics are typically 
contingent and not divisible. Official national and municipal statistical yearbooks along 
with statistical collections at the county and street levels were analysed to provide an 
overview of China’s demographic and economic situation and particularly to assist in the 
interpretation of qualitative data. The China Core Newspapers Full-text Database 
(CNKI.net) provided access to these newspapers and enabled keyword searches. This 
enables me to examine the intensity of this issue and the changes in official framing or 
public perceptions of urban villages and of their dwellers. 
 
Archival Research  
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I conducted archival research at Shenzhen’s Municipal Archive and City Planning Archive. 
Although much information is withheld because of the 30-year rule that protects 
government records from being released to the public, some pre-1984 records related to the 
origins and policy initiatives of Shenzhen have been reviewed. These archives contain 
internal publications and data collection. Through applications to relevant bureaus or 
agencies, selective open data on city finances, urban improvement projects and the hukou 
system were obtained.75 Moreover, the libraries of Shenzhen municipality and Futian and 
Luohu districts include many local newspapers and Chinese journals. Their reference 
libraries also collect working reports and audit memos on city planning and urban village 
redevelopment. Another good collection was the chorography (difangzhi) that documents 
the historic, administrative and demographic details of each district, which has been 
updated and released since 2010. These dense secondary materials may not be necessarily 
reliable but serve as reference points for searching or verifying primary data.  
 
Residence in Urban Villages 
The most intensive episodes of my fieldwork involved three months of residence in two 
urban villages located in guannei and guanwai and periodical visits to other field sites to 
conduct documentary research, interviews and participant observations. Uncle Lou, one of 
my informants, helped me arrange a temporary residence, in one of the many apartments 
that he owned or sub-rented in the Shi Village, from 2 March to 14 April 2013. Situated on 
the main avenue and adjacent to the JC’s main building, the apartment served as a 
dormitory for JC employees where the emergent deployment and everyday services of the 
company’s employees are concurrently catered. I stayed with two roommates in a three-
bedroom apartment. One of my roommates was a sub-contractor of the Teochew clan and 
the other was a junior captain of the collective security team who had worked in the village 
and lived in the dormitory for over five years. We shared the bathroom, kitchen facilities 
and home appliances, and the living room, which facilitated our interaction. 
 
Although we rarely cooked for ourselves, and even less often for each other, we regularly 
gathered for dinner and drinks starting from my first week of residence. Such social 
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gatherings allowed me to take a closer look at the daily routine of these service providers, 
appreciate their aspirations and assess their insiders’ views of the order and trades in the 
migrant enclaves. More importantly, their friendship allowed me to make connections 
within and beyond the urban village and solicited more than a dozen interviews. While 
Uncle Lou arranged the top-down or vertical endorsement of my fieldwork, my roommates 
activated the horizontal or bottom-up channels. 
 
Between 2 September and 12 October 2013, I moved to the Gong village, located in the 
outskirts. This time I completed the renting process alone for three reasons. First, my 
investigation was extended to cover the blue-collar migrants that resided primarily in the 
outskirts. Second, I sought to gain a first-hand experience of the negotiations and 
interactions involved. Third, I aimed to establish my own networks within the urban 
village and to test the validity of my observations in the absence of my resourceful 
informant. I ended up living in a much more crowded and primitive apartment with five 
other migrant workers in their mid-twenties to late thirties. As strangers to each other, our 
initial interactions were neither harmonious nor efficient. Yet, because of my ability to 
speak their dialects and the sudden departure of two occupants, who moved out to return to 
their native places during the third week of my stay, I quickly gained an intermediate 
occupant status relative to the old residents and the newcomers.  
 
Due to our closer relationship, most of them agreed to assist my research during their free 
time. Apart from giving interviews, some accompanied me to the city and district’s human 
resources centres and the others introduced me to their co-workers. At one time or another, 
they gathered with me at their favourite restaurants, stores and bars. Such contacts revealed 
the trades and occurrences of everyday life in these urban villages, which are not easily 
observed or engaged in by an outsider. Initially, I negotiated an affordable four-month 
contract to allow me optimal time to earn the trust of the other occupants and to study the 
migrant enclaves. With the help of my friends and my daily encounters, the data collection 
was completed earlier than expected. Thus, I left my room for them for the remaining two 
months. This was a small gesture of gratitude that I offered to my roommates, and at times 
informants, who kept me up-to-date on new developments in their villages and their lives 
when I travelled back and forth from Hong Kong to Shenzhen to conduct other qualitative 
studies. 
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Semi-structured Interviews  
I was able to conduct in-depth interviews and rich ethnographic accounts because of my 
personal connections (guangxi) at the selected sites. Through kinship and networks, I 
found two informants who are native villagers and who have rented and managed dozens 
of apartments in three of the study sites. Because of their positions and business relations, 
these villagers were able to introduce me to several local bosses, clan chiefs, and migrant 
workers who further extended our reach in the sites. With the presence of a trusted third 
party, the village bosses and clan chiefs were willing to reflect on their views and relations 
with the state and other actors as well as to explain their causes in regulating and 
developing the villages. Some of these individuals provided access to relevant minutes and 
reports and invited me to participate in village functions or clan ceremonies that are 
typically reserved for native villagers. This included access to demolished sites that are 
exclusive to the representatives of the JCs and real-estate developers. Others shared their 
personal stories, including the education standards and career prospects of younger 
generations. These semi-structured accounts addressed our goal of obtaining 
intergenerational and occupational variations while also identifying new dimensions, such 
as the succession crisis among and withdrawing trend in JCs. 
 
A total of 89 semi-structured interviews were conducted within and beyond the sites. These 
included 11 interviews with the heads or deputies of JCs and the chiefs of lineage or clans 
as well as 25 interviews with native villagers who were either landlords of urban village 
apartments or managers of these migrant enclaves. Most of the interviews were conducted 
at the interviewees’ offices, shops or nearby restaurants. I further conducted 35 interviews 
with rural migrant tenants or workers in the urban villages. I excluded those who had 
resided in the city fewer than six months in order to observe the official definition of 
migrants and to ensure that the analysis included only those familiar with the spatial and 
political settings. Some of these migrants worked in the villages, whereas others worked in 
nearby factories or offices. I compared these groups to seek their diverse or recurring 
perceptions of the trades and order in the urban villages. 
 
I searched beyond the sites to conduct an additional 18 interviews with city planning 
officials, company executives, NGO workers, reporters and researchers. In doing so, I 
focused on collaborative evidence of the interactions between intermediate agencies and 
municipal apparatuses, between migrant workers and right-based NGOs, and among these 
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varied groups. These individuals also provided outsiders’ perspectives, enabling us to 
assess the social perception and acceptance of the migrant enclaves. Essentially, the 
classification and features of the major actors are as follows: 
a)   Old or elder migrants refer to those who were born before 1980, most of whom are 
less educated, mainly aimed to make money and then returned to their native place. 
b)   New or young migrants refer to those who were born after 1980, who constituted 
17.6 per cent of the migrants in 2011 and exhibited sharp variances from old ones. 76 
c)   Clan chiefs refer to the heads or deputies of ancestry, lineage, kinship or trade 
networks who perform both communal and business functions. 
d)   Village bosses refer to the chairmen or deputies of JCs; most of them were formerly 
members of VCs and representatives of local congresses or committees.  
e)   Native villagers refer to the native peasants who continued to retain their rural hukou 
after urban sprawl, and most of them became the landlords of urban villages.  
 
As this thesis mainly addresses the source and role of the intermediaries, the interviewees 
were heavily selected from the male elites in the migrant enclaves. Three out of the twenty-
five native villagers that I interviewed were female and only one of them was a landlord. In 
chapter 7, I thus tried to provide a more balanced and aggregated view of the female 
gender in the assessment of the rural migrants’ views on social order in the urban villages. 
Nevertheless, this selection inevitably led to a gender bias and further research is necessary 
to uncover the gender-based tension associated with access to land rights and its dividends 
and with the extent of social dominance in China’s urban society. 
 
Participant Observations and Data Verification  
Language ability proved vital to extending my exposure to these sites and among the 
different migrant groups. I was a migrant myself, having been born in Meizhou – a Hakka-
speaking prefecture in Guangdong province – of Teochew ancestry and migrating to Hong 
Kong at the age of five. Hence, apart from fluent Putonghua, I also speak native Hakka, 
Teochew, and Cantonese, which are the main dialects widely spoken in South China and 
its urban villages. By breaking down language and identity barriers, I was able to engage in 
daily conversations and access further interview opportunities. I became a more “trusted” 
member of the respective clans as my informants were only Cantonese-speaking locals. 
 
                                                
76 National Health and Family Planning Commission, 2013:17. 
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These interactions provided opportunities to connect with different groups of migrant 
households. Dozens of informal conversations were conducted with rural migrants who 
were traders, shopkeepers, security guards or ordinary tenants. I attempted to balance the 
population of the sample with the use of informal contacts, which allowed for a fair degree 
of flexibility and control. The age, occupation and kinship groups that are underrepresented 
in the formal interviews were hitherto supplemented by informal conversations. For 
example, these informal contacts evidenced the youth and educated generation’s increasing 
anxiety, political awareness and negative attitude towards the power relations in the urban 
villages and towards the deprivation of their collective land rights by the state. 
 
These everyday contacts enriched the ethnographic accounts and strengthened their 
validity.77 With these new connections, I revisited some former interviewees on my own to 
verify previous testimonies and to explore new dimensions. These self-developed 
connections also brought me to the fourth urban village in the outskirts districts. Of course, 
the quantity of information is not comparable to that of the first three villages; for example, 
I did not gain access to the clan chiefs or the reports from the JC in the fourth village. 
However, this controlled case confirmed that the observations in the three urban villages 
were generally reliable and comprehensive.  
 
Ethical Issues and the Politics of Denial  
Because of the local situation, written consent was not feasible to obtain, and many 
interviewees considered such consent to be a liability rather than a protection. Nevertheless, 
verbal consent remained essential, and the interviewees were always informed that they 
could withdraw from participation at any time. In this study, I do not reveal the identity of 
any local bosses, grassroots officials or rural migrants, and I did not record their 
conversations or photocopy their minutes, notes or archives during the fieldwork. Without 
their consent and with the potential threat of retaliation from the authoritarian state, I 
honoured and rigorously upheld these research ethnics.  
 
However, most interviewees occasionally allowed and even encouraged me to take photos 
of the space or the buildings, which would most likely implicitly reveal their identities if 
the authorities cared to investigate. I repeatedly raised this concern, and the following were 
                                                
77 Carlson et al., 2010:72. 
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the most common responses that I received: “no worries (meishi)”, “that’s a different 
matter (nashi lingyi mashi)”, or “carry on (jixuba)!” 
 
Their responses prohibited further clarification, and I was relieved to have the opportunity 
to document the field. Their behaviour was not only interesting but also illuminating. I 
refer to this behaviour as the politics of denial, indicating that the interviewees were 
convinced that they would not be liable as long as they were not openly identified. This 
consensual judgement between street-level cadres and village bosses illustrates their 
understanding of the norm or trustworthiness of the authorities, most likely nurtured by 
precedents or informants. In other words, these individuals were quite certain that they 
could avoid breaking hidden rules if they did not explicitly reveal their identity and if they 
shared information only with researchers, whose potential to draw media attention and 
generate “mass incidents” is low. Most importantly, this behaviour pattern implies the 
relative authority and autonomy of the grassroots agencies, which have subsequently 
driven me to examine and deliberate on this structured yet informal realm. 
 
 
ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS 
 
In this introductory chapter, I have outlined how and why an understanding of the 
“development without slums” phenomenon is crucial for students who focus on 
development and change during rapid urban transformation and in the early stages of 
capital accumulation. This focus also provides an opportunity to assess the interplay or 
synergy of despotic power and infrastructural power in general and China’s authoritarian 
resilience and grassroots autonomy in particular. I discuss the theoretical background that 
frames our research questions and objectives and explain why a case study of Shenzhen’s 
urban villages involving document research, interviews, and ethnographic accounts is 
highly appropriate for studying this anomaly or particularity. 
 
Chapter 2 examines the scale and pace of China’s urban contestation from a comparative 
perspective. I first establish the relations between rapid urbanisation and informal 
settlements in developing countries. I then criticise UN-Habitat’s definition of a slum as 
merely an aggregated measure of poverty, which neglects the social, political and time 
dimensions of slums and thus produces inaccurate cross-national data. I argue that the 
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absence of slums in China requires a more rounded analysis to assess the positive and 
normative implications of this setting. An operational definition of a slum involving public 
goods provision, social order maintenance and the durability of informal settlement is 
offered to compare and distinguish the migrant enclaves in China. The profile of each of 
the four urban villages is also examined to provide an overview of their differences from 
slums, their common features and their individual variations. 
 
Chapter 3 documents how remaining socialist institutions constitute China’s rural-urban 
divide, which shapes the pseudo-citizenship and enclosed living space of rural migrants. 
Built upon the hukou and danwei systems, these institutions are the integral parts of a 
targeted surveillance mechanism that aims to regulate rural-urban migration, differentiate 
welfare entitlement, and enforce social control. This chapter explains how the periodic 
adjustments of these systems and the empowerment of its proxies have not altogether 
redressed systematic discrimination against rural migrants but have nonetheless 
consolidated an intermediate realm that regularly provides essential public goods and 
services in the urban villages. This trade-off between eligibility and entitlement is crucial 
to explaining why China enjoys the impetus for economic growth while concurrently 
consolidating the threshold for social stability. 
 
Chapter 4 seeks to explain how China’s dual land system concurrently forms urban villages 
and provides exit points in the countryside for rural migrants. I first examine how the 
ambiguity of land ownership and land use rights has ensured that the local state and 
grassroots regime play a prominent role in the process of land transfer and expropriation. 
These institutional constraints explain why affordable and convenient shelters have been 
preserved for rural migrants during unprecedented migration and urbanisation. I also infer 
how the dual land system accounts for China’s back-and-forth migration pattern and 
ultimately the exit points for rural migrants in the countryside. The formation of patronage 
between different stakeholders is emphasised to illustrate the dynamics of land 
appropriation and the contestations between the income-earning majority and the dividend-
earning minority in the urban villages. 
 
Chapter 5 compares the roles of intermediaries by measuring the degree of public goods 
provision, social order maintenance and social inequality entrenchment in four urban 
villages. I first describe how intermediaries at the grassroots level have thrived along with 
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community governance and service privatisation. I then explain the collaborative 
mechanisms through which crime rates are controlled, public amenities are produced, and 
service contracts are distributed in the migrant enclaves. By commercialising politics, these 
agencies establish a web of clients and reinforce one another’s independence. China’s 
migrant enclaves are thus prevented from collapsing into social decay and political anarchy 
as their third-world counterparts have, but the boundaries of contestation remain 
ambiguous, and the eligibility to negotiate and to be discharged from coercion often 
overrides concerns regarding due process and rightful entitlements. 
 
Chapter 6 analyses the changing pattern of grassroots state-society relations during urban 
renewal. I first identify the emergence of a highly rational planning regime in China’s 
sunbelt, which has been committed to promoting industrial upgrade, modern zoning and 
rational administration. Urban villages are hence considered the “others”: the roots of 
social decay, a waste of land use value and a symbol of vice. Under this institutional and 
discursive approval, various intermediaries have practiced either protective or entrepreneur 
brokerage, despite knowing that urban renewal would have deprived them of their space 
and their value of existence. Although the fragility of urban village reveals the territory of 
informal politics amidst high-modernism, the demolition of migrant enslaves would have 
fuelled slum formation or social instability if the land and hukou systems had not 
respectively offered exit points for and nurtured disenfranchisement of the rural migrants. 
 
Chapter 7 offers a migrant perspective of the social and spatial settings in urban villages 
and examines their relations with state power. Based on 60 semi-structured interviews, I 
first identify the primary mediators and their socioeconomic ties in urban villages. I then 
compare the native villagers and rural migrants’ evolving roles in and attitudes towards 
these enclaves. By giving voice to the subaltern, I contest the notion that attributes rural 
migrants’ economic hardship and political conformity to deep-rooted cultural factors. Yet I 
also find explanations based on kinship ties and generalised reciprocity to be inadequate. 
Instead, I demonstrate how divergence in trade and class, the timing and locality of 
settlement, and the division of outsider and insider serve to nurture collusion, segregation 
and personalised reciprocity among different social actors in urban villages. Although the 
internal power structure and external political access still favour local bosses, native 
villagers and clan chiefs, most dwellers benefit from everyday trades and security in the 
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territorialisation of politics. This explains the variations in their levels of appreciation or 
toleration of the embedded order. 
 
Chapter 8 concludes this work by presenting the findings and assessing their implications. 
First, I illustrate that because of the mediation of intermediate agencies between the state 
and grassroots society, China’s migrant enclaves demonstrate distinct characteristics 
compared with those in other developing countries while also sharing similar patterns of 
social transformation with the formal city. Second, I suggest that the regulated migrant 
enclave is a product of enduring contradictions in China’s early stages of urbanisation and 
capital accumulation, in which the influences of surviving socialist institutions are as 
important as dominant market forces. Third, I illustrate the roles of these intermediaries, 
which are engaging but parochial, resourceful but dependent and exclusive rather than 
inclusive, have illustrated the mosaic interplay rather than purely synergy of despotic 
power and infrastructural power. During the course of privatisation and in the absence of 
electoral politics, I argue that the co-existence of regime resilience and social residence is 
essential to explain the structural stability and localised cohesion despite of periodic 
contestations at the grassroots level. I end this thesis by explaining why China’s 
“development without slums” phenomenon is a particular manifestation of prevalent social 
transformation more than it is a negative case.  
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2. Urban Contestation and Migrant Enclaves in Comparative Perspective  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter surveys China’s urban contestation from a comparative perspective in order to 
explore the meanings and accurate measurement of slums. I first describe how China’s 
post-1978 urbanisation is exceptional both within its own history and across developed and 
developing countries. While this exception clearly demonstrates the proliferation of global 
capitalism since the 1970s that allowed China to urbanise at a much faster pace than early 
and late developers, it also calls for examining the conditions by which Chinese cities have 
been able to accommodate and manage this unprecedented scale of spatial-political 
contestation. By contestation, I refer not only to the dramatic increase in rural migrants in 
cities but also to their associated demands for public goods and services, the related 
challenges for social order and stability and the resulting changes in the intermediate space 
between state and grassroots society.  
 
Common to China and other large developing countries is the emergence of informal 
settlements to accommodate such rapid increases in the urban population.78  However, 
whereas most third world migrant enclaves have become slums, ghettos or squatter 
settlements, China’s migrant enclaves have distinguished themselves in terms of public 
goods provision, social order maintenance and exit opportunities. This structure is 
essentially overlooked in UN-Habitat’s definition of a slum, which is merely an aggregated 
measure of poverty, neglecting the social, political and time dimensions of slums and 
resulting in inaccurate cross-national data for comparison purposes.  
 
By reviewing the literature on slums, I contest the power relations, economic roles and 
cultural footprints of such migrant enclaves. Not merely an indicator of poverty, slums also 
depict a wide-range of inequality, function as a political community, and reinforce their 
inhabitants’ “sense of the place”.79 The absence of slums thus requires a more rounded 
analysis to assess the positive and normative implications of this setting. An operational 
definition of a slum that touches upon the availability of public goods, the degree of 
                                                
78 Cross, 1998; Davis, 2006; Duhau, 2014. 
79 Tuan, 1977. 
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political anarchy, the embeddedness of socioeconomic inequality, and inhabitants’ 
interpretations of this social order is deemed necessary. These objective and inter-
subjective criteria serve to determine whether slums exist in China and to analyse the 
dynamics of conventional and informal politics in migrant enclaves. The profile of each of 
the four urban villages is then examined to illustrate their differences from slums, their 
common features and their individual nuances. 
 
 
CHINA’S UNPRECEDENTED URBANIZATION 
 
China was an underdeveloped country dominated by an agricultural population when the 
People’s Republic was founded. In 1949, China had 132 cities, an urbanisation rate of 10.6 
per cent, and a total of 58 million people living in urban areas. By 2012, these figures had 
risen to 658 cities, an urbanisation rate of 52.6 per cent, and a total of 712 million people 
living in urban areas.80 Between 1980 and 2010, the first three decades of reform and 
opening of the economy (gaige kaifang), China’s urbanisation rate grew from 20 to 50 per 
cent, indicating the addition of approximately 540 million people to its urban population. 
As of 2014, China had a total of 103 cities with a population exceeding 5 million, 
compared with 38 such megacities throughout the rest of the world.81 Only 30 years were 
needed for China to reach 30 per cent growth in its urban population, whereas the same 
increase took 170 years in Britain (1720-1890), 60 years in in the United States (1860-
1920), and 40 years in Japan (1925-65).82 
 
China’s urbanisation is equally unprecedented relative to its contemporary counterparts. 
Table 1 shows that China’s urban annual growth rate reached 4.52 per cent and 5.53 per 
cent in 1980–1995 and 1995–2010, respectively, surpassing the records of all of the 
developing giants and the averages for Southeast Asia and South America (except for 
Indonesia in 1980–1995). Commonly known as the BRICS, these countries are suitable for 
                                                
80 UN-Habitat, 2010:13; National Bureau of Statistics, 2013:1. 
81 Calculated from NBS, 2014b: 13-19, United Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs, 2010. 
82 The exact figures are 19.6 to 49.8 per cent for China, 19.8 to 51.2 per cent for the US and 50.8 per cent for 
the UK (NBS, 2012; USCB, 2012; Mellor, 1983). The official figures for Japan are 21.5 per cent in 1925, 
37.1 per cent in 1950 and 56.1 per cent in 1955. Japan’s urbanisation was first reversed by the war during the 
1940-45 period and then increased by 19 per cent within 5 years, largely because of the reshuffling of county 
and municipal boundaries in 1953. Japan’s Economic Planning Agency recognises that the measure of the 
urbanisation rate is contestable for this period, and the OECD estimates that Japan’s urbanisation rate reached 
50 per cent in the mid-1960s (JEPA, 1995; JSB, 2010; OECD, 2010:18).  
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comparison because they share certain features with China. First, they represent the most 
dynamic newly industrialised countries that have the potential to catch up with the West. 
Second, these countries share an export-oriented development trajectory in becoming the 
chief benefactors, and sometime defenders, of global capitalism. Third, their enormous size 
in terms of population and area ensure that they have a comparable magnitude of urban 
contestation. Based on these criteria, Russia is excluded from the list because it is generally 
not considered a late developer and because its post-Soviet development has primarily 
been driven by the sale of primary resources. South Africa is also excluded, as its economy 
has been dominated by the tertiary sector, and its slums primarily resulted from the policy 
of apartheid rather than from urbanisation.  
 
Table 1 Urbanisation of Large Developing Countries, 1980-2010 
 Urban Population 
(‘000) 
Urbanisation         
(%) 
Urban Annual 
Growth Rate (%) 
Annual Change in 
Urban Population (%) 
 1980 (1980-1995) 
Brazil   79,621 65.5 3.03 1.13 
China 189,886 19.4 4.52 3.12 
India 159,984 23.1 3.07 0.93 
Indonesia  32,401 48.4 4.95 3.00 
Mexico  45,626 66.3 2.63 0.67 
South Africa  14,080 22.1 3.13 0.79 
Southeast Asia  90,822 25.5 4.00 2.00 
South America  162,347 67.4 2.60 0.89 
 2010 (1995-2010) 
Brazil  169,098 86.5 1.99 0.72 
China 635,839 47.0 3.53 2.79 
India 364,459 30.0 2.42 0.81 
Indonesia 102,960 44.3 2.76 1.46 
Mexico  88,272 77.8 1.77 0.39 
South Africa  31,155 61.7 2.16 0.83 
Southeast Asia 246,701 41.8 2.67 1.29 
South America  330,228 84.0 1.62 0.47 
Source: UN-DESA, 2011. World Urbanization Prospects: The 2011 Revision. 
 
China’s urbanisation clearly stands out among this group of those profiting from 
globalisation. The average annual change in China’s urban population was 3.12 per cent 
and 2.79 per cent during the 1980-1995 and 1995-2010 periods, respectively, figures that 
are 1.6 to 6 times the regional average. China’s urban population also reached 634 million 
in 2010, which exceeded the combined urban populations of Brazil, India, Indonesia and 
Mexico in that year. These data suggest that China’s urban transformation has been rapid 
and massive, both in absolute terms and according to international standards. 
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Hence, the scale and pace of China’s post-socialist urban transformation are exceptional 
both within its own history and across the world.83 This exceptional development is vital 
because it clearly demonstrates the proliferation of global capitalism since the 1970s, 
which allowed China urbanise at a much faster pace than the early developers in the West, 
Latin America, and Southeast Asia. This situation also calls for examining the conditions 
by which Chinese cities were able to accommodate and manage this unprecedented scale 
of spatial contention. Certainly, urbanisation is not only a geographical phenomenon 
involving the movement of people and increased productivity but also a series of socio-
political contestations such as demands for public goods, challenges to social stability and 
the production of new actors such as rural migrants and an urban middle class.  
 
In fact, China’s rapid industrialisation and urbanisation prompted a massive demand for 
labour, widening the rural-urban income disparity and exacerbating contestation for urban 
space and dwelling. Millions of rural migrants who are granted geographic mobility for 
travel and work but are denied socioeconomic entitlements, such as danwei compounds 
and subsidised housing in host cities, are forced to seek accommodations on their own. 
Between 1978 and 1999, net migration and natural growth respectively constituted 74.8 
and 25.2 per cent of the total increase in urban population.84 By 2014, the total number of 
rural migrants or floating populating had reached 274 million, of which about 168 million 
were working in the urban centres in other provinces.85 In 2013, the provinces or direct 
municipalities of Guangdong, Shanghai, Beijing, Zhejiang, and Jiangsu respectively 
constituted 29.45, 22.13, 12.20, 10.09 and 8.28 per cent of the inter-provincial rural 
migrants.86 The Guangdong province, where Shenzhen is located, has thus absorbed nearly 
one-third of the total inter-provincial migrants who stayed longer in, and demanded more 
goods and services from, the host cities.  
 
This severe urban contestation has created migrant enclaves known as urban villages 
within booming Chinese cities. Ma and Xiang first identify peasant enclaves as a “new 
urban mosaic that did not exist in Maoist China” and connect their formation with the 
                                                
83 The rate of urbanization of all developing giants, including the BRI(C)S, has fallen behind that of China. 
The principal counterexample to China’s exceptional situation is the urbanisation of South Korea, which 
required approximately 27 years to reach the 50 per cent benchmark from a base of 20 per cent (UN-DESA, 
2010). 
84 Zhang and Song, 2003:388. 
85 China Labour Bulletin, 2015. 
86 National Health and Family Planning Commission, 2014:177. 
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resurgence of kinship.87 Scholarly attention has since been diverted to focus on the nature 
and characteristics of such migrant enclaves. Most of this literature recognises the 
functions of urban villages in enabling rural migrants to station, work, and survive in cities 
during a course of rapid urbanisation and internal migration.88 However, urban and public 
policy studies that have selected urban villages as a subject of enquiry have also explored 
how informal settlements encounter an urban planning regime. Notwithstanding the critical 
perspectives offered by this body of literature, these studies largely treat urban villages as 
externalities that result from unclearly defined property rights, ineffective land use or 
spatial irregularity. Urban villages have occasionally been considered “slum-like” without 
concrete reasons cited for this comparison.89 Implicit in this argument is that urban villages 
are a “new problem” (xinwenti) in need of a solution. This perspective aligns with state 
policy that aims to eventually demolish urban villages.90  
 
Admittedly, a number of sociological and anthropological studies have touched upon urban 
villages. However, urban villages are largely treated as an indicator rather than as a subject 
of their own. Several prominent studies have also focused on relatively homogeneous 
villages (such as Zheijang Village in Beijing or Hunan Village in Shanghai) rather than on 
the heterogeneous enclaves that we aimed to study. Furthermore, less featured in this body 
of literature is a comparative analysis of slums and China’s urban villages, as well as the 
power relations and economic roles of such migrant enclaves in the course of new 
governance initiatives and further economic liberalization.91 
 
 
DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTIONS OF SLUMS  
 
Because of diverse understandings of urban space, the term “slum” is perceived in different 
ways. Central to this divergence are the political order, economic equality and social 
functions of slums and the question of how to categorise and manage them. The Chicago 
School of Sociology pioneered the study of slum by revealing its disorder and irregularity, 
of which high modernist architects concur and consider it to be a social problem but also a 
                                                
87 Ma and Xing, 1998:546. 
88 Davis, 1995; Friedmann, 2005:70-74; Hsing, 2010:122-132; Song et al. 2008. 
89 Tian, 2008:290; Miller, 2012:25. 
90 Davis, 2000; Wu et al., 2007; Lin, 2009; Zhang, 2011. 
91 Zhang, 2001; Xiang, 2005; Logan, 2008. 
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planning opportunity. In light of the spread of neoliberalism, Marxist political economists 
touch upon this increasingly global phenomenon and emphasises the entrenched inequality 
of slums. Based on detailed ethnographic and longitudinal studies, humanitarian socialists 
and critical geographers, while not completely against the above findings, accuse these 
framings of inventing witchcraft and insist on the ordinariness, vivacity and functions of 
these enclaves. These perspectives respectively interpret a slum as a hotbed of social 
disorder and hence a target for elimination, a symbol of entrenched inequality and hence an 
arena for resistance, or a community of vibrant interactions and hence a space to be 
preserved. 
 
Hotbed of Social Disorder 
Although Victor Hugo and Fredrick Engels had discovered slum as a phenomenon, the 
systematic study of it pioneered at the city of Chicago, where the sociologists were seeking 
answers on the social impacts of rapid urbanization and increase in social mobility. While 
they recognise the dynamics of economic growth associated with migration, they also 
conclude that urbanization and industrialization caused structural social changes, 
contributing to the disintegration of preexisting norm and the weakening of social control 
in the cities.92 Slum is thus considered as a transitional zone essential to serve the city 
centre and yet far from being a pleasant and stable community. Slums are perceived as the 
others where violent crimes, low wages, poor working conditions and vice collide with 
each other.   
 
Although there are attempts to normalise the social order in the subaltern, the established 
dichotomy between disordered/transitional migrant enclaves and congruous/commuter 
middle-class suburbs continues to inform urban planning and influence public opinions.93 
This concurs with high modernism that stresses neutrality in the administrative ordering of 
spatial forms and mastery of the environment to aid in capital accumulation. According to 
renowned modernist planner Le Corbusier, a city planner’s design must be implemented 
and “freed from the pedestrian pressures and special interests”.94 Central to this abstract or 
aerial view is the use of functional zoning and megaprojects to promote the desired urban 
space and aesthetic values that shape urban dwellers’ relationships with one another, with 
                                                
92 Park and Burgess, 1984:54-56, 108-11; Thrasher, 2013:3-44; Zorbaugh, 1983:9-16. 
93 Bairoch, 1988; White, 1993; Hall, 2002. 
94 Cited in Hall, 2002: 225. 
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the state and with nature. Once the urban space is carved into multiple single-purpose 
zones, it becomes cost effective and easy to govern. This rationality principle has gradually 
reduced the aim of urban planning to the realisation of the exchange value of land in the 
market95. The purpose of rational zoning is to “[replace] a city of history with a city of 
science” in which “social order is defined by architectural order”.96  
 
Although ideal modernist projects have rarely been conceptualised, Jane Jacobs reminds 
that the ethos of modernism remains illuminating by promising a utopian form of 
modernity that can be standardised and applied by late developers.97 New nations and 
developmental regimes are particularly vulnerable to such high levels of modernity, which 
visualise national progress and materialise the “Rest’s” enduring dream of catching up with 
the West.98 Naturally, the audience for a safe and ordered space is not only domestic but 
also international. International regimes, national governments, and city planners are 
united in regarding slums as the externalities of development or as indicators of 
backwardness. Any policies or measures that could retard the formation of slums or 
eliminate them are welcome. 
 
In China, the real estate boom and investment-driven growth since the 2000s have 
produced excessive demand for housing and shopping centres, thereby spreading 
cosmopolitan aesthetics and intensifying the competition for land.99 Housing, which was 
previously a form of social security, has increasingly become a market commodity 
provided by private and profit-driven enterprises. Transformed into a “concrete dragon”, 
the best architects and architectural firms in the world have participated and made fortunes 
in China’s megaprojects and urban development.100 Individual autonomy has increased, 
and modern aesthetics have evolved and come to define China’s cosmopolitan urban 
space.101 Two questions arise: How has the competition for land in China’s prime cities 
managed to shelter rural migrants despite the increasing privatisation of land use rights and 
the commercialisation of housing? To what extent have migrant enclaves been preserved or 
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integrated into the formal city, both functionally and politically, under rational zoning? 
 
Symbol of Entrenched Inequality 
Although Marxist political economy approach does not consider slums to be desirable, it 
does consider them to be provocative in terms of class consciousness and collective 
mobilisation. Slums are regarded as a visual symbol of widespread inequality and spatial 
anarchy originated and intensified by global capitalism. Whereas cheap and abundant 
labour is required for an export-oriented economy and capital accumulation, redistribution 
efforts targeting migrants are currently lacking in the rescaling of government.102 Cities in 
the Global South have thus magnified the politics of gentrification, with squatters, dirty 
streets, beggars, and other victims of capital accumulation increasingly segregated or 
marginalised. 103  Davis concurs that that the downsizing of the public sector and the 
privatisation of urban space have entrenched migrants and the poor in shantytowns and 
squatter settlements, with most such inhabitants suffering from poverty, lacking education 
and health services, and being trapped at the periphery. 104 
 
The prevalence of grievance is articulated as an opportunity to redress the social injustice 
generated by global capitalism. Smith has long regarded the widespread process of 
gentrification as advancing a new urban frontier.105 Mitchell and Harvey also link the 
enunciation of progressive politics to the occupation of public space.106 Liberalisation has 
spread urban poverty and resulted in shabby enclaves, and corporatist states are 
simultaneously required to provide an orderly and hygienic landscape to attract capital 
investment. Open resistance among the marginalised in gentrifying neighbourhoods thus 
reveals this contradiction and draws attention to the pattern of inequality. Organised along 
the theme of deprivation and resistance, urban space is treated as a social frontier in which 
people contest injustice and exercise their rights as citizens. Slums are viewed as both a 
problem and an opportunity whereby the grievances of the poor and migrants are 
visualised and organised resistance on their behalf is possible. 
 
Undoubtedly challenged by neoliberal forces, China is increasingly adapting to, if not 
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favouring, severe decentralisation and privatisation measures. In the mid-1990s, central 
administrative and fiscal competencies were devolved to local authorities, which have been 
committed to attracting cheap labour and developing an export-oriented economy.107 By 
the early 2000s, state-owned enterprises also underwent large-scale privatisations, the 
danwei system disintegrated, and many social services were contracted to private 
companies. The size of China’s public sector decreased from 72 to 28 per cent of GDP 
between 1978 and 2008.108 Other socialist institutions, such as the hukou system, have 
continued to deprive rural migrants of the right to receive socioeconomic entitlements in 
the cities. It thus becomes imperative to measure the degree of public goods and club 
goods provision to rural migrants and to assess in the ways in which these goods have 
become a form of self-help. This limited occurrence of organised resistance in urban 
villages also raises concerns regarding whether the communist regime has retreated from 
economic production while maintaining its social control or whether other mechanisms 
have become involved.  
 
Vehicle of Dynamic Communities 
A specific type of humanitarian socialism tends to criticise the above perspectives for 
inventing the problem of slums and presenting a top-down, holistic approach to the issue. 
These observers urge a research agenda that would seriously consider migrants’ 
perceptions of this social-spatial setting and the dynamics of their inhabitancy. Fishers, 
McCann and Auyero argue that slums or shantytowns are more durable, multifaceted and 
integrated into Latin American societies than the modernisation or Marxist political 
economy theories have allowed.109 Through her ethnographic accounts of slums in four 
continents, Neuwirth concurs that slums, although irregular and substandard, are lively and 
not as threatening or exploitative as commonly assumed.110 Although Calderia portrays 
Sao Paulo as a “city of walls” in which the rich have repeatedly barricaded themselves 
from the poor, this segregation is argued to be primarily caused by a reinforced fear of 
shantytowns or barrios rather than being a function of class and wealth.111 In detailed 
ethnographic studies of Rio de Janeiro’s squatters or favela, Perlman argues that these 
                                                
107 Wang, 1997; Zhang, 1999. 
108 Huang, 2008:21; National Bureau of Statistics, 2010a. 
109 Fishers et al., 2014. 
110 Neuwirth 2006. 
111 Calderia 2000. 
50 
 
communities are not marginal but fully embedded into the urban economy.112  Finally, 
Matthews, in his study of a ghetto at the heart of Hong Kong, reveals how its motley group 
of inhabitants operate businesses and pursuit profit, exchange goods and ideas, and live a 
vibrant life under low-end globalisation in contrast to the seedy and dangerous images 
reinforced by the elite.113  
 
These anthropological accounts thus reject the idea that economic structure alone 
determines spatial relations. Rather, these observers emphasise the social interactions 
encompassed in the development of vibrant and durable enclaves. Explicit in their 
argument is that slums are and should be perceived as ordinary communities, neither 
representing an externality to be eliminated nor serving as a space to mobilise resistance. 
The everyday interactions of small-time actors have adapted to or profited from global 
capitalism. This perspective provides a different lens to address and interpret the absence 
of the slum phenomenon in China. This view demands a bottom-up study of whether rural 
migrants approve of the public goods allocation mechanism and accept the socio-political 
settings that prevail in urban villages.  
 
This approach also involves questioning why migrant enclaves can be considered ordinary 
and how these spatial forms and economic centres can exploit or empower inhabitants. 
Central to these enquiries is a relational concept of power along with its grassroots focus 
that has gradually emerged in the debate concerning the intermediate realm that exists 
between state, market and non-state actors in urban China, including the works of Li 
Zhang, Biao Xiang, David Bray and Benjamin Read. However, these authors address either 
the highly homogenous migrant enclaves or danwei in North China, which have long and 
distinguished socialist origins and trajectories, or the RC, which is more formal in terms of 
hierarchy and organised in structure.114 But in South China, most of the urban villages are 
heterogeneous, and migrants of different clans or lineages compete with one another for 
power and resources. Some of them even occupy different corners or streets in each village, 
and for historical and institutional reasons, they have different levels of political access.  
 
Trajectories and the Loci 
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Notwithstanding the value of the first two theoretical traditions, I contend that they are 
slightly deterministic in logic and exogenous in focus. These traditions tend to assume a 
linear path for urban futures among late developers, in which the state and the people are 
viewed as collective entities respectively promoting or resisting those futures. Because 
most studies in this third tradition were developed in Latin America and Africa, their 
idiosyncratic context often assumes clientelism as reciprocal or political anarchy as 
normal. However, these assumptions are rather unwarranted in China, which has 
experienced communist and social revolutions followed by a series of market reforms. In 
this context, the influences of socialist institutions and collective agencies are as important 
as modernist principles or neoliberal forces.  
 
By the same token, although my thesis very much adopts the theoretical lens of the third 
tradition, I try to make some distinctions. First, I prefer to use the term “locality” instead of 
“community”. This is because the structural underpins of the word community often 
assume cohesion or interconnectedness in the specific enclaves as given, which prohibit 
the study of the distinct loci of interactions and a heuristic understanding of the flexible, 
adaptive and varied patterned of grassroots politics. Second, I avoid treating migrants as a 
unified entity. This is because this implicitly assumes the presence of particular culture 
prevailing among particular social grouping. Accordingly, some deeply rooted peasants’ 
psyche, habits and values such as “eating bitterness”, “culture of poverty” and “endless 
patience” are attributed as the obstacles to their own socioeconomic progress or the reasons 
that some many injustice are tolerated from one generation to another.115  
 
Although these explanations are not entirely inaccurate or purely mythic, they are either 
incomplete or overly generalised. The cultural thesis cannot articulate the agency’s 
informed calculations, and it does not pay sufficient attention to the variation in resistance 
and claims between different localities. Why, despite sharing a similar political culture, did 
peasants in the native country and workers in factory dormitories become more contentious 
than migrants in urban villages? Similarly, the structural thesis tends to underplay the 
influence of socio-political institutions along with the agency’s adaptations. Migrant 
enclaves are regarded as all but self-limiting, self-reproducing or static entities, without 
acknowledging their connections to the formal city and their external relations with the 
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local government as well as the political consequences. 
 
 
AN OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF SLUMS 
 
The United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat), an international 
organisation devoted to promoting sustainable human settlements for all, has provided a 
working definition of slums. This effort has enabled international estimations and cross-
country comparisons. Based on this definition, the slum population of the developing 
world is estimated to have increased from 776.7 million in 2000 to 827.6 million in 
2010.116 Hence, in East Asia, including China, 36.5 per cent of the urban population was 
classified as living in slum households in that year, and this figure was identical to the 
average in the developing world. A slum household is defined as one lacking one or more 
of the following conditions:117 
i.   access to improved water,  
ii.   access to improved sanitation facilities,  
iii.   sufficient living area,  
iv.   the structural quality and durability of dwellings, and 
v.   the security of tenure. 
These five criteria are clearly indices of access to essential goods and services or living 
standards, and all of them are commonly exhibited in developing countries as a result of 
their low and unstable income, lack of public infrastructure, and inefficient management, 
among other causes. Hence, UN-Habitat’s definition of a slum is nearly identical to 
measurements of poverty, thus failing to recognise the communal interdependency, 
political anarchy, and durability shared by such urban enclaves. 
 
Second, China’s migrant enclaves are relatively invisible and small in scale. A recent 
report by UN-Habitat praises the achievements of urban planning in China118 , where 
migrant enclaves are minute and sporadic urban villages that are always served, albeit 
primitively, by public amenities such as pathways, electricity, water supply, schools, and 
clinics.119 Housing in urban villages is primarily built with durable building materials with 
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foundations and roofing and rented to migrants by the indigenous villagers who own the 
land.120 Third, the various forms of migrant settlements in China reveal the limitations of 
these cross-national data. Instead of building slums or squats, an increasing number of 
Chinese migrants are living in factory dormitories, public housing or associational 
compounds.121 This variety of settlements largely satisfies criteria (i), (ii) and (v) but often 
does not meet (iii) and (iv). The Governing Council of UN-Habitat states as follows: 
When driving by a slum, you will most probably be repulsed, but perhaps 
subconsciously, you are tempted to blame what you see on those who actually live 
there. Everyone, especially those who live there, wishes slums would just go away 
(author’s emphasis).122 
This statement implies that slums are the host and source of urban poverty and hence 
should be eliminated. The international agency has since standardised the definition of a 
slum household and incorporated an agenda for the demolition of slums into the United 
Nations Millennium Development Goals, which sought to improve to the lives of at least 
100 million slum dwellers by 2020 and to reduce the number without sustainable access to 
safe and drinking water by half.123  However, as the literature review suggests, slums 
should not be simplified into an indicator of poverty and underdevelopment; they also 
serve to reveal political anarchy, social inequality and their inhabitants’ sense of place. The 
absence of slums thus requires a more rounded analysis to assess its positive and normative 
implications. Our operational definition of slums hence comprises the following four 
criteria:  
i.   A source of urban poverty by which the inhabitants’ welfare and public goods 
provision are perpetually marginalised; 
ii.   A space of political anarchy in which the coercive force of the state is substituted 
by gangs or bosses and sabotaged to periodic instability; 
iii.   An enclave of entrenched inequality in which the inhabitants are either 
disenfranchised from the rights to voice or deprived of the capacity to exit; 
iv.   A dynamic and evolving structure such that the inhabitants’ perception of the 
enclave and attachment to in it matter. 
 
Specifically, we use several indicators to measure the form, nature, embeddedness, and 
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acceptance of China’s migrant enclaves. First, to assess whether an urban village is a 
source of urban poverty, I identify the average income and source of income of the 
inhabitants, including native villagers and rural migrants. Their normal and disposable 
incomes are then contrasted with those of urban dwellers possessing urban hukou and 
living in commercial buildings. Although the general pattern is that inhabitants of urban 
villages earn less than individuals living in commercial properties, there are substantial 
nuances among urban villages and their social groups. Second, to measure the extent of 
social order, I compare the crime rates of urban villages with those of other gated 
communities and the city average and analyse whether such statistics are reliable and their 
differences significant. The actors and mechanisms accounting for the relative governance 
with the enclaves are also examined. Although the state does not directly rule the migrant 
enclaves, it relies on some intermediaries to reinforce the boundaries of authority and to 
maintain social order in these enclaves. Third, to measure the degree of entrenched 
inequality, I examine the voice and exit strategies employed by rural migrants within 
different contexts. The mechanisms that they adopt to negotiate with the state during 
everyday politics and the concerns that lead them to leave for more removed areas or 
return to the countryside during urban renewal are contrasted. Finally, I rely on in-depth 
interviews and participant observations to trace how the rural migrants explain and 
interpret their residence in and relations with informal settlements. I find that territorial 
politics has combined with clan and business ties to justify most inhabitants’ perceptions 
that they are not living in a slum and will not do so. 
 
Structural Differences among Migrant Enclaves 
Apart from analysing these objective and subjective criteria, I find that certain structural 
settings have differentiated the migrant enclaves in China from its third world counterparts 
from the very beginning. First, slums and urban villages function differently amidst 
urbanisation. Whereas Latin American and African slums are a catalyst for urban 
expansion, the urban villages in China are the results of urban expansion. Because the 
urban villages and slums respectively serve as centrifugal and centripetal forces during 
urbanisation, the former are sporadically located and small in scale, whereas the latter are 
rather concentrated and extensive. Urban villages in South China typically house 40,000 to 
80, 000 inhabitants, whereas favelas in Rio de Janeiro, barrios in Mexico City, 
shantytowns in Mumbai and squatter settlements in Mali house as many as half million 
inhabitants. Size is important because it structures the demand for public goods and the 
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efficacy of social order. This structural difference makes urban villages relatively easier to 
govern than their third world counterparts. Nevertheless, the movement of millions of 
migrants into Chinese cities presents severe challenges for the urban redistribution system 
and public order. 
 
Land ownership is the main factor that differentiates the trajectory of contestation between 
third world slums and China’s urban villages. In contrast to migrants in slums, who have 
less ground for making claims to illegally constructed informal settlements and illegally 
occupied urban land, native villagers in China’s urban villages possess exclusive land 
rights to construct their apartments. Likewise, the migrant residents in such urban villages 
usually retain land rights back to their rural villages in the native place. Hence, although 
both types are called migrant enclaves, the ownership and demographic structures of urban 
villages are much more complex. This invites us to describe their unique or distinguished 
characteristics and to explore how such informal settlements are governed. 
 
The dynamics of the political system also have considerable effects. Various studies of 
slums in Latin America and South Asia reveal that these slums often function as ballot 
boxes in which migrants exchange votes for goods and services from local politicians or 
parliament members.124 Accordingly, redevelopment projects or infrastructural upgrades 
are either deterred or installed in these migrant enclaves. Voters in migrant enclaves thus 
function as an integral part of patron-client networks in these electoral or liberal 
democracies. Regardless of their status in the city, rural migrants make use of their 
citizenship to negotiate access to public goods and services. This draws us to explore the 
mechanisms for grassroots negotiation and rightful resistance in China’s authoritarian 
context and its urban-rural divide. 
 
 
CHINA’S MIGRANT ENCLAVES  
 
Urban villages have long been considered an alien space by city authorities and local 
citizens. When I visited cadres and officials, friends and relatives, and ordinary citizens 
during my fieldwork in Shezhen, authorities and local citizens often questioned the value 
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of studying the dark side of the sunbelt city. Even the local bosses, native villagers and 
rural migrants, who are the insiders, were also surprised that I was interested in exploring 
their everyday lives and understanding their problems and desires. The following are some 
typical comments that I encountered during my repeated visits. 
Prostitutes, gambling and drugs are clustered in many urban villages; they are our 
security threats [zhian yinhuan]. But the situation is improving, and getting rid of them 
is a just matter of time; they [urban villages] have no future (City planning official in 
charge of a district redevelopment project).125 
We only go to the urban village next to our complex to repair our vehicles; it looks 
chaotic [luan] and full of bad persons [huai fenzi]. We never allow our child to enter 
or pass through these areas. People might disappear or get hurt; they are dangerous 
(Urban couples living in modern high-rises).126 
My family got more than 40 apartments in Shi village. But after several robberies 
during site inspections, we decided to subcontract the renting business to other 
middlemen. An estate agent and clan broker would serve as middlemen to make the 
deal and collect the rent. Safety takes priority [anquan zhishang] (Native villager 
living in a suburban villa).127 
The migrants are so different; they cannot and will never be part of us. They are poor, 
unhygienic, deceptive, and always come and go. Unlike us, they spend most of their 
money and neglect their clan. That’s why we need to monitor them while maintaining 
a distance [baochi juli]. This is the boundary (Deputy of a RC holding government 
appointments).128 
Clearly, the fear of urban villages and the discrimination against the inhabitants of such 
informal settlements have come not only from outsiders but also from insiders. This 
solidified image is a combination of perception and reality. Three levels of explanation can 
provide insight as to why so many local citizens, including those who come from a 
different class and habitus, who supposedly govern the enclave and who profit from the 
property rentals in it, are unanimously united against its presence and connotation. First, 
these citizens are not simply in fear of the space; more precisely, they resent the rural 
migrants living in the space. Except during the early reform period in the 1980s, when 
factory girls (da gongmei) occupied a respected profession, the state and urban society 
have not regarded migrant workers as equals. 129  Instead, rural migrants, albeit an essential 
means of production for the export-oriented economy, are often portrayed as subordinate 
non-citizens or as threats to social stability. Contrary to this perception, many residents of 
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urban villages are not the typical urban poor: they are productive citizens and migrants 
who hold jobs or operate businesses.130 This reality reflects the deep rural-urban divide in 
China and satisfies criterion 1 concerning the spread of urban poverty in urban villages. 
 
Second, more precisely, the fear is embedded in the differentiation of the owners and 
brokers of global capitalism from its toilers, illustrating the division between classes and 
class relations. In fact, the chaotic images or descriptions of urban villages as havens for 
illicit activities are neither accurate nor comprehensive. As demonstrated in chapter 4, the 
crime rates of the urban villages in Guangzhou and Shenzhen were comparable to the rest 
of these metropolises; some wealthy urban villages that could afford to install closed-
circuit television systems (CCTV) actually had lower crime rates relative to those of 
modern gated communities. Furthermore, the majority of urban villages have not fallen 
under the control of gangs or entered into anarchy in the midst of surveillance from police 
and private security guards. By portraying urban villages as a “scar”, “ill” or “cancer” 
afflicting the city, official media and city authorities have stigmatised their residents as 
burglars, drug addicts or even murderers.131 The everyday control and eventual demolition 
of urban villages are therefore easily justified. In other words, this scenario reflects 
criterion 4, the infiltration of state power into urban villages.  
 
Third, one must also recognise, however, that intra-group discrimination and social 
emulation are class factors as much as judgements of taste. Because of the difference in 
social and cultural capital, middle-class parents would not allow their children to enter 
urban villages, fearing that they would acquire the habits or be attracted by the goods of 
the lower class.132 By the same token, although native villagers originated from urban 
villages and have continued to make a living by renting inexpensive urban village 
apartments, they have made increasingly conscious attempts to disassociate themselves 
from their rural and hence inferior origins. This tendency draws our attention to criterion 3 
regarding how the perception of the self among different social groups appropriates the 
image of and power within urban villages.  
 
Nevertheless, fear is not merely a matter of construction; instead, it reflects certain facts. 
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An urban village is clearly an enclave or an island that is distinguished from its 
surrounding landscape. The enclave is in Shenzhen, supporting the city’s export-oriented 
economy and resembling certain features of a slum. However, it is not of Shenzhen in the 
sense that it reflects a relic of an uneasy past or a form of unsustainable economic model 
from which the vanguard city seeks to be detached. Moreover, an urban village is not 
compatible with the grand history and relatively consensual image of the sunbelt city. It is 
this form of softened alienation rather than the hard evidence of crime and vice that 
characterises and distinguishes urban villages from the rest of the city and from slums in 
the developing world. From this perspective, one must consider criterion 4 regarding 
whether residents or tenants are disenfranchised from the rights to voice or deprived of the 
capacity to exit. Although these migrants might be denied citizenship and exploited by 
global capitalism, the provision of shelter and the necessity to maintain stability within it 
do provide hope to the most disadvantaged. This interplay reveals the priority of migrants 
and the mechanisms of local governance in China. 
 
However, the everyday behaviours of outsiders suggest that urban villages are not as 
dangerous as perceived. On the contrary, these enclaves are socially and politically 
integrated into the landscape of the modern city. When asked how frequently they travel in 
and traverse the urban villages, the respondents suddenly realise that they are connected to 
these enclaves or “islands” more often than they had imagined. For instance, Shi Village is 
at the heart of Futian district, Shenzhen’s administrative and commercial centre. Bypassing 
it would also mean bypassing the traffic arteries and multiplying travel time, a sacrifice 
that very few citizens are willing to make. Likewise, Gong Village is an integral part of a 
chain of global capitalism where labourers, factories and outlets are adjacent to one another. 
Certain goods and services are easily available and are supplied in large amounts in urban 
villages, including sex workers, cheap apartments, indigenous foods (tute chan) and knock-
off goods (shanzhai huo). In other words, the divergence between words and actions 
invites us to explore the special features of China’s migrant enclaves and the power 
relations within them. China’s urban villages might resemble the features of slums in the 
developing world in certain ways, but they are largely a different form of slum.  
 
 
PLACE, PEOPLE, TRADE AND ORDER 
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How special are China’s urban villages? What aligns and distinguishes the four urban 
villages from one another? I attempt to answer these questions by comparing the basic 
features or the places, people, trade and social order in these migrant enclaves. Following 
the economic reforms, coastal cities such as Guangzhou and Shenzhen have expanded, 
absorbing once rural areas into their urban perimeters. Subjected to China’s dual-land 
system, the urban villages were able to provide affordable shelters in the city centres. 
Hence, for most of the post-reform era, migrant workers constituted the majority of 
residents in these four urban villages. In addition, because of these rural origins, each of 
the four urban villages was informally governed and served by a VC and then privatised 
into a JC in two waves in 1992 and 2005. Renting apartments, most of which were built 
illegally and expanded rapidly, is a major source of income for native villagers, but the 
trade within urban villages varies significantly. This feature ultimately differentiates the 
migrants with respect to class and identity.133       
 
Nong Village is famous for the production of both authentic and fake paintings and for its 
artistic atmosphere. A Hong Kong merchant brought the oil painting industry to this 
remote village in the northwest Longguan District of the city in 1989. The fake paintings 
industry was initially not a great success. Hence, native villagers began to leave while rural 
migrants arrived to obtain inexpensive apartments. By the late 1990s, the village gradually 
established itself as a sociocultural phenomenon through reports in local and national 
media. More design factories and art production companies chose to establish their 
businesses there to benefit from the economy of scale and the branding effect, recruiting 
numerous artists and artisans. Depending on one’s bargaining talent, several hundreds to 
thousands of yuan can be spent on a “masterpiece” from Da Vinci, van Gogh and Picasso 
or famous posters from the period of the Cultural Revolution. Apart from this unique trade, 
the village further distinguished itself by the following structures. First, it is one of the few 
urban villages whose main businesses have not been monopolised by the native villagers, 
as most of them had already transferred their assets in the villages to shares of private firms 
or commodities through various creative measures or illegal means. Second, the JC has 
continued to regulate the social order and public goods provision in the enclave but its 
main duties have been centred on property management and art deals.  
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Occupying the fertile plain of River Shenzhen, Shi Village has an 800-year history that 
dates to the Sung Dynasty. The village bosses whom I interviewed unanimously insisted 
that their ancestors were the early and native settlers of the city, in contrast to the 
fisherman origins portrayed in the official discourse. They insisted that the official 
discourse, which suggests that Shenzhen has transformed from a tiny fishing village into a 
modern metropolis, is merely a reproduction of Hong Kong’s success story. Of course, the 
fact that Deng Xaioping happened to visit a fishing village during his famous Southern 
Tour in 1992, which restarted market reforms after the Tiananmen Incident, was another 
contingent factor. Today, the village is one of the few villages that remain untouched in 
Futain District in the Central Business District (CBD). Given its prime location and the 
demand for accessible housing, Shi Village has an extremely high density. However, in 
addition to the rental business, the village is also famous for its clothing stores, electronics 
markets and groceries; international and national brands such as Walmart, Nike, Zheng 
Kungfu and Li-Ning have also opened branches in the village. A variety of public and 
cultural facilities and a private security team have also been installed. Not only did these 
goods and services make the community a model that local authorities wished to claim 
credit for, but the village also attracted many white-collar workers to rent apartments, 
reside and make a living within it. 
 
Gong Village lies adjacent to National Highway 107, which connects the cities of 
Shenzhen and Dongguan, and is home to more than 180 small and medium-sized 
manufacturing enterprises. Beginning in the late 1980s, investors from Hong Kong, 
Taiwan and overseas were invited to establish businesses. The native villagers, most of 
whom belong to the Teochew people enjoying privileged business networks in South 
China, had practised outward processing trades that initially included including textiles and 
garments but have recently diversified into electronics, plastics and leathers. To reduce 
transportation costs and maintain competitiveness, the JC and RC initiated a project to 
build a modern on-ramp to connect the village to the National Highway exit. Thus, despite 
being located in the outskirts of Bao’an District, as many as 50,000 migrants now work 
and reside in the village. The villages are further divided into production, residential and 
recreational zones, resembling the spatial settings of the danwei system or the Foxconn 
model, albeit with certain nuances.134 Although Gong Village has been extremely open to 
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foreign investments and has allowed varying degrees of privatisation, it is also probably 
one of the most centralised urban villages in terms of householders’ share distribution and 
social order regulation. Not only is its density of surveillance cameras comparable to the 
wealthy Shi Village, but most decision-making authority has also been concentrated in the 
hands of a village boss who is the chairman of the JC, the director of the RC and the 
representative of the Guangdong People’s Congress.  
 
Shang Village, located adjacent to the border with Hong Kong, was notorious for its 
collective enterprise, its prostitution, its concubines (er nai) and, most recently, its modern 
high-rises. Because of its prime location and advantaged position in the flow of 
information, the village bosses and villagers have been rather adaptive to changing 
economic and political signals. The lineage, with nearly all native villagers belonging to 
the Huang family, has also preserved a source of communal authority. In 1986, this village 
was the one of first to start a JC and other joint-enterprises, selling garments and tyres to 
merchants in Hong Kong. When the collectives were no longer competitive in the early 
1990s, the factories were rapidly demolished and redeveloped into residential apartments 
and retail shops. Since then, it has become a renowned entertainment zone with readily 
available prostitution, drugs and alcohol. Restaurants, karaoke, and clinics were also 
established to provide multiple services. In response to the government’s strike-hard (yan 
da) operations against illegal activities in 1998 and 2006, these businesses and their 
workers moved to Dongguan or the outskirts districts. During the same period, Shang 
Village became the residence of concubines, some of whom were formerly sex workers. 
Their patrons were often Hong Kong merchants and workers who provided financial 
support in exchange for companionship. Once Hong Kong dwellers no longer had 
sufficient resources or the desire to support an extra family, the story of the concubine 
village also disappeared. At present, large-scale urban redevelopment has demolished 
nearly two-thirds of the urban village. Migrant workers were forced to evacuate, native 
villagers reduced their rates of return, and middle-class citizens with urban hukou have 
occupied the newly built modern high-rises. Such moves have led to an ample change in 
the demographics and socio-political landscapes of the village, and such change might well 
be the final stage of the village’s transformative trajectory.   
 
Table 2 contrasts the basic features of the four urban villages. First, the populations of the 
four urban villages range from 12,000 to 80,000 within a congested living space ranging 
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from 4.47 m2 to 8.21 m2 per person, which is much smaller than the averages of 8-15 m2 in 
Shenzhen. High residential density is often the source of crime, vice and safety hazards. 
However, size is often a proxy for wealth, which can generate incentives to maintain 
internal order and the ability to bargain for external funding. Whereas the degree of pure 
public goods varies and some club goods are rather selective, basic infrastructures and 
public security are nonetheless available across the four urban villages; hence, 
socioeconomic factors might not be the most important variables in explaining the control 
or management of contestation.   
 
Table 2 Basic Features of the Four Urban Villages in Shenzhen 
Villages/ 
Features 
Population Location Major social groups Living space Size Main business 
Shi 80,000 Guannei White-collar migrants 
 
6.75 m2/person 25.81 ha. Electronics, clothing, 
grocery 
Shang 65,000 Guannei Entrepreneur migrants 
 
4.47 m2/person 22.70 ha Entertainment, drugs 
and prostitution 
Gong  12,000 Guanwai Peasant migrants 
 
8.21 m2/person 11.70 ha. Design, arts and art 
supplies  
Nong 58,000 Guanwai Blue-collar migrants 
 
5.25 m2/person 46.09 ha. Textile, electronics 
and clinics 
Source: Annual Work Reports of Shenzhen Urban Renewal Bureau and the respective Joint-stock Companies.  
 
 
In this regard, it is relevant to discuss the variation in the cultural lineages and communal 
power of the four urban villages, which are less formal but revived superstructures during 
the post-Mao era.135 Certainly, the communal authority of the JC is a result of history and 
lineage; however, one should recall that belonging to the same clan or family provides 
cohesion and checks and balances on the governance of the JC. In fact, the abilities to 
deliver constant economic returns, provide a safe environment or liaison to obtain 
government support are also salient factors in earning and sustaining such communal 
power. Tracing the history of the changes in the JC’s communal powers and the attitudes 
of various social actors is thus essential.   
 
In this light, this study accounts for the differences in grassroots institutions or 
intermediaries across these four villages. The JC has functioned as either a communal 
authority or a collective enterprise, whereas the RC is a state-sponsored, self-ruling agency 
that is arguably an extension of the state. Whereas each urban village has only one JC, the 
maximum population overseen by an RC is 15,000 to 25,000. Despite the absence of 
                                                
135 Ma and Xiang, 1998; Zhang, 2001: 47-68. 
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formal hierarchy between RC and JC, the differences in the ratio between the two have 
produced different power dynamics in the villages. The single case study with four 
embedded studies enables us to conduct a controlled study. My first assumption is that the 
availability of public goods and the degree of social order vary slightly between the four 
urban villages under different administrative, economic and demographic contexts. 
Furthermore, I assume that these relationships are not nominal but ordinal, reflecting the 
degree and order of interactions between different segments of the local state. Such an 
investigation requires an assessment of the interplay among JCs, RCs and other social 
organisations. 
 
In sum, the comparative analysis of migrant enclaves reveals how students of Chinese 
politics have failed to thoroughly explore local politics in urban areas compared with their 
Western, Latin American and Southeast Asian counterparts. This neglected area of study 
not only reflects how research agendas are embedded in political institutions or their rural 
extensions but also indicates that migrants should not be regarded as merely subjects in 
factory dormitories or a class detached from their living environment. Without thorough 
investigation of everyday life and power relations in urban villages, where the majority of 
China’s 274 million rural migrants live, the struggle of migrants and the mechanisms of 
grassroots governance cannot be articulated. Treating migrants principally as exploited 
subjects in sweatshops also has the disadvantage of implicitly diverting the primary object 
of contention towards corporations while undermining the responsibilities of the local state. 
Before making these assessments, I will first examine the institutional foundations that 
gave rise to urban villages across South China.  
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3. Institutional Adaptation and Migrant Governance 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter examines the institutional framework underlying China’s rural-urban divide, 
which concurrently grant mobility, deny citizenship and reinforce the enclosed living space 
of rural migrants. Built upon the household registration (hukou) and work unit (danwei) 
systems, these institutions and their proxies and substitutes, are integral parts of a targeted 
surveillance system that aims to regulate rural-urban migration, determine welfare 
entitlement and enforce social control. To fulfil these functions under a declining state 
sector, certain authority and responsibilities – an exclusive domain for securing essential 
resources – have been delegated to city governments and grassroots agencies.136  
 
I first explain how despite the overall policy commitments to equity and equality in the 
socialist era, peasants were concurrently regarded as the means of production and subjects 
of control. With the retreat of the state from various socialist commitments and yet with the 
preservation of the socialist institutions, the differentiated and targeted treatment of rural 
migrants was further institutionalised in the reform era.137 However, I contest the argument 
that the hukou and danwei systems are merely instruments of the state used to control or 
infiltrate society; instead, these systems are also regarded as a source in the development of 
an intermediate and semi-autonomous realm between state and society.138 I support this 
claim through a discussion of policy changes pertaining to hukou and danwei and the 
mechanisms and agencies of local governance in China’s sunbelt cities. 
 
Although relaxation of the hukou system has enabled an influx of cheap labour for the 
export-oriented economy, this has not resulted in either social instability or urban decay. 
Despite the new policy initiatives in Shenzhen, its hukou system has continued to 
differentiate welfare for rural migrants and nurture societal discrimination against them. 
Similarly, although the importance of danwei radically reduced in the mid-1990s, its 
functions of regulating labour within spatial units and coordinating subjects within 
                                                
136 Tang, 2015. 
137   Socialist institutions refer to the traditional institutions inherited from the socialist era, which may or 
may not have elements of socialism.   
138 Cf. Lee and Zhang, 2013; Lu and Perry, 1997; Solinger, 1999; Teets, 2013. 
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exclusive realms have not been fully abandoned. The factory dormitories of joint ventures 
and private firms in the development zone of the SEZ have reproduced and intensified the 
practice of combining economic relations and spatial form, leading to the contemporary 
manifestation of the danwei. The need to ensure both a constant supply of labour and rigid 
surveillance of migrants has ironically aligned nominally socialist authorities and capitalist 
investors, yielding the sweatshop phenomenon. In contrast, the role of collective agencies, 
which combine economic resources and political authority, is clearly evident in the 
differences observed in the performances of four urban villages described in Chapters 5 
and 6. 
 
Until the proliferation of urban villages in mid-1990s, rural migrants typically underwent a 
period of residence in a highly controlled factory dormitory in the development zone, 
followed by assimilation into relatively autonomous urban village housing in the suburbs 
or city centre. A sense of improvement is thus widely experienced among rural migrants 
when they become tenants in an urban village, and this perception partly explains why they 
have accepted the status quo rather than contested the institutional form and communal 
order. Because private firms exclusively regulate factory dormitories, whereas a 
combination of political and socioeconomic units simultaneously govern urban villages, 
the contrasting outcomes of factory dormitories and urban villages reveal the relatively 
desirable form of migrant settlement and community governance.  
 
Periodic adjustments of the hukou system have not eliminated discrimination against rural 
migrants but have instead continued to restrain migrants’ demands on urban welfare. While 
the danwei system has been severely weakened, its logic of combing economic and social 
functions in governing an urban unit has found a contemporary manifestation. Above all, 
these changes have consolidated an intermediate space and empowered a grassroots agency 
that checks direct intervention by the state and provides essential public goods in the 
migrant enclaves. This trade-off between eligibility to negotiation and entitlement of 
participation is crucial to explaining how China can encourage economic growth while 
simultaneously establishing a threshold for social (in) stability. 
 
 
INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE RURAL-URBAN DIVIDE 
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The Hukou System and Differentiated Entitlements 
To distinguish itself from its predecessors and restore the economy after years of war, the 
new socialist regime’s priority was to increase productivity through industrialisation. This 
agenda established a set of new institutions to address the challenges of governing cities 
that were traditionally the bases of its enemies and to realise its promises of social reform 
for its supporters.139 Using the pioneering Soviet Union’s experience as a model was not 
only ideologically appropriate but also highly convenient; relying on the masses was 
another option, as they were among the few resources that were abundant in the 
underdeveloped country and were ready to be mobilised. Consequently, a command 
economy and a resident permit (propiska) system were implemented to regulate peasants’ 
mobility and collectivise their productivity as prerequisites for growth.140 Owing to the size 
of the migrant population and its internal dynamics, China’s hukou system was ultimately 
more rigid and comprehensive than its Soviet counterpart. 
 
Although the First Five-Year Plan (1953-1957) aimed to provide only 1 million city jobs 
per year, more than 20 million peasants had already entered towns or cities between 1949 
and 1957.141 The huge influx of rural migrants occurred primarily because urban factories 
were confronting unrealistic production quotas set by the central planning agency. The 
factory management thus heavily recruited peasants to reduce production costs and to fulfil 
quotas.142 Although this practice actually served the state’s development agenda, the State 
Council did not endorse this bottom-up initiative and regarded this group of migrants as a 
“blind flow” (mangliu) that was harmful to orderly industrialisation and structural 
security.143 This intervention from the central authority clearly reveals the hidden tension 
between the goals of maintaining economic growth and enabling social control. In the 
socialist period, this tension was largely resolved by compromising the latter to achieve the 
former. 
 
To this end, the hukou system was implemented in cities in 1951, extended to the 
countryside in 1955 and incorporated throughout the entire country in 1958.144 The system 
                                                
139 Meisner, 1999: 75-77. 
140 Solinger, 1996:33-34. 
141 Walder, 1986:36. Data from the National Bureau of Statistics suggest that the urban population increased 
from 71.6 million to 99.5 between 1953 and 1957.  
142 Potter, 1983: 468. 
143 Chan and Zhang, 1999:830. 
144 Chan and Zhang, 1999:819-820.  
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then linked every individual to his or her permanent residence and differentiated 
socioeconomic entitlements between peasants and urbanites, with the aim of ensuring 
structural stability in developed urban areas, and regulating labour to guarantee the means 
of production for the command economy. The system served three functions: controlling 
geographic mobility, differentiating welfare entitlements and enforcing social control.145 
By the mid-1980s, control over geographic mobility was abandoned to encourage surplus 
labour in the agricultural sector to seek employment in the manufacturing sector. However, 
the system’s two remaining functions have remained intact. Compared with the peasants, 
who are tied to their rural land and have access to few public goods and services, urbanites 
enjoy relatively extensive public amenities and social security, including unemployment 
assistance, subsidised housing, pensions, health care, and public education.  
 
To remain and work in cities, rural migrants are required to obtain three documents from 
the regulating authorities. Without a temporary resident permit (zanzhu zheng), a family 
planning certificate, (shengyu zheng), and an identity card (shenfen zheng), these migrants 
will be sent back to their rural residences. Although the hukou system requires these 
documents to enforce population control, the document requirements have resulted in 
miscellaneous charges and endemic corruption. In the countryside, public security bureaus 
and family planning commissions each charge tens to hundreds of yuan to issue outside 
work permits and family planning certificates. In some cases, when migrants return to the 
country and subsequently wish to return to work in the city, they must submit new 
applications and repay the fees. In the city, each of the two regulating authorities charges 
additional hundreds of yuan to issue and review temporary resident permits and family 
planning certificates, most of which expire each year and require renewal.146 The process 
repeats along with the alternating migration pattern, contributing to the ‘little treasury’ 
(xiao jinku) in the localities.147 The presence of vested interests that blend power and 
wealth explains why hukou reform has often encountered great resistance from regulating 
authorities.  
 
To avoid these charges, it is not uncommon for some migrants to take risks and become 
what are known as ‘three no individuals’, who are then subjected to constant state 
                                                
145 Cheng and Selden, 1994; State Council, 1955. 
146 Sun, 2004:fn4. 
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surveillance and violence. In 2003, Sun Zhigang, a rural migrant who failed to produce 
these documents, was sent to a detention centre, forced to wait to be deployed, and then 
beaten to death. Sun’s status as a university student who had a temporary resident permit 
raised nationwide attention. Scholars, NPC delegates, and even the Premier intervened.148 
A total of 20 officers were held accountable for his death, and the custody and repatriation 
policy that had authorised his detainment was abolished; however, the hukou regulation 
that required all rural migrants to produce three documents has remained intact. Despite 
illustrating the party-state’s adaptability in the face of a public outcry, the state has yet to 
address the discriminatory treatment of rural migrants. From this perspective, the hukou 
system has perpetually institutionalised the rural-urban divide, in which peasants and rural 
migrants not only are entitled to fewer goods and services and subjected to targeted 
surveillance and control but are also accorded inferior status as a result of such differential 
treatment. 149  This is widely viewed as the institutional cause of wealth and income 
inequality between peasants and urbanities, causing structural tensions as China’s economy 
further liberalizes.150 
 
The Danwei System and an Enclosed Realm 
Compared with the hukou system, which was adopted for the entire country, the danwei 
system is an almost exclusively urban formulation. The origin of this system can be traced 
to the Yan’an period in the 1930s, during which the CCP aimed to create an intermediate 
realm between public and private realms. The interests of the minor public (xiao gong) or 
the danwei were preserved within or along with those of the greater public (da gong) or the 
state.151 Exclusive property or specific functions were devolved to each danwei to promote 
self-sufficiency and self-reliance. Although the boundary between the minor public and the 
greater public had always been ambiguous, the creation of this intermediate realm 
reinforced the privileges of urbanites and different work units while regulating social 
relations through spatial forms. Danwei was thus both a conceptual realm and a physical 
realm. To cite Henri Lefebvre:  
A revolution that does not produce a new space has not realised its full potential; 
indeed, it has failed in that it has not changed life itself but has merely changed 
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ideological superstructures, institutions or political apparatuses.152  
 
Although Lefebvre is referring to the macrostructure of Chinese socialism, his observation 
concerning the interplay among spatial form, social life and ruling ideology is far from 
obsolete. Consistent with the theories of Lefebvre and the image of communism, the 
danwei system was regarded as an instrument of the state to regulate and infiltrate society 
and to practise everyday surveillance.153 The extension of the system to all urban areas and 
its success in transforming people’s identities to the extent that the answers to “Where are 
you from?” changed from one’s native place to one’s workplace affirmed the 
understanding that the danwei not only conquered the private sphere but also contributed to 
people’s organised dependence on the party enterprise or the consolidation of 
corporatism.154 On the other hand, danwei system also constituted similar working-class 
communities and workplaces that stimulated collective pride and mutual assistance, which 
were seen by E. P. Thompson as a hotbed for the formation of class consciousness.155 
 
Certainly, the danwei system served to regulate the livelihoods, welfare, and social 
activities of urban workers to nurture the content of their daily lives and their loyalty to 
their official patrons. In this regard, a danwei was an administrative, economic and spatial 
unit.156 First, each danwei was an administrative unit that controlled the dossier, personnel 
matters and cellular boundaries shaping one’s social networks and defining one’s social 
status. For each worker, issues such as promotions, penalties, work transfers and marriage 
were subject to the approval of his or her senior or supervisory unit. As an economic unit, 
each danwei was assigned specific production tasks and quotas, and its workers or 
members were accorded exclusive privileges, such as welfare housing, health clinics, child 
education and pensions. Although the quantities of these goods and services were similar, 
their quality differed between danwei. In this regard, the danwei system not only 
differentiated workers from peasants but also nurtured individual workers’ loyalty to and 
identification with particular danwei. As a spatial unit, each danwei was designed to 
integrate residential areas and workplaces, which were separated into different compounds 
that were often adjacent to one another and linked by pathways and recreation facilities. 
                                                
152 Lefebvre, 1991: 54. 
153 Bray, 2005: ch.5; Walder, 1986: ch.3.  
154 Perry, 1997:42; Walder, 1986: 11-13.  
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The allocation of apartments had no relation with personal wealth. Instead, the quality and 
size of apartments were determined by the status and capacity of one’s danwei, one’s 
seniority within the system and the size of one’s family. Not every city was organised in 
the ideal form; however, the danwei had performed the functions of standardising urban 
space, providing social security and centralising the means of production.157 
 
However, the danwei system was not merely a state tool; it had also developed an internal 
logic and interests. As the sophisticated and comprehensive functions described above 
reveal, the danwei occupied a relatively autonomous sphere between the state and society. 
First, the system represented a realm of the “minor public” given the tasks of providing 
certain public goods and regulating social relations. Second, these tasks were based on the 
logic of self-reliance, which the danwei, as an organizational form, enjoyed the exclusive 
capacity and flexibility to adapt to standard policy guidelines and changing social 
conditions.158 Andrew Walder, in the 1980s, discovered that an implicit agreement existed 
between managers and workers in the danwei, whereby managers promised to maximise 
bonuses and minimise tight quota, while workers agreed to produce effectively and not 
abuse machines or waste materials.159 This is because the management team’s performance 
was judged by its ability to enhance workers’ income and benefits and other social 
indicators. As the opportunity to move between workplaces was low, once an exit strategy 
was not feasible, managers and workers preferred to negotiate rather than be content. Not 
only did the danwei enable the presence of an organised working class, it also promoted 
job-home balance, social equality and generalised reciprocity.160 In this regard, except 
during the high tide of political campaigns or socialist experiments, the danwei performed 
the socio-political function of constraining the scale of collective action.161 More precisely, 
protests during the Mao era were largely limited to the boundaries established by each 
danwei through which mobilisation was structured within different cellar units and was 
prevented from developing into mass incidents that could affect political stability.162  
 
Economic relations were indeed much easier to regulate than spatial relations. One reason 
for this relative ease of regulation was the mismatch between the number of residential 
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apartments and the size of a danwei. Because of this misalignment, welfare housing was 
widely regarded as the most important amenity and the symbol of danwei. In 1998, the 
State Council issued a circular to encourage urbanisation by legalising the sale of welfare 
and economic housing in the private market.163 Danwei no longer allocated new flats to 
employees, and old flats were traded for currency. The circular effectively marked the end 
of a welfare housing policy that had lasted a half-century and the disintegration of the all-
inclusive danwei system. Most notably, housing has since become a commodity rather than 
an entitlement, contributing to the booms of the property market and the banking sector. 
Although this policy gave the old-generation danwei workers a final opportunity to own 
property at a discounted rate, rural migrants and the youth were excluded by default. State 
or collective assets were hence redistributed to those enjoying institutional privileges, 
discriminating against those who did not.  
 
The rural-urban divide is determined by place of residence and the availability of 
resources. Whereas the hukou system regulates the entitlement aspect of the social system, 
the danwei system addressed the provision aspect. Despite market reforms, the hukou 
system has continued to deny citizenship status of rural migrants and reinforce their 
discriminative entitlements and discretionary residence. Undoubtedly, the danwei system 
was more developed in the industrial North than in the coastal South in the socialist era. 
However, the idea of a SEZ and the administrative structure of its economic model largely 
constitute the contemporary manifestation of danwei, as will be discussed below. But this 
development should not be mistaken for a return to corporatism. On the contrary, it reveals 
the complexities and nuances of associational life and social welfare provisions in the 
midst of capitalist reforms that deviates from the state-centred corporatist framework.164  
 
 
PERIODIC ADAPTATIONS AND THE RATIONALITY OF HUKOU SYSTEM 
 
Encircling the City from the Countryside 
The relaxation of the hukou system has closely reflected the reality of market reforms, 
despite being embedded in a certain socialist rationality and conditioned by organizational 
interests. The first wave of major reforms occurred in October 1984 when the State 
                                                
163 State Council, 1998. 
164 Cf. Lin, 1995; Unger and Chan, 2008; Howell, 2012. 
72 
 
Council allowed rural migrants who had urban jobs and registered shelters to temporarily 
reside in townships.165 As a follow-up measure, the Ministry of Public Security introduced 
temporary residence permits (jizhu zheng) in September 1985 to legalise the residence of 
rural migrants in urban areas. Any peasants who remained in cities for more than three 
months were allowed to apply for permits, thus invalidating the old regulation that required 
peasants to register with local police for more than three days of urban residence and 
accelerating the process of labour migration in the coastal provinces.166  
 
In most Chinese cities, the residence permit is renewable but must be re-registered every 
year. As a hub of rural-urban migration and China’s first SEZ, Shenzhen has extended the 
permit renewal period to two years,167 an effort to ensure an abundant supply of labour for 
the export-oriented economy in the sunbelt while reflecting the sunbelt cities’ ability to 
select productive and qualified migrants. Throughout the 1980s, only talented and educated 
individuals were permitted to stay and work in the SEZ. This selection mechanism 
guaranteed the means of production but also provided a stabilising force. One notable 
example was the Kaida Toy Factory, which was one of the earliest and largest joint 
ventures in the Shekou Industrial Zone, the first open industrial zone created as part of 
China’s market reforms. In 1982, an ordinary worker at the factory could earn a monthly 
income of 400 yuan, which was four times the salary and allowance of workers in State-
owned Enterprises (guoying qiye or SOEs).168 For a time, working for Kaida was among 
the most glorious occupations in China, illustrating the chance of rural migrants’ 
integration into cities in the early reform period. 
 
Before 1984, grave uncertainty regarding the pace and scale of market reforms persisted 
and led to caution in the recruitment of labour. Joint ventures primarily recruited – or, more 
accurately, the local authority only allowed – the rusticated youth or danwei workers in 
nearby countries or cities to enter the SEZ’s job market.169 Strictly speaking, these workers 
were migrants but not rural migrants, as most of them had already possessed urban hukou 
in second- or third-tier cities. Workers in SEZ were divided into three types in descending 
order of benefits and prospects: regular labour (zhengshi gong), contract labour (heyue 
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gong) and temporary labour (linshi gong). The educated youth and danwei workers who 
had an urban hukou were initially employed as contract workers; after three years of 
probation, they were upgraded to regular labourers entitled to obtain a Shenzhen hukou.170 
By contrast, the migrants, some of whom were recruited in violation of state regulations, 
were employed as temporary workers.  
 
These practices not only survived but also intensified with further privatisation in the 
1990s and 2000s. Despite enactment of the Labour Law and the Labour Contract Law in 
2008, which respectively mandate equal pay for equal work and create litigation 
procedures to redress unfair treatment, the overall situation remains discriminatory against 
migrants. Young migrants, in particular, despite having better education and better skills, 
became dispatch workers, receiving lower pay and fewer fringe benefits. However, due to 
competition from outsourcing service providers, many private firms and SOEs regularly 
engaged in labour dispatching and outsourcing. A study conducted by the All-China 
Federation of Trade Unions in 2010 revealed that the total number of dispatch workers in 
China had reached 60 million, constituting as many as 30 to 60 per cent of workers in 
many SOEs and private corporations in Guangdong.171 Due to the differentiated treatment 
endorsed by the hukou system and the fact that many of companies did not directly sign 
contracts with dispatch workers, the labour laws cannot regulate these practices.  
 
Although workers in the SEZ’s factories were widely considered the lucky few across 
China, their prospects were structurally differentiated. While they worked in the same 
factories, contract workers and regular workers, determined by their hukou origins, 
followed parallel paths, with differing prospects and little chance of converging. Workers’ 
hukou status functioned not only as an entry ticket but also as a triumph card through 
which the cycle of discrimination continued to revolve. 
 
Granting Citizenship to the Talented and Obedient Few 
Another wave of reform concerns the relaxation of the policy to convert agricultural hukou 
into non-agricultural hukou (nongzhuanfei). Between 1992 and 1994, several large cities 
began to introduce the “blue-stamp” hukou.172 Similarly to the American green card, this 
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type of hukou contained a blue stamp issued by the public security bureau, enabling its 
holder to enjoy social security entitlements and civil rights comparable to those of the 
owners of urban hukou. The blue-stamp hukou was designed to attract talented migrants 
from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan as well as wealthy migrants who could afford to buy 
private property in the cities. Because the transition period of conversion of blue-stamp 
hukou into formal urban hukou was as brief as two years, wealthy migrants were motivated 
to buy commercial property, contributing to the first wave of property fever in China. 
Although this transitional policy was abandoned in most cities by the early 2010s (and 
completely invalidated by a new reform in 2014), adjusting the hukou system to adapt to 
specific conditions and local needs represented a form of bottom-up initiative.173 
 
Shenzhen has been the pioneer in inventing and testing these new policy initiatives. In 
2005, the Shenzhen government issued a circular and five supplementary documents in an 
attempt to construct “a harmonious and efficient city” by strengthening and aligning the 
standard of population control with the level of urban development.174 The primary aim of 
the initiative was to attract an essential and productive labour force to upgrade industries 
and hasten urbanisation. First, Shenzhen like many metropolises changed their migrants’ 
temporary resident permit (zanzhuzheng) to residence permit (juzhuzheng) in 2008, which 
allowed rural migrants to enjoy some benefits once exclusive to urbanities. Although the 
entitlements between urbanities and migrants have since then been minimized, the 
difference remains substantial. Table 3 summaries the differences in entitlements between 
urban citizens and rural migrants, as of 2014. 
 
Table 3 Entitlements between Holders of Urban Hukou and Residence Permit 
 Urban Hukou Resident Permit 
Residence Unconditional Renew every two years 
Reapply at the end of the contract 
 
Health and 
Pension 
Exclusive rights  
Secure assess 
Conditional rights of access to some urban welfare 
after three months of social security contributions 
Restricted transfer of benefits from one city to others or 
back to one’s native place 
Insecure and varied levels of benefits  
 
Child 
Education 
Nine years of free and 
compulsory education 
Higher probability of 
Free education after meeting some economic and 
public security related criteria 
Lower probability of university admission but higher 
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university admission tuition or sponsorship fees  
 
Housing  Low-cost or welfare 
housing for low income 
group 
Ineligible for any low-cost or welfare housing, 
regardless of income 
Major difficulties in obtaining mortgages 
 
Employment Better pay, training and 
fringe benefits 
Rights to permits, 
licences, and benefits 
Restricted to serve in some service sectors, including 
various civil service bureaus  
Ineligible to apply for certain business permits, 
government licences, and unemployment benefits 
 
Civil rights Serve as electorates  
Travel and study aboard 
Cannot vote in elections for resident committees (until 
2012) and people’s congresses in the city 
Cannot apply for documents for overseas travel to 
Hong Kong or Macau 
 
Source: Compiled using data from Shenzhen’s government websites and interviews with officials. 
Second, the city authority also established a point scheme to standardise the criteria for 
hukou transfer.175 Since 2010, the threshold to apply for hukou transfer has been set at 100 
and involves six indexes: personal credentials, de facto residency, social security 
contributions, age, and official awards. For example:  
A university degree receives 60 points, while a diploma receives zero points; private 
property without a mortgage receives 30 points but receives 20 points with a 
mortgage; paying an annual income tax between 35,000 and 46,000 yuan receives 30 
points, whereas paying less than 35,000 yuan receives zero points; being between 18 
and 35 years of age receives 5 points, whereas being over 45 receives minus 5 points 
per year; social service and offical awards are rewarded but varied between 3 and 30 
points depending on the nature of the awarding bodies.176 
Table 4 compares the weighting of each criterion that enables migrants to pass the entry 
threshold and apply for a hukou transfer. It shows that after several years of operation, 
there are few differences between the point systems of China’s wealthiest cities. First, the 
quality of individual migrants is an overriding criterion. Good education and essential job 
skills would each singlehandedly meet the entry threshold. Second, contributions to city 
finances and development are highly rated. Such contributions are measured by taxes 
payable, social security contributions, and official awards or scientific innovations. Third, 
applicants must prove that they are obedient subjects who have not violated the one-child 
policy, have not undergone re-education through labour (laogai), do not have criminal 
records, have not been affiliated with any illegal and unauthorised organisations, and have 
contributed to the local social welfare scheme for more than six months. While the re-
                                                
175 Shenzhen Government, 2011; See National Health and Family Commission, 2012: 92-96 for a review of 
the implementation of Point System in Guangdong.   
176 Shenzhen Civil Affairs Bureau, 2014. 
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education system was abandoned in 2013, for more than half a century, this system enabled 
the police to send people to labour camps and restrict people’s freedom without trial. As 
targets of social control, rural migrants were long victims of this policy.  
 
Table 4 Weighted Index of Hukou Point Scheme in Three Guangdong Cities, 2014   
Index/City Shenzhen Guangzhou Dongguan 
 Pass Mark Ratio  
Education 100 117.6 100 
Job Skill 100 117.6 100 
Tax payable 100 23.5 100 
Social security contribution 60 58.8 60 
House ownership 30 23.5 30 
Official awards 60 141.2 100 
Social service 10 11.7 10 
Industry in demand n.a 35.3 30 
Scientific invention 50 58.8 60 
Years of residence n.a. n.a. 20 
Source: Compiled from the Guidebooks for Hukou Transfer through Point Scheme in Shenzhen, Guangzhou 
and Dongguan.  
 
Analysis of the application criteria suggests that the new initiative has not provided a path 
for the majority of rural migrants to secure citizenship. Essentially, educated, wealthy, and 
youthful migrants are eligible to transfer their hukou. Talent and capital become the 
overriding criteria for successful hukou transfer, a process whereby the granting of 
citizenship is justified as growth promoting, albeit at the cost of equity. In contrast to 
Guangzhou, where the hukou spaces for qualified applicants were capped at 3,000 as of 
2014, Shenzhen abolished its annual quota of 6,000 in 2013. However, survey data indicate 
that only 18 per cent of rural migrants in Shenzhen met the above threshold in 2013.177 
Indeed, our migrant interviewees, most of whom are tenants of the village of Gong, are 
indifferent to and dissatisfied with what the government refers to as “the hukou policy for 
the new era”:178  
Wang, a 28-year-old migrant from Jiangxi, regarded the policy as a kind of privilege 
(tequan) that was not meant for average (putong) rural migrants. He loved and was 
absorbed into city life but could not imagine the possibility of transferring his hukou, 
as was also true of his friends in a medium-sized electronics factory.179 
Tian, who had worked in Shenzhen since 1999, revealed the irony that the longer she 
worked and stayed in the city, the further she was from meeting the threshold, as age 
and educational attainment had gradually worked against her. The awards of service 
(xianjin) she had received over the years in the danwei or street offices had offered 
                                                
177 Shenzhen Civil Affairs Bureau, 2014. 
178 Interview, municipal government official, 27 September 2013. 
179 Interview, migrant worker, Shenzhen, 28 August 2013. 
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little help.180 
These testimonies reveal that the hukou system has not only differentiated the entitlements 
of migrants but also nurtured their belief that they are not an integrated part of the city, 
regardless of their contributions to and lengths of stay within it. Moreover, the threshold 
limit is highly discriminatory in that it tends to reward the privileged few while excluding 
the disadvantaged majority. 
 
However, the fortunate few who are eligible to apply for a transfer do not unanimously 
welcome the policy either. Basically, class and income sources divide them. On the one 
hand, the native villagers of all four urban villages, most of whom are landlords, 
acknowledged the policy but felt lukewarm towards it. A frequently raised concern was 
that the transfer would effectively deprive them of rural land dividends that are worth more 
than urban social security protection. As such, rather than targeting Shenzhen’s hukou, 
these villagers have done whatever is necessary to retain their collective land ownership 
and be exempted from urban governance. Second, migrant entrepreneurs of small and 
medium-sized businesses as well as educated and professional rural migrants, most of 
whom are tenants of the Shi and Shang Villages, are more interested in applying for 
Shenzhen’s hukou. For these cohorts, who represent the income-earning classes, the 
possibility of permanent residence in a familiar place, receiving social security protection 
for them and their children, is highly attractive. Moreover, returning to their native lands is 
no longer viable for them because many have lost their land rights in their native place due 
to land requisition or possession by other family members.181 These contrasting responses 
reveal that the city-based hukou system has not addressed structural inequality associated 
with the hukou system and may have even aggravated it.  
 
Third, under the present system, the typical poor migrant, who is truly in need of welfare to 
build his or her social capacity, cannot meet the threshold. The requirement that migrants 
must have contributed to social security for more than six months is unrealistic for many. 
First, the disposable incomes of rural migrants are limited after payment of rent and daily 
expenses and purchases of household necessities. Most elder migrants prioritise either 
remittances for their families or personal savings and investments. Migrant youths, who 
                                                
180 Interview, migrant worker, Shenzhen, 30 August 2013. 
181 Although the land system entitles every household or individual an alienable parcel of land, it has not 
addressed demographic changes, which effectively deprives the land right of the youth generation.  
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have an extremely low marginal return on their contributions to the local social welfare 
scheme, have opted for either consumption or education. Second, frequent frustrations in 
China’s labour market have forced rural migrants to frequently seek new jobs, typically 
compelling them to remain in a city for two to three years. With this common uncertainty, 
rural migrants have little incentive to contribute to a social security system linked to a 
particular city. This rigid requirement clearly derives from the hukou system and the fiscal 
reform of 1994, after which city finances became self-help.182 
 
The mismatches outlined above largely explain why the number of successful urban hukou 
applications averaged only 40,000 per year between 2010 and 2013 in Shenzhen. The 
figures were much lower than the targets set by the city government in its 12th Five-Year 
Plan (2010-2015), in which it pledged to increase its hukou population from 250 million to 
400 million.183  In view of this policy dilemma, the city authority has provided basic 
welfare coverage to rural migrants. Although more substantial medical care remains tied to 
migrants’ original residences, the children of migrants who have lived in Shenzhen for 
more than one year have been granted public education since 2005.  
 
The city’s Population Management Office claims that more than 98 per cent of its 
permanent residents are covered by social welfare.184 But this figure must be interpreted 
with caution. First, the figure includes only permanent residents and omits many temporary 
migrants who have resided in the city for less than six months. Although the year-end 
population of Shenzhen in 2013 was 14.2 million, the sum of the hukou and floating 
populations was 10.4 million. Although temporary residents are often not entitled to local 
welfare by international standards, one must recall that the majority of these nearly four 
million migrants are fellow countrymen, not foreign nationals, yet are excluded from the 
hukou reforms. According to an official and nationwide survey in 2012, less than one-
fourth of migrant workers were covered by endowment and medical insurances at the host 
cities and their enrolment in unemployment and maternity insurances were as low as 9.9 
and 5.8 per cent respectively. 185 
 
More importantly, the “eligibility without entitlement” argument has profound political 
                                                
182 See Pai, 2013:15-40, for how rural migrants float among cities seeking employment.  
183 People’s Daily, 17 October 2012. 
184 Interview, government official, Shenzhen, 12 April 2013.  
185 National Health and Family Planning Commission, 2012:43. 
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consequences.186 By eligibility, I mean that the city government has extended the coverage 
of social security to cater to the needs of wealthy and highly mobile migrants to absorb 
their capital and human resources. By entitlements, I mean that the hukou system has 
continued to discriminate against migrants with respect to access to some public housing, 
sectors of employment, financial tools, and civil rights.  Without legal recognition of 
migrants’ rights or a public process for earning them, it is difficult for rural migrants to 
transcend their second-class identities and inferior status. Many rural migrants simply 
cannot follow and thereby understand the periodic policy changes; they also lack the 
knowledge and ability needed to negotiate over what has been promised them by their 
employers and grassroots officials. In view of these difficulties, a growing number of 
grassroots NGOs in Shenzhen, such as the Little Bird Hotline and the Workers’ Centre, 
have altered the focus of their advocacy. Rather than simply providing legal advice to 
migrant workers or negotiating with migrants’ employers, these NGOs have devoted the 
majority of their time and efforts to organising seminars and workshops to educate workers 
about the goods and services available in the city and how to obtain them.187  
 
Re-institutionalising the Hukou System 
The third wave of reform began after China’s fourth-generation of leaders repeatedly 
called for structural reform of the hukou system in the late 2000s. This call has generated 
widespread expectations, prompting constant press reports and academic papers on the 
question of whether China has abolished the hukou system. With the change in CCP 
leadership confirmed at the Third Plenary of the Communist Party’s 18th Party Congress 
in 2013, the hukou reform was formally incorporated into the key document of the party 
congress. In July 2014, the State Council issued an opinion outlining the scope of the 
reform, and three months later, its Legal Affairs Office drafted a consultation paper to 
establish the pace and objectives of the reform. The consultation paper includes three key 
components: 1) to allow all nationals to obtain a permit to access basic social welfare 
services in their places of residence, 2) to immediately abolish the hukou system in small 
towns and abandon it in medium-sized cities by 2020, and 3) to retain the hukou system in 
large and mega-cities with populations greater than 5 million.188 
 
                                                
186 Zhang, 2010.  
187 Interview, NGOs staff, Shenzhen, 25 and 26 September 2013. 
188 State Council, 2014. 
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The changes associated with this reform should not be overstated. Despite the vast scale of 
this reform, its pace and aims have not significantly deviated from those of previous 
reforms. The State Council’s opinion and consultation paper agree that ‘citizenship should 
be enabled incrementally’ and ‘would be granted to capable individuals’. As noted by 
many observers, the reform primarily aims to divert urbanisation to small and medium-
sized cities and alleviate the financial burden on social security and mitigate complex 
governance issues in large and mega-cities. However, one must recall the size and degree 
of urbanisation in China, which substantially limits the extent of reform. As of 2014, 
Mainland China had a total of 103 cities with populations above 5 million.189 To place this 
figure in context, the United States has 8 cities of that size, India has 7, Japan has 3, Brazil 
has 3, and 31 other countries have only 1. This group of 103 cities, referred to in the 
consultation paper as large and mega-cities, will continue to be regulated by the hukou 
system. Because the reform excludes the most common host cities where the majority of 
rural migrants reside, the long due reform has neither eliminated the rural-urban divide nor 
redressed structural inequality.   
 
Two mid-ranking officials at Shenzhen’s Development and Reform Office recognise this 
drawback but implicitly affirm that granting equal citizenship to rural migrants was never 
the policy intent: 
Shenzhen’s hukou reform mainly aims to absorb talented migrants to ensure the SEZ’s 
suitable development. Our city finances simply could not afford the running expense if 
urban hukou are allocated to everyone. Stability is another concern. One must be a 
pioneer, but at the same time, one must be realistic. Establishing a model experience 
(dianxing jingyan) for the city is going to benefit many.  
True, we target an endorsement of the central government, not only because this helps 
to coordinate actions between branch and lump (tiao-kuai) and drives favourable 
polices but also because an endorsed model can easily travel to other cities.190 
The rationale of policy makers in one of most progressive and wealthy cities reveals the 
extent of adaptive governance. 191  The key criterion of a good policy proposal is not 
whether it addresses the structural problems of the existing framework but whether it 
would be welcomed by the centre and applied to other areas. Central recognition is linked 
to promotion and is clearly the cadres’ primary concern. By the same token, concern about 
widespread applicability indicates why the bottom-up political initiative has become 
                                                
189 Calculated from NBS, 2014b: 13-19. 
190 Interviews, government officials, Shenzhen, 31 August 2013 and 14 August 2014. 
191 Until 2011, Shenzhen was the only megacity in China that had never experienced a financial deficit.  
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increasingly moderate after decades of reform, as radical reform would create problems for 
other policy makers confronting similar issues. From this perspective, the financial burden 
is only one of the many obstacles to reforming the hukou system. Concerns about impeding 
the vested interests of government xitong and imperilling the essential tools of social 
control are at least equally important.  
 
 
URBAN CONTESTATION, DORMITORY AND ENCLAVES  
 
From the perspective of local governments, the rural migrant is a means of production and 
a source of contestation. Shenzhen has experienced two phases of rural-urban migration, 
corresponding to different contestation dynamics. The municipality maintained an average 
urban population growth rate of 15.8 per cent in the 1980s, and this rose to 24 per cent in 
the first half of the 1990s. In the first period, the city primarily absorbed intra-provincial 
migrants, including some rusticated youth holding urban hukous. In the second period, it 
led other cities with respect to massive inter-provincial migration. Intra-provincial 
migrants find it easier to reside with friends or relatives and less costly to return to the 
countryside when the urban job market becomes saturated or unstable. In contrast, inter-
provincial migrants have had a genuine need to find self-help accommodations in host 
cities.  
 
Many first-generation migrants did not build homes in the cities, due to their communal 
ties and ultimate goals: working away was for them primarily a means of improving their 
families’ living standards and status in their native villages. Cheap and substandard 
housing thus allowed these rural migrants to minimise their living expenses in cities and 
maximise their remittances to their rural families and permanent residences. However, 
second-generation migrants, most of whom have lost or were never granted land rights, 
have more individualistic expectations and have adopted modern lifestyles, which can only 
be pursued in cities. A survey conducted in Shanghai in 2012 (n=2000) showed that 39.79 
per cent of young migrants intend to reside in big cities permanently, developing their 
careers and raising their families.192 This behavioural change has put enormous pressure on 
housing, medical care, child education, and communal services in cities. 
                                                
192 National Health and Family Planning Commission, 2012:129.  
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The fiscal reform of 1994 further intensified spatial contestation in China’s sunbelt. The 
reform replaced the revenue-sharing system with a tax-sharing system in which customs, 
sales, and the majority of value-added taxes were exclusively central, and taxes on 
business, stamps, property, and land use were exclusively local. This reform has improved 
the central government’s extractive capacity in relation to local governments. Booming 
cities such as Shenzhen were motivated to explore locally generated revenue to maintain 
public investments and cover social security expenses.193 It is estimated that land-related 
revenue accounted for 72 per cent of the total revenue of Guangdong Province after 
1995.194 This backdrop implies that Shenzhen’s urban contestation is probably among the 
most severe in the country. When rapid urbanisation and rural-urban migration encounter a 
fiscally weak and administratively shrunken state, social decay and ungoverned enclaves 
tend to result. Nevertheless, the pattern and nature of Shenzhen’s migrant accommodations 
illustrate certain deviations. 
 
Table 5: Types of Migrant Accommodation in Guangdong, 2001-2012 (%) 
Accommodation/Year 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Dormitory 
 
44.8 47.8 43.8 39.1 37.7 34.0 32.9 33.6 27.8 29.8 27.2 24.4 
Construction site  
 
10.8 8.8 6.7 6.1 5.7 4.9 4.8 4.6 3.5 3.5 3.3 2.6 
Rental house 
 
30.9 34.8 42.1 45.3 47.3 52.0 52.8 52.2 58.4 57.1 59.5 63.2 
Hotel or hostel  
 
5.9 2.6 1.7 1.5 1.8 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.4 0.9 
Local resident’s house 
 
3.5 3.3 3.3 3.9 4.0 3.3 3.4 3.6 4.1 3.8 4.0 4.0 
Others incl. own apartment 
 
4.2 2.7 3.2 3.9 3.4 4.0 4.4 4.3 4.7 4.5 4.6 4.9 
Source: Compiled using data from Ministry of Public Security, 2001-2012. 
 
Table 5 shows the types and features of migrant accommodations in Guangdong Province 
over the last decade. 195  The overall pattern of migrants’ choices of accommodation 
clustered consistently around affordable and temporary housing. The major types of 
migrant accommodation were dormitory and rental housing, which on average accounted 
for 84 per cent of accommodations. Since 2004, rental housing has gradually replaced 
dormitories as the most favoured migrant accommodation. In Shenzhen, manufacturing 
workers employed by large enterprises often lived in dormitories provided by their 
                                                
193 Wang, 1997; Zhang, 1999. 
194 Ho and Lin, 2005: 700. 
195 Shenzhen does not have such consecutive data, but its selective records concur with Guangdong’s. 
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employers, all of which were adjacent to the factories. Construction workers and domestic 
workers were accommodated, respectively, in temporary compounds built onsite and in 
employers’ private households, both of which were functionally another form of dormitory. 
Other rural migrants who owned or worked in small and medium enterprises or service 
industries tended to seek private accommodations on their own. According to an annual 
report by Shenzhen’s Urban Villages Redevelopment Office, urban village housing 
accounted for approximately 92 per cent of the rental housing of rural migrants.196 
 
In addition, the majority of migrant accommodations are temporary housing. Between 
2001 and 2012, less than 5 per cent of rural migrants purchased houses in cities. Renting 
urban village apartments or residing in factory dormitories requires less capital and 
provides greater flexibility, a rational choice given the migrants’ low income earning 
capabilities in the cities and back-and-forth migration patterns. The fact that the hukou 
system denies rural migrants socioeconomic entitlements, such as subsidised public 
housing and the ability to obtain a mortgage within their host cities, was the institutional 
factor that forced migrants to remain perpetually floating. However, even if rural 
migrants—as second-class citizens and transients—had a genuine interest in looking for 
affordable housing or were trapped in temporary housing, these two factors do not explain 
how and why valuable lands, subjected to urban sprawl, were used to construct factory 
dormitories and apartments for the most disadvantaged.197  
 
Privatised Factory Dormitories and Controlled Space  
Despite the disintegration of the danwei system, the idea of an organised work unit has not 
appeared in China. One of its proxies is the broad functional system (xitong) within the 
party-state, which remains influential in shaping China’s economic development. Each of 
the ministries or commissions in the State Council and the bureaus of the Communist Party 
has hierarchical units at each territorial level of government. These units include 
government agencies and state-owned enterprises, which are assigned specific ranks and 
jurisdictions. Power is therefore fragmented among different xitong and municipal 
governments, generating both tension and collaboration regarding issues of vital interest, 
such as competition for urban land. Hundreds of xitong are found in Shenzhen, and a group 
of important ones is referred to as the ‘eight great lords’ (bada zhuhou), indicating their 
                                                
196 Shenzhen Urban Planning, Land and Resources Commission, 2005:12. 
197 Chapter 5 will discuss the relationship between the land system and urban village housing in detail. 
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autonomy within the municipality.198 These xitong are formally subsidiaries of SOEs or 
extensions of local governments, but in practice, they are often mixed with private capital 
of officials. Their lands were of high quality and quantity because they continuously 
offered loans, leverage, and political support to the municipal government. One retired 
official commented that collaborations between different segments of the state promoted 
growth when Shenzhen was weak and poor and minimised risk when the municipality 
became prosperous and autonomous.199 In other words, political linkage is a source of both 
funding and political support. 
 
The primacy of xitong can be traced to the administrative and spatial arrangements of 
Shekou. China Merchant Group, a subsidiary of the Ministry of Communications, was 
assigned the responsibility of operating China’s first industrial zone open to foreign capital. 
The transportation xitong has since controlled all land appropriation in Shekou, which was 
approximately one-thirtieth of the initial SEZ area. The group formed a management 
committee in the industrial zone and concurrently expanded its business there. This 
experiment not only blurred the distinction between the state and the market but also 
reproduced certain socialist danwei practices during the course of market reforms. 
Shekou’s founding head and Shenzhen’s longest-serving mayor concurred that this 
arrangement aimed to limit the mobility of workers, contain the effects of the development 
zone, and safeguard the livelihoods of danwei workers during the early reform stages.200 
 
Capitalists who were concerned about the uncertainty of investing in a socialist regime 
highly approved these institutions. Two senior executives of manufacturing companies 
recalled that, in addition to the land required to build factories, their joint enterprises in 
Shekou were allocated an additional portion of land to build factory dormitories.201 Apart 
from the advantage of controlling the means of production, these manufacturing companies 
were also attracted by dividends from land assets because, although factory dormitories are 
prohibited by law from being mortgaged, in practice, these building structures have always 
increased the total estimated value of factory complexes. This practice, which is still in 
force today, has provided a strong economic incentive for private investors to support, or 
abuse, the state land ownership inherited from the socialist era. 
                                                
198 Chen, 2010: 110. 
199 Interview, Shenzhen, 13 March 2012. 
200 Xu, 2008: 50-53; Shenzhen Municipal Chorography, 2011, vol.4: 99. 
201 Interview, Hong Kong, 1 December 2013. 
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As a result of collaboration between the xitong and firms, many first-generation migrants 
in Shenzhen’s export-oriented industry were not required to find their own urban shelters 
because suitable shelters had already been designated. Manufacturing companies have 
produced many multi-storey factories and high-rise dormitories in industrial zones or 
secondary barriers. For large enterprises, these dormitories were built adjacent to factories; 
for medium-sized enterprises, the factories and dormitories were densely located on 
different floors in the same compounds. The most extreme example was Foxconn, a mega-
world plant that accommodated all of its 550,000 workers in dormitories on two campuses 
in the Bao’an district.202 
 
Although the appearance of a factory dormitory was similar to that of standard residential 
apartments, the facilities inside were primitive, with restricted living spaces. Migrants were 
typically provided bunk beds on which they hung their clothes and belongings. Each room 
accommodated 8 to 24 people, and individual living spaces were as small as 20 square feet 
each. The number of inhabitants on each floor ranged from 50 to 120, and everyone shared 
a public bathroom. Regardless of marital status, workers were treated as single and 
assigned to single-sex dormitories.203 One exception was found on Foxconn’s Longhua 
campus, which had installed a wide variety of communal, recreational, and catering 
facilities. That particular campus was propagated as a model factory for customers, 
governments, and the media. Similar facilities were absent from other Foxconn campuses 
and from those of other companies.204 These facilities were installed before the strikes but 
fully renovated after the suicide cases. However, because of long working hours and tight 
surveillance, migrant workers rarely have time to use these facilities.  
 
Several factors were required to reproduce a spatially regulated workplace in the reform 
era. First, complimentary dormitories were allocated and served as housing stipends to 
extract marginal labour productivity and to control the means of production, particularly in 
response to fluctuations between peak and low seasons. 205  Training, surveillance and 
overtime work were more manageable when migrant workers resided next to the factory. 
Second, once migrant workers resided within a factory complex in an industrial zone, their 
                                                
202 Pun and Chan, 2012: 386, 394-395. 
203 Fieldwork, Shenzhen, 12-18 March 2012. 
204 Pun and Chan, 2012: 394; Zhou and Cai, 2008: 230-233.  
205 Perlin, 2013: 46-52. 
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mobility and interaction with other social actors were effectively restricted. Migrants’ 
service to industrial development was consumed, and their potential threats to city order 
were thus minimised.  
 
These practices suggest that the Chinese state may have selectively retreated from its stated 
functions during the market reforms. Such practices also inevitably prompted concern that 
the spatial configurations in China’s sunbelt were marginalising migrants, who were 
provided with a place to stay and work in the city despite having their “rights to the city” 
denied. This thesis proposes that ordinary citizens should have been entitled to participate 
in important decisions that shaped their city and affected their livelihoods.206 From this 
perspective, the factory dormitories functioned almost like cages containing rural migrants 
who served as tenants and human resources but not as citizens. Although these migrants’ 
contestations were contained, they were not resolved. Over time, migrants resorted to 
various “weapons of the weak” to sustain their contestations and call attention to their 
existence. Some migrants chose suicide to voice their grievances, as on the Foxconn 
campuses, whereas others adopted exit strategies to move from factory dormitories to 
urban villages. Some migrants practised everyday resistance tactics, such as disconformity, 
foot-dragging, and pilferage, as reported by migrant workers and labour NGOs.207 
 
In short, the spatial contestation in China’s sunbelt cities has largely been managed and 
absorbed by the interplay between surviving socialist institutions (or traditional practices 
without elements of socialism) and new market forces in the context of the rural-urban 
divide. Factory dormitories, which constituted one of the two dominant forms of migrant 
accommodations in Shenzhen and across South China, are the physical evidence of that 
collaboration. Certainly, the absence of overt resistance should not be mistaken for a lack 
of contestation. The continuous presence of rural migrants, including their residence, work 
and exchange, has transformed the urban fabric of Shenzhen.  
 
Having said that, the spatial and political order in China’s sunbelt has largely been 
preserved by the interplay between adaptive hukou system and revitalised danwei system 
and the resulting patterns of migration and settlements. These systems provided affordable 
dwellings, delivered basic public goods, and reinforced social control and class domination, 
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thereby regulating migrant contestations and preventing their integration into formal cities. 
The larger question here concerns the process and consequences of urbanization. While 
urban expansion can be all-round costly for policy makers, they tend to view urbanization 
as strategically necessary but migrant assimilation as secondary, thereby ignoring some of 
the difficulties and contradictions mentioned. The dynamics and impacts of this orientation 
will be further addressed in chapter 6. 
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4.  The Land System, Exit Points and Privatised Collectives  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Land disputes have spread in China as high-speed industrialisation and urbanisation 
intensify the demand for farmland and urban space. According to the Ministry of Land and 
Resources, the area of arable land decreased from 129.8 million hectares in 1997 to 121.7 
million hectares in 2008, amounting to a 6 per cent decrease in roughly one decade.208 
Land conversion and land use rights transactions are concentrated in the suburbs and urban 
areas in light of China’s market reforms and further integration into the global economy. 
Foreign investors, private developers, rural collectives, city governments, villagers and 
urbanites have become the key actors in this process. Although it is not uncommon for land 
expropriation (zhengdi) and housing demolition and relocation (chaiqian) to become “mass 
incidents”, the scale and effects of these contestations have largely been contained and 
regulated in the sunbelt cities and their migrant enclaves.209  
 
This chapter thus seeks to explain the relationship between China’s dual land system and 
its pattern of urban contestation and migrant enclaves. Land, which is both a form of 
property and a means of production, is central to the socialist regime’s economic and 
political agenda. Although land in China has not officially become a commodity, it has 
more or less functioned as one because of the on-going marketisation and globalisation in 
the reform era. But the persistent pressure regarding development and privatisation has 
produced substantial ambiguity in the use and transfer of land, creating an informal land 
market and blurring the boundary between regulator and practitioner.210 In this regard, the 
thesis of local state corporatism can be expanded from viewing the state as an economic 
agent to analysing the spatial and political implications of the restructuring of state 
power.211 
 
On the one hand, the dual land system accounts for China’s back-and-forth migration 
pattern and the provision of shelter for rural migrants in the sunbelt. Migrants are provided 
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209 Fu and Gillespie, 2014:3; Tian, 2008. 
210 Lin, 2009: 39, 46. 
211 Oi, 1999; Hsing, 2010:8. 
89 
 
with incentives and opportunities to work in the countryside if the urban job market 
shrinks. Moreover, land appropriation mechanisms are essential for turning urban villages 
into the dominant form of affordable settlements for the most disadvantaged. Although 
urban villages are not designed to provide affordable housing for migrant workers, they 
have, in practice, evaded government responsibilities and legitimated class differentiation 
and polarisation, including the production of a rentier class – the native villagers. Although 
the land system does not reform – some might even argue that it reinforces – the unequal 
status of rural migrants, it offers them temporary residence in the city and a permanent 
home in the countryside. The resulting trade-off – between collective land and citizenship 
or between eligibility and entitlement – reveals the influences of socialist institutions 
within the market economy. These influences underpin the argument that China’s 
development trajectory and urban transition are best explained by path dependence.212 
 
On the other hand, the ambiguity regarding the use and transfer of land has ensured that the 
local state or, more precisely, the rural collectives and municipal governments play a 
prominent role in the process of land expropriation and urban development. Since the first 
mega-development projects began in 2005, the interests of the municipal government, rural 
collectives, native villagers and rural migrants have largely been aligned, enabling a 
satisfactory outcome for many participants. This outcome has consolidated a patronage 
throughout the urban villages in which the gaps between the income-earning majority and 
the dividend-earning minority and between preserving urban villages and building high-
rises are bargained over and articulated. In this regard, the collective agencies collaborate 
under entrenched inequality while preventing open conflict.  
 
This chapter draws implications beyond the dynamics of land development to address the 
types of institutional arrangements that protect and regulate the interests of rural migrants. 
First, this chapter reveals the effects of institutional constraints and explains the conditions 
under which affordable migrant enclaves along with exit points for rural migrants have 
been preserved in China’s unprecedented migration and urbanisation. Second, it examines 
the formation of patronage between different stakeholders to illustrate the dynamics of land 
appropriation and the robustness of grassroots negotiation after the shareholding reform. 
The chapter challenges the neoliberal prescription that the privatisation of land and full-
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speed urbanisation would respectively protect the interests of the peasantry and minimise 
contestation over land. 
 
 
THE STATE AND DUAL LAND TENURE SYSTEM 
 
Land and the Socialist Political Economy 
As a property asset and a means of production, land has been central to the socialist 
regime’s ideological commitment and political economy. The 1954 Constitution stated that 
the new regime was committed to gradually eliminating private ownership of property and 
means of production.213 Between 1950 and 1956, a series of land reforms confiscated or 
expropriated all rural and urban lands owned by landlords and private enterprises and 
redistributed them to state or collective agencies. This nationalisation process established a 
unique socialist land ownership system that destroyed the exploitative landlord-tenant 
structure along with its patron-client relations in the countryside.214 While the process 
fulfilled the regime’s promise of social transformation for the peasantry, it also collected 
and aggregated resources for the planned economy in cities.215 
 
This diverse state agenda required a dual land tenure system. In rural areas, the ownership 
of land and land use rights was designated to rural collectives. While the communes 
remained in place, daily operation was devolved to the production team (shengchan dui) 
from 1961 to the mid-1980s in most villages. During that period, the production team 
reserved land for the provision of public goods and the construction of village enterprises. 
Each peasant household was then given an inalienable parcel of land for a housing site and 
for farming, and they shared collective benefits from its agricultural output. This 
arrangement indicated that social stability and food security were the state’s primary 
agenda items in the countryside.216 In urban areas, the state agenda shifted to promoting 
industrialisation and advancing the danwei system. As a means of production, urban land 
was owned and managed by municipal authorities. To meet the changes in production 
quotas, the means of production were allocated to and circulated between urban collectives 
and SOEs. The conversion or transfer of land was always free of charge, as these units 
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were integral parts of the command economy.217  
 
In Mao’s China, land was respectively owned by the state and the collectives and 
simultaneously allocated and redistributed by municipal authorities and rural collectives. 
This dual land tenure system combined land ownership with land use rights in both rural 
and urban areas while also differentiating among regulating authorities to address the 
diverse agenda of food self-sufficiency and a resourceful urban economy. Under a rigid 
land system and a command economy, the tension between public ownership and public 
interest was resolved or at least remained latent. 
 
Differentiating Land Ownership and Land Use Rights 
In the wake of the dramatic socioeconomic changes after the market reforms, the dual land 
system has changed. In rural areas, the Household Responsibility System (HRS) was 
initiated around 1980 to allow farmers to contract land, machinery and other facilities from 
rural collectives and to freely dispose of the surplus after state taxes and collective 
retention. Because the HRS was initially able to increase work incentives and agricultural 
productivity, this bottom-up initiative was adopted as a national policy. Although land use 
rights were contracted to individual households for 15 to 30 years, households did not 
possess the rights to transfer collective land or to mortgage the real property built on 
collective land.  
 
Subsequent law reforms have been devoted to defining and regulating the procedure for 
land conversion. The Land Administration Law (1993, 2004) classifies collective land into 
three types: “land for farming”, “land for construction”, and “land for dwelling” (zhaijidi). 
The law specifies that priority should be given to using collective land for 1) agricultural 
output 2) building TVEs and providing public welfare and 3) constructing houses for 
native villagers. However, the law also specifies that 4) collective land can be expropriated 
by the state for public interest and converted into other uses if compensation is offered. 
Because of the ambiguities concerning the definition of public interest and the 
measurement of land value, land conversion has become an intense subject of disputes.218  
 
Similarly, land ownership and land use rights are also separated in urban areas, but city 
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governments and urbanites possess comprehensive rights to dispose of the land. On 9 
September 1987, Shenzhen SEZ pushed the boundaries of the law by auctioning and 
selling its land use right to a joint venture.219 As this policy was considered a necessary 
step to boost foreign investment and increase land use efficiency, China’s constitution was 
amended in 1988 to legalise the transfer of land use rights.220 The Property Law (2007) 
further grants urban residents the rights to sell, lease and collateralise their real property 
built upon state-owned land. As the interests of the owners of land (city governments) and 
the users of land (foreign investors, private developers and urban residents) largely 
converged, land development in the city centres or designated development zones became 
more effective and less contentious. 
 
The legal reforms also modified the meaning of the “dual land” tenure system in which the 
difference involves both locality and the separation between land ownership and land use 
rights. The socialist regime’s public ownership of land has been preserved, while the 
private sector’s demand for clearly defined land use rights has also been accommodated. 
Despite the revision and adaptation, land development has remained severely conditioned 
by the socialist legacy rather than primarily driven by demand and supply.  
 
Land Conversion and Its Discontents 
This conditional relaxation of the land system reveals the dilemma of China’s post-socialist 
transition. While the local governments aim to attain rapid economic growth at any price, 
the principle of public land ownership is inalienable. Although the central government and 
the public consider industrialisation and urbanisation vital, they are increasingly concerned 
about impacts on food security and, to a lesser extent, environmental sustainability. The 
dual land tenure system has therefore provided a form of institutional constraint that not 
only regulates the process of land conversion but also defines the interests of stakeholders. 
The state or the rural collective thus owns all land and monopolises its primary market. 
The exclusive role of local governments and the complementary roles of collective 
agencies in converting and leasing land have become sources of discontent. 
 
Land expropriation has often resulted in social unrest. Land disputes and associated 
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grievances among local authorities and private developers are estimated to constitute more 
than 60 per cent of the 90,000 and 180,000 “mass incidents” that occurred in 2006 and 
2010, respectively.221 A longitudinal survey by Landreas shows that the number of land-
taking cases increased steadily from 2001 to 2010. The NGO’s nationwide survey in 2011 
suggests that farmers received only $17,850 per hectare as compensation on average or 2.5 
per cent of the market price obtained by local governments ($740,000 per hectare).222 
Other estimates of the value of this compensation vary between 5 and 10 per cent of the 
market price. 223  This vast divergence arises because peasants’ compensation fees are 
settled in accordance with the standard of agricultural output of land rather than the market 
price of land. 
 
Peasant impoverishment is a contributing factor to increasing urban-rural inequality, in 
addition to polarisations within urban and rural sectors respectively. Data from NBS 
confirm that the urban-rural income gap rose from 1.71 in 1984 to 3.33 in 2009. If the 
value of urban social welfare is considered, then the rural-urban income disparity is even 
greater.224 One land-related explanation is that compared with urbanites, who can invest 
and lease land use rights from the city government (secondary market) and then trade their 
property between private individuals (tertiary market), farmers are prohibited from trading 
their land or mortgaging their buildings, and their land use rights can be circulated only 
within the rural collective. Without a secondary and tertiary market, farmers cannot capture 
the market value of their piece of collective land.225 Nevertheless, most farmland in China, 
after all, is not marketable in the same way as in the costal and developed areas because of 
the differentiation in rents. 
 
Explicit in this argument is that the privatisation of collective land will clarify the 
ambiguity of ownership rights and reduce the frequency of social disputes.226 Implicit in 
this argument is that an increase in land use transactions in rural areas will bring justice to 
peasants and resolve the problem of under-urbanisation in China.227 Absent from these 
neoliberal doctrines are the socio-political consequences of ideological privatisation and 
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unrestrained urbanisation. These arguments fail to account for the social protection of the 
peasantry and the affordable settlements in migrant enclaves that are inseparable from the 
dual land tenure system.228 Land compensation from the sale of land is a one-off event that 
cannot be compared to sustained welfare through land tenure. Furthermore, privatisation 
does not truly increase the bargaining power of peasants in the context of local state 
corporatism.  
 
Furthermore, the question of whether peasants should be regarded as the owners of 
collective land who are entitled to obtain the entirety of its market value is also 
debatable.229 Because real estate has brought huge revenue to city governments and private 
developers, they do mind to give higher compensation to the native villagers’ variable land 
in the city. In the end, the cheap shelter for the migrants is demolished whereas the lavish 
high-rise is sold to the urbanites, thereby structuring inequality as the former is deprived of 
basic security for lodging while the latter earning compound interest from the property. 
Most importantly, the disintegration of the dual land system will drive peasants into the 
cities, resulting in food insecurity, depriving farmers of basic security, reproducing a 
landed class, and forming slums with their entrenched inequality and social disorder. 
 
In the following, we use the pattern of back-and-forth migration and the emergence of 
migrant settlements to illustrate the ways in which the dual land system has respectively 
guaranteed structural stability in the course of economic transition and managed urban 
contestations brought by rural migrants. Although these socialist legacies have created 
other problems, privatisation would obviously compromise the attainment of an alternative 
model of modernisation.  
 
 
EXIT POINTS, SOCIAL PROTECTION AND STRUCTURAL STABILITY 
 
Collective Land, Return Migration and Structural Stability 
The global financial crisis of 2008 led to a sharp reduction in export orders from the United 
States and Europe. The 20 per cent reduction in exports in 2008 severely affected China’s 
labour-intensive and export-oriented economy, leading to a large and abrupt decrease in 
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demand for migrant workers in the manufacturing sector in coastal cities. By early 2009, 
the number of unemployed migrants who were laid off and became precarious labour in 
cities reached 20 million, which constitutes 40 per cent of the world’s total estimated 
unemployed population as a result of the global financial crisis. 230  Based on a 
representative sample of 1,200 household in six provinces in rural China, another estimate 
suggested that 45 million rural dwellers either lost their jobs or postponed their entry into 
cities between September 2008 and April 2009.231 
 
Why have the effects of the economic crisis on advanced countries and export-oriented 
countries not affected China’s social stability as well? The 4 trillion yuan stimulus package 
from China’s central government is largely responsible for the country’s rapid and forceful 
rebound. China’s GDP recovered from a growth rate of 6.1 per cent in the first quarter to 
reach 10.8 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2009.232 Another commonly mentioned factor is 
the improved flexibility of China’s labour market, as rural workers were willing to accept 
lower wages or shorter working hours in order to stay in the market during the crisis. The 
average monthly salary and hours of work for a migrant worker is said to have decreased 
by 2.4 per cent and 1.9 per cent, respectively, between January and April 2009.233  
 
However, one must recall the gap in time between the adverse effects of the financial crisis 
and the recovery from these effective measures. In late 2008, hundreds of thousands of 
laid-off rural migrants blocked and protested outside of closed factories and labour 
departments. Ultimately, it was not the suppression from the coercive state that dismantled 
this angry and impoverished crowd. Instead, these unemployed rural migrants disappeared 
as they were pushed out of cities because of a lack of social welfare and pulled towards the 
system of land and subsistence in the countryside. Millions of rural migrants embarked on 
their spring journeys (chunyun) home several months earlier than usual and thus filled the 
headlines of news stories.234 
 
This movement indicates that the basic social protection provided in the countryside 
offered a trade-off for the adverse effects of the global crisis in cities. The returned 
                                                
230 Chan, 2010:660. 
231 Garnaut et al., 2010:245. 
232 Xinhua 21 January 2010. 
233 Garnaut et al., 2010: 242, 249. 
234 Chan, 2010: 659. 
96 
 
migrants were immediately surrounded by their families and relatives and absorbed into 
their land to contribute their labour. The collective land system provided more than simply 
a subsistence remedy, such as housing and food; the system also offered social ties and 
personal worth in the midst of economic shock. This system guarantees permanent shelter 
and temporary relief for migrants in the process of seeking alternative employment. 
Findings from a large-scale nationwide survey indicated that approximately 15 million 
rural migrants returned to the villages in 2009, and approximately 80 per cent of these 
migrants returned to the agricultural sector and worked for an average of half the year.235 
The rural-urban divide embedded in the hukou system and the dual land system was 
aligned to generate structural stability. 
 
To be certain, the buffer zone effect in the course of the economic recession is not 
unprecedented. Under a dual economic structure, the agricultural sector always serves as 
the channel for reshuffling labour from the manufacturing and service sectors. When 
wages in the modern sector fall below the reservation wage, workers will seek employment 
in the traditional sector provided that the cost of moving is not prohibitively high.236 This 
process also occurred during the Asian financial crisis, when millions of Indonesian 
workers returned to the countryside, resulting in reduced unemployment in the cities.237 
Indonesia’s long-developed rural infrastructure and the size of its agricultural economy 
were cited as the causes enabling the return flow of labour, leading to a lower 
unemployment rate and slower decline in real earnings in the rural areas than in the urban 
areas.238 China’s situation was special because its return migration was not simply driven 
by economic factors but also structured by the sophisticated hukou and land systems. 
 
Although the interplay between surviving socialist institutions and new market forces has 
formed and largely sustained urban villages, what has enabled China to regulate urban 
diseases common in developing countries is not a distinctive development model but a 
nuanced pace and form of development. First, China has experienced rapid, constant and 
unprecedented economic growth for three and a half decades. The pace of development 
quickly generated employment opportunities for surplus labourers and continuously 
reduced urban poverty. Second, China has adopted an investment-led growth model in 
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which the construction of real estate, highways and high-speed railways are uninterrupted. 
This development pressure generated an urban landscape with an associated modern 
aesthetic, which is contrary to the formation of slums and the presence of squatters. 
 
Back-and-Forth Migration and Exit Points for Migrants 
China has long experienced a back-and-forth migration pattern even prior to the global 
financial crisis. Each year, hundreds of millions of rural migrants have taken the journey 
home during the Spring Festival, an event that the World Bank calls “the largest movement 
of people in the world” (Figure 4). The World Bank sought to use this phenomenon to 
illustrate how factor mobility enabled efficient economic growth in China, whereas others 
have emphasised the role of institutional factors.239 Another regular trend associated with 
migrants in China is high remittances, which are not only an important source of rural 
income but also reflect the migrant workers’ intention to return to their native place.240 
Remittances from urban to rural China has increased from 200 billion yuan in 1997 to US$ 
30 billion or approximately 250 billion yuan in 2005.241 The majority of first-generation 
migrants whom I surveyed concurred that they send at least 8,000 yuan, between one-
fourth and one-third of their annual income, to their family in their native place. 242 
Remittances are primarily used for improving rural residents’ living standards, such as 
purchasing food, clothing and medicine; settling debts and fees; and building a house. 
However, better-off households use the remaining sum for investment and capacity 
building. The major means include recruiting labour to assist in crop cultivation, buying 
better fertilisers or farm equipment, and paying children’s tuition fees.  
 
From time to time, rural migrants return to their permanent residence in the countryside as 
a way to adapt to fluctuations in the urban job market, participate in personal and social 
rituals, or invest and start businesses. Migrants seldom stay in one city to develop their 
careers; rather, most migrants move between cities and between the countryside and cities 
to seek better job opportunities and to adapt to the business cycle of manufacturing 
factories and construction projects. Although Shenzhen has the fastest economic growth 
rate with abundant jobs, three-fifths of its rural migrants have stayed and worked in the city 
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for fewer than 5 years.243 
 
 
Figure 4 Pattern of internal migration during Spring Festival, 27 January 2014 
 
This back-and-forth migration pattern is caused by two sets of institutional constraints. 
First, rural migrants and their families are not entitled to much social security in cities 
under the hukou system. Second, the collective land system provides a subsistence level of 
social protection that includes shelter and food in the countryside. Consequently, rural 
migrants tend to move into cities alone and leave behind the elderly and children, whose 
productivity is sufficient to make a living through farming and, to a lesser extent, the 
renting business. Because of the strain in human resources, each rural household has only 6 
to 12 mu of land to cultivate; this amount produced an average land-related income of 
6,000 to 8,000 yuan annually in 2010 and 2012 according to a survey of more than 50 
counties. Migrant workers’ remittances provided an additional 3,000 to 5,000 yuan of 
income.244  
 
Of course, the actual amount varies between inland and coastal regions and is also 
conditioned by the change in credit interest. However, the collective land system 
constitutes a “generational division of labour” by enabling the less productive elderly to 
earn a living from farming and allowing the more productive youth to seek employment in 
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cities.245 The abolition of the century-old agricultural tax in 2006 reduced the autonomy of 
township governments and their ability to provide public goods, but it also lightened the 
burden of those staying on the farm.246  
 
Thus, an official survey conducted across three provinces and twelve villages in 2012 
indicated that as many as 95.4 per cent of elders were satisfied with their current living 
standard.247 The way that the question was posed indicates that only poverty reduction was 
assessed, whereas other social costs such as broken families, elderly and children left 
behind, and the destruction of the rural fabric of life were untouched.248 However, my in-
depth interviews (n=60) in the four urban villages show that more than three-fourths of 
migrants were concerned about the value dimension attached to rural land, as this 
dimension has secured the ties between migrants and those left behind. While migration 
has been endorsed as a means of bringing fortune to one’s families and a challenge to be 
overcome by talented and adventurous young peasants, those who have partaken in that 
ritual are expected to eventually settle in their native place.249  Although many of my 
interviewees expressed the desire to privatise their land, emphasising the sense of security 
behind property ownership, they almost unanimously agreed that if privatisation meant 
abandoning their collective land rights, they would refuse to sell their means of production 
and to sever their social ties in exchange for a one-off payment.250  
 
In addition, because rural migrants lack resident status, the cost of leaving urban areas and 
returning to rural areas once the employment situation becomes unfavourable is relatively 
low. Their skills and age are additional factors urging migrants to return to the countryside. 
Labour-intensive industry and its division of labour cause most rural migrants to remain 
semi-skilled workers despite years of work and training. To increase efficiency, younger 
workers always replace older workers. In 2008, 70 per cent of all migrant workers were 
below 40 years of age, but this figure decreased to 59.3 per cent in 2012.251 Although this 
change reflects the beginning of the end of China’s demographic dividend, it remains 
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difficult for rural migrants to find blue-collar work in large factories and in coastal cities 
after the age of 40.252 Hence, the longer the rural migrants work in the city, the less 
competitive they are. 
 
Finally, the average job tenure for China’s rural migrants is extremely short. According to 
two national surveys, migrant workers who resided in cities less than 2 years increased 
from 35.43 to 39.76 per cent from 1987 to 2005.253 Similar pattern was also presented in 
Shenzhen, in which only 29.2 and 3.3 per cent of its migrant workers respectively worked 
for more than 5 and 20 years in 2013.254 These data infer two recurring patterns. One is 
that rural land and urban jobs have continued to push new migrants out and pull old 
migrants back to balance and steadily decrease the average job tenure. Another is that 
despite of their long residence in the city, rural migrants find difficulty to assimilate into it, 
nor consider it the permanent residence. Although the abolishment of the hukou system 
could be a long-term solution, collective land has somehow managed to address the 
comparative disadvantage of rural migrants, who are provided with not only a second form 
of employment but also alternative business and social roles in the countryside. The 
combined effect is that rural migrants prefer to rent a cheap apartment to minimise their 
costs in the city rather than building a house from scratch as their third world counterparts 
in the need of occupying a free space and in the hope of signifying their hard life. These 
institutional constraints retard the formation of slums, although the floating population has 
become as high as 274 million. 
 
However, back-and-forth migration is not unique to China. In Latin America, Southeast 
Asia and West Africa, circular migration has occurred in response to changes in production 
cycles and the onset of economic crisis.255 China’s situation was nuanced, as its circular 
migration was not simply driven by economic factors but also structured by its 
sophisticated hukou, the land systems and associated tenure of urban residence, and the 
threat of inability to obtain future permits for travel to cities. In short, circular migration 
alone cannot prevent the formation of slums, but China’s institutional constraints have 
collectively increased the costs and changed migrant workers’ prospects of permanent 
residence in cities. Erecting urban slums, albeit illegally, in an attempt to occupy a space 
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and to signify their citizenship, has not been the intention of China’s rural migrants. 
Instead they are semi-proletarianised and become long-term sojourners. 
 
THE TRAJECTORIES OF GRASSROOTS NEGOTIATIONS 
 
Migrant Enclaves on Collective Land  
In the context of rapidly developing urban sprawl, collective land in rural areas was 
absorbed into the jurisdiction of urban areas. Until 2010, Shenzhen maintained a dual 
administrative structure that divided the municipality into two parts. One administration 
governed the districts of Luohu, Futian and Nanshan and several early industrial zones 
designated as the city proper. The territorial jurisdiction of the SEZ was restricted to this 
395 km2 of land and included 91 administrative villages. The other administration 
governed the districts of Bao’an and Longgang and the new high-tech zones in the suburbs. 
This area, which included 239 administrative villages spread across 1,553 km2 of land, was 
known as the secondary barrier (er xianguan).256 This administrative division has not only 
determined the quality of migrant settlements but also shaped the dynamics of negotiations 
between the municipal government and other grassroots actors.  
 
Although it was not uncommon for local governments throughout the world to utilise land 
development as an urban growth machine, some observers argue that China was distinctive 
because of the local state’s monopolistic power in the land system. Not only did this power 
leave land conversion relatively unregulated, but land revenue also contributed to the 
formation of local state corporatism.257 According to Ping’s calculations in 2006, land 
revenue has generated 615 billion yuan in fiscal income for local governments and 
accounted for 30 to 60 per cent of their expenditure. Furthermore, Wu estimated in 2013 
that 30 trillion yuan of land value has been transferred to the local state through land 
requisition and development in the reform era.258 This figure contributed to the synthesis of 
the enormous, predatory and almost exclusive gains that local governments have secured 
from land development. 
 
However, the very existence of scattered yet widespread urban villages – many of which 
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intersect with high-rise buildings and grand shopping malls – in the sunbelt city’s urban 
centre challenge the validity of this state-centred thesis. If the local state had enjoyed 
hegemonic power, these rural institutions would not have been integrated into the cities 
after 35 years of reform. If the local state treated economic returns as an overriding factor, 
these low-density tenements would have been demolished long ago to increase land use 
efficiency and value. On the contrary, the dual land system has continued to restrain 
municipal governments from infringing on the boundaries of urban villages. The fact that 
urban villages have never effectively become urban “communities” (shequ) is a good 
indicator of the power sharing between city governments and rural collectives, which will 
be discussed further in Chapter 5. 
 
Nevertheless, a carrot and stick approach has been adopted to maximise disposable land in 
the sunbelt city. On the one hand, the municipal government has allocated incentives to 
transform villagers into urbanites. The transfer of rural hukou to non-rural hukou 
(nongzhuanfei) was granted to all native villagers whose villages fell within the city’s 
administrative jurisdiction. As shown in Chapter 3, this type of transfer is difficult to 
procure under the hukou system, as it grants migrants both citizenship and the associated 
social welfare. However, when the Shenzhen government enacted this policy in 1992, it 
encountered bitter resistance. More than 95 per cent of native villagers refused to accept 
the offer. 259  They voiced concerns regarding the loss of social ties and the strict 
enforcement of the one-child policy, but the primary reason for their discontent was that 
the welfare entitlements of the urban hukou could no longer be compared to the rental 
value of urban village housing for this group of “landed peasantry”. Benefitting from small 
groups and shared interests, they overcame the problems of collective action and 
succeeded in forcing the government to put the hukou transfer policy on hold.260 Contrary 
to popular perception, China’s coercive state retreated, and this action resulted not in the 
protection of a dissenting public sphere but in the production of a rentier class. 
 
On the other hand, the municipal government has applied its despotic power to nationalise 
collective land into state-owned land because the law allows the local government to 
convert and develop agricultural land in the “public interest”. Although industrial upgrades 
and transportation networks are frequently used as the pretext for expropriating collective 
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land, most of these projects have resulted in factory buildings or real estate developments. 
The merging of administrative divisions in 2010 was the latest overarching attempt by the 
local state to discard the dual land system. Although this policy technically made every 
piece of land state owned, disputes and litigations over land have continued to increase, 
and the nationalisation process has not been effectively implemented as of 2015. 
 
Central to such disputes is that although the land has been nationalised, the property built 
upon it remains private or collective. Essentially, nearly all of the available and accessible 
farmland in Shenzhen had been requisitioned and developed. According to a report of the 
National School of Development of Peking University, the built areas of Shenzhen 
increased from 3 m2 to 934 m2 between 1979 and 2003, constituting 47 per cent of the 
city’s total area. This figure is three times higher than those for Beijing, Shanghai or 
Guangzhou. 261  What had been left untouched since 2005 until the large-scale urban 
renewal was the zhaijidi in the villages, which was saved through complicated negotiations 
with the grassroots regime and protected by a reluctance to openly violate fundamental 
socialist rights.262 In Shenzhen, each native household is entitled to a piece of zhaijidi on 
which to build an apartment of 480 m2. The term “native” refers to those possessing a local 
rural hukou registered before 1 January 1991 in the inner city (guannei) and before 29 
October 2004 in the outskirts districts (guanwai). These are the dates on which the land in 
the respective areas was nationalised by the municipal government. A household includes 
an unmarried native villager under the age of 30 regardless of sex. In practice, however, 
women in Shenzhen have rarely inherited the household quota based on lineage and family 
traditions.263 
 
When the city expanded and absorbed the rural villages of peri-urban areas into its 
jurisdiction, the dual land system intervened. Because the “land for agriculture” and “land 
for construction” were requisitioned and redeveloped but not the “land for dwelling”, 
urban village housing still stands in the city centre. In 2000, Shenzhen had 241 urban 
villages occupying 43.9 km2 and housing 2.15 million inhabitants. By 2005, the figure had 
risen to 320 urban villages occupying 93.5 km2 and housing 5.02 million inhabitants, of 
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whom 4.69 million were rural migrants.264 According to an annual report from Shenzhen’s 
Urban Villages Redevelopment Office, urban village housing accounted for approximately 
92 per cent of the rental housing for rural migrants.265 
 
China’s urban contestation is thus overshadowed by a series of exchanges and negotiations 
between the city governments and rural collectives entitled to different land use rights and 
subject to similar institutional constraints. Hsing depicted these actors and their 
subsidiaries as “socialist land masters”, as their authority and rights are not only inherited 
from the socialist era but also justified by the principle of collective ownership of property 
and means of production.266 In 2014, Shenzhen conducted a new round of land reform 
aimed at accelerating land transition and urban renewal, and during this period, the 
socialist land masters both competed and aligned with one another. In the following 
section, we examine how and under which conditions the stakeholders of collective land 
have seized their interests while unintentionally protecting the living space of rural 
migrants. The policy effects with regard to property rights, the distribution of land value 
and migrants’ living space will be discussed further in Chapter 7. 
 
Shareholding Reforms and Intermediaries  
Joint-stock companies are vital to the process of land development and grassroots 
negotiation. Although the shareholding reform of JCs is traditionally regarded as exclusive 
to the Pearl River Delta, recent studies show that it has also been transferred to or initiated 
in the Bohai Bay Rim and the Yangtze River Delta. Not surprisingly, all of these areas are 
sunbelt economies that have experienced more severe urban contestation and have enjoyed 
better access to this new model. Shenzhen, among Guangzhou, Foshan and Dongguan, was 
one of the pioneers of this initiative. The first wave of shareholding reform arose in 1992 
as a bottom-up initiative to address the ambiguity of land use rights and to capture the 
enormous land revenue from industrialisation. The second wave emerged in 2004 in the 
form of a state-led policy that aimed to transform all native villagers into urbanites and to 
nationalise collective land for urbanisation. 267 
 
The years of the reform are significant. The year 1992 marked Deng Xiaoping’s Southern 
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Tour, which accelerated the pace and scope of market reforms. The shareholding reform 
was justified because “other forms of ownership should supplement the dominant state 
sector in the initial stage of socialism”. The JC was hence classified as an “organised 
socialist enterprise” that contained a balanced share of collective and individual shares.268 
Similarly, the year 2004 marked the beginning of a massive modernisation plan in 
Guangdong. After years of industrialisation without urbanisation, the Guangdong 
provincial government and the Shenzhen municipal government were eager to use land 
development as a new engine of growth. Consequently, all rural collectives within 
Shenzhen’s administrative boundary were given a three-year transition period to convert 
into JCs.269 
Table 6: Features of Three Joint-Stock Companies in Shenzhen  
Village/Feature Eligibility of 
shareholders  
Percentage of 
collective shares 
Sources of 
collective assets 
Criteria for share 
circulation  
Nong 
 
 
Native villagers 
(lineage) 
40 690 mu of zhaijidi 
and TVE buildings 
Pass on to family 
members  
Shi 
 
 
Native villagers 
(lineage) 
35 380 mu of zhaijidi 
and TVE buildings 
Sell to the 
collective  
Shang 
 
 
Native villagers 
(household) 
25 340 mu of zhaijidi 
and TVE buildings 
Sell to other 
shareholders 
Source: Annual Reports of the Joint-Stock Companies in Shi, Shang and Nong villages in 2011-2012, 
supplemented by interview data. 
As a privatised village committee, a JC is essentially a hybrid institution. Such a company 
concurrently represents the collective ownership of land and the interests of individual 
shareholders. Table 6 shows the unique and exclusive features of JCs. 1) The nature of the 
shareholding is mixed, containing both collective and individual shares; this design embeds 
the statist element into the privatised entity. 2) Eligibility for being a shareholder is rigid; it 
includes only native villagers with the additional conditions of lineage and household, 
which are meant to prohibit the transfer of shares by marriage and to regulate the 
expansion of shareholders among the youth. 3) The transfer of shares is discouraged, with 
circulation allowed only within the collective and among shareholders; this approach 
ensures cohesion among the villagers but also assures the authority of management. 4) The 
sources of collective assets are nearly identical, consisting of land assets and real property 
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in collective land, which entails spatial constraints for the company.270  
 
These features indicate that the JC has functioned as a hybrid entity combining and 
exercising the roles of state, firm and communal organisation in urban villages. This 
structure reinforces a closed system that entitles insiders to collective assets and associated 
dividends and that also grants the JC the authority to make deals with outsiders. This 
institutional arrangement ensures that every JC, regardless of its wealth and authority, has 
been designated the objective of making a profit and managing an enclave.  
 
During the shareholding reform, JCs converted all collective land and assets into shares to 
form land-based joint stock co-operatives. Because most of the collective land in China 
had been contracted or leased to individual households under the HRS in the early 1980s, 
the shareholding reform – although containing elements of privatisation – in practice led to 
a process of re-collectivisation. 271  Consequently, the JCs adopted a proactive role in 
assuming collective land use rights. In contrast, villagers became a passive dividend-
earning class who did not need to farm or conduct business. This process has transformed 
the role of the JC from an impartial contractor to a committed player that oversees daily 
operations and is entitled to profits from land conversion and transactions. 
 
Land Development and Grassroots Exchanges 
The primary role of the JC is that of a manager and a broker. Nearly every JC in the sunbelt 
cities has brokered the nationalisation of collective land and participated in the illegal 
transition of such land in the informal market. Although the Land Administrative Law 
prohibits the transition of collective land beyond native households, the law makes an 
exception for TVEs to boost local employment and industrialisation. When Shenzhen’s 
TVEs lost their comparative advantages, such as cheap labour and abundant land, to their 
counterparts in adjacent cities, the sale of TVEs actually provided a new source of income 
for urban villages. The JC took advantage of this loophole by selling the shares of TVEs or 
by establishing joint ventures with investors. 272  In these tailor-made joint venture 
agreements, the JC always used land to pay for its investment, which effectively 
transferred the land assets from the collective to outsiders, primarily foreign investors, real 
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estate developers or the subsidiaries of government xitong.273  
 
For instance, in Gong village, which is adjacent to the high-tech development zones, more 
than 60 per cent of its collective land has been transferred into nearby manufacturing 
companies to build factories and dormitories. This series of informal land transactions 
explains why more than half of the factories in the Pearl River Delta were actually built on 
rural collective land.274 In Shang village, which is within the commercial centre, a total of 
400 mu of agricultural land have been reallocated to the TVEs and then sold to real estate 
developers. However, despite the enormous transition of land, the majority of the 239 
administrative villages in the city expanded and maintained a physical boundary in the city 
until the late 2000s.275 
 
The territory of the JC has been preserved because it is also a ruler of the community. This 
unique role ensures that land exchange is not purely monetary and that physical requisition 
does not necessarily compromise the JC’s political function. For instance, in Shi village, 
collective land has regularly been sold for public projects, thereby enhancing the 
development of external and political linkages. The construction of the Shenzhen Central 
Plaza is one of the most representative projects demonstrating this process that could not 
have materialised without assistance from the JC in Shi village. The project covered a total 
area of 45.6 hm2 constituting the South Axis of Shenzhen, in which more than 75 per cent 
of the land was allocated to commercial buildings and shopping malls, with the remaining 
part reserved for green belts, performing sites and government land use.276  
 
In exchange, the municipal government distributed 60 million yuan of funding to construct 
a cultural centre in the urban village and to build other public amenities, such as roads, 
parks and sanitary facilities. Furthermore, the village boss of Shi took the opportunity to 
establish patronage up to the level of the major’s office. Since then, the JC has devoted 
more resources to governing the urban village to secure its collective assets and to request 
additional state funding. In return, the Shenzhen government has used the village as an 
illustrative case for the central government and other cities. Ranking officials as high as 
Politburo members were brought to the village to see what were considered achievements 
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of self-sufficient economies, socialist new villages, or governed communities. The 
parameters of urban villages are in this regard secured through the construction of political 
patronage.277 
 
 
PRIVATISATION AND THE RESOURCEFUL COLLECTIVES 
 
Emergence of a Rentier Class 
Although a typical urban village in Shenzhen contains an average of 70,000 people, its 
collective land rights are confined to approximately 1,200 shareholders who are native 
villagers. In legal terms, JCs, similar to VCs, are required to hold regular grassroots 
elections to choose their leaders and management team. However, the shareholding reform 
has essentially legitimised a form of money-for-seats patron-client relationship. This 
situation involves a highly autonomous grassroots realm along with enduring leadership of 
local bosses in urban villages. Four of the five chairmen and deputies of JCs whom we 
interviewed have held their positions since 1992, and two of them were the secretaries of 
VCs. 
 
After the shareholding reform, a new type of “landed peasantry” emerged in the urban 
villages. Compared with rural peasants, urban villagers enjoy a variety of income sources, 
but most do not need to work. Each urban villager normally has four sources of income: 1) 
income from labour, 2) rental income from urban village housing, 3) annual dividends 
from the JC, and 4) compensation from land or property requisition. Among the 25 native 
villagers interviewed, none are currently work on a farm. Several villagers have started 
businesses that are largely related to real estate or managed by professionals; hence, the 
income generated should be classified as investment income rather than income from 
labour. Compensation can turn urban villagers into millionaires overnight, but such 
opportunities most often provide a one-off payment; we shall return to this topic in the 
discussion of urban renewal. Most of the time, however, rental income and annual 
dividends constitute a reliable source of income for urban villagers, transforming them into 
a landed, dividend-earning class.  
Under this political economic structure, the interests of native villages are linked with 
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those of JCs. Table 7 describes the sources of income for the three JCs in our field sites. 
Despite minor categorical variations, the JCs undoubtedly rely on private business rather 
than government redistribution to function. Although district appropriation accounts for 
10.1 per cent of their income, their collective assets produce the remaining 89.9 per cent. 
The primary difference between the three urban villages is in the types of property that are 
rented. Gong village, which formerly housed several SOEs and TVEs, has continued to 
benefit from renting out old factory sites. Similar infrastructures in Shi and Shang villages 
were redeveloped into apartments whose central locations ensure a high and suitable level 
of rental demand. Common to all three urban villages is their direct and indirect rental 
income, with approximately 76.1 per cent from rental charges and 13.8 per cent from 
investment returns and management fees. These business models and sources of income 
reveal the sphere of collective agencies and the market economy. The question of whether 
the hybrid system can enhance the primitive accumulation of labour and capital is as 
important as the question of whether it will cause corruption, inequality and inefficiency.278  
Table 7 Sources of Income of Joint-Stock Companies in Shenzhen 
Village/Source Apartment 
rental 
(%) 
Factory 
rental 
(%) 
Management 
fee 
(%) 
Investment 
dividend 
(%) 
District 
appropriation 
(%) 
Gross 
income 
(‘000) 
Shi 
 
71.8 2.8 8.3 5.3 11.9 7,624 
Shang 
 
68.9 4.9 7.7 8.7 9.8 6,278 
Nong 
 
56.7 23.1 6.2 5.4 8.6 4,120 
Source: Annual Reports of the Joint-Stock Companies in Shi, Shang and Nong villages in 2011-2012. 
 
Provision of Affordable Shelter 
Undoubtedly, the most important role of urban village housing is to offer inexpensive, 
affordable and accessible shelter to rural migrants. Because zhaijidi is free, the cost of a 
house in an urban village is nearly identical to the cost of construction. The capital 
investment for such self-built housing is relatively small and can easily be financed 
through the personal savings of native villagers or borrowed from relatives, friends and 
rural credit unions. Collective land use rights ensure that these conveniently located 
accommodations are offered at relatively low prices, making them extremely competitive 
in a dynamic city’s low-end rental market. In 2010, the average rent in Shenzhen’s urban 
                                                
278 Wang et al., 2015. Chapters 5 and 6 will discuss and assess the collective roles of the JCs in detail.  
110 
 
villages was only two-fifths that of formal settlements. According to real estate agents and 
landlords, the rent for urban village housing accounted for approximately one-fifth to one-
sixth of the monthly income of rural migrants. As of 2014, the cost of a two-bedroom flat 
in the guanwai pair rented by migrant workers who either refused to live or were not 
allocated with factory dormitory was between 500 and 1200 yuan per month. Apartments 
of similar size in urban villages in the city proper, which are primarily reserved for migrant 
entrepreneurs or white-collar migrants, cost between 800 and 2, 200 yuan.279 Basically, the 
rent for a bed space in the city centre is roughly equal to rent for a two-bedroom flat in the 
outskirts. 
 
The legal status of urban village housing further contributes to its domination in the rental 
market. Commonly referred to as “small property rights houses” (xiao chanquan fang), this 
housing is built on collective land with limited property rights. Most of the apartments hold 
only a stamped certificate from the rural collectives to trace their ownership, but they are 
banned from obtaining an official property rights certificate issued by the Housing 
Authority. Because a “small property rights house” cannot be transacted in the market, it 
can be used only for rental purposes. Motivated by high demand and lucrative gains, 
villagers commonly build high-density housing in a way that maximises floor area. Houses 
in the city centre are approximately 5 to 6 storeys high, whereas houses in the outskirts 
reached 12 storeys after the 2000s. These houses exceed the limits of municipal building 
regulations that cap the height of village houses at three storeys and the size at 480 m2. 
Subordinated to a rural land system and primarily regulated by the JC, urban villagers 
enjoy more flexibility in the adoption of city planning and safety regulations. An estimated 
56 per cent of the buildings in Shenzhen contain illegal structures, the majority of which 
are concentrated in urban villages.280 
 
Institutional Sources of Informality 
Multiple reasons have enabled the urban villages to evade regulations and expand rapidly. 
The structural reason is the local state’s tacit encouragement. On the administrative level, 
although the state no longer provides this form of public goods in the era of privatisation, 
the responsible bureaus and officials would be held responsible if the crime rate or social 
unrest increased. Furthermore, more living space and rental transactions mean more value-
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added, business and land use taxes, which are important sources of local revenue. Many 
local officials have thus fully recognised the contribution of urban villages in providing 
affordable shelter for migrants and relieving their burden. On the personal level, the cadres 
and officials in local police stations and fire departments as well as industry and commerce, 
and environmental bureaus all live across the bribes and fees from these native villagers 
and rural migrants. The larger the irregular and informal economy is, the higher the black 
and grey income is; and local officials thus have incentives to preserve these illegal 
structures. 
 
Although the structure in urban villages may be illegal, the building materials are not 
necessarily primitive and unsafe. On the contrary, most apartments in our field sites were 
built with durable materials by professional construction teams. Each house normally had a 
foundation, windows, and glazed tiles and roofing, along with shared kitchens and 
bathrooms. The apartments were often rented to several related migrants or subleased by 
an agency working on behalf of landlords. Durable materials were used because the 
housing was not a one-off purchase commodity but rather a financial asset that could 
generate regular dividends. Precedent suggested that although unsafe and hazardous 
buildings had been torn down, illegal or unauthorised structures qualified for compensation, 
albeit at a discounted rate. Relatively durable buildings would hence maximise villagers’ 
claims for appropriate compensation during urban renewal. Because affluent native 
villagers had originally been legally restricted and communally bound to stay in their 
apartments, they had an incentive to maintain higher building standards.281 
 
Apart from the monetary benefits, living in migrant enclaves also has other distinctive 
attributes. Common to the majority of rural migrants is a period of residence in highly 
controlled factory dormitories in the city outskirts, followed by tenancy in the relatively 
autonomous urban village housing in the city centre. A sense of improvement is thus 
widely held among rural migrants, and this perception partly explains why they have 
chosen to accept the status quo. During the interviews, many migrants suggested that 
having the freedom to choose when to switch off the lights, having the space to bring 
guests into their homes and, ultimately, not being watched and regulated by others signify 
that they are in control of their daily lives.  
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In sum, the JCs, native villagers and city authorities have formed a patronage that requires 
each group’s mutual benefits and cooperation to function. Initially, native villagers inject 
their collective assets into the JC and cast their votes to support its leadership. To maintain 
the system, the JC must deliver annual dividends from collective investments and ensure 
an orderly enclave to facilitate the development of a competitive rental market. In a quid 
pro quo arrangement, local governments and grassroots regimes have an incentive to 
tolerate illegal structures in the urban villages and to endorse the relative autonomy of the 
JCs. For an urban village, housing has not only provided shelter for rural migrants, who are 
essential for industrial growth and urban development, but also regulated the migrant 
enclaves, which can be extremely costly for official units and protocols to manage. As long 
as the economic and political return is superior to other development alternatives, this 
patronage will continue to enjoy mutual assurance and guarantee structural stability in 
China’s sunbelt. Chapter 6 will explain how and why the launch of a new wave of urban 
renewal projects targeting at the urban villages in the city centre indicates the changes in 
the functions of the above equation.   
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5 Commercialised Grassroots Agencies and Regulated Urban Space 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter examines the mechanisms of grassroots governance in the migrant enclaves in 
the course of decentralisation and privatisation. This exploration focuses on an 
intermediate realm and examines the roles of a group of non-state agencies. Known as 
joint-stock companies, they are privatised village collectives that have nonetheless 
inherited the dual roles of governance and production in the urban villages. These 
collectives primarily serve as grassroots regimes that regulate communal order, align social 
organisations and deliver the core and residual tasks of urban authorities. Through the 
interplay of coercion and exchange, JCs have preserved a coercive force to enable the 
sensitive handling of daily disputes and to provide an orderly environment for their rental 
businesses. Additionally, they function as shareholding companies to differentiate the 
provision of public goods and welfare services among different social groups. These 
activities consolidate a web of social networks that connect the rural migrants, who are 
tenants, workers or consumers, with the native villagers, who are landlords, owners or 
service providers. 
 
Although the JCs have established cohesive networks in the migrant enclaves, they have 
also reinforced socio-political inequality between the income-earning tenants and the 
dividend-earning landlords. This scenario inevitably leads one to ponder whether the JCs 
are practising a form of clientelism or whether these collaborative mechanisms are 
reinforcing the authoritarian state rather than empowering the grassroots society.282 I argue 
that these non-state agencies are indeed an intermediary between the party-state and 
grassroots society that contemplates urban contestation and public goods provision but 
restrains the emergence of civil society. In this regard, China’s migrant enclaves are 
integrated into the formal cities and prevented from collapsing into social decay and 
political anarchy as their third-world counterparts often do. Yet the boundary of 
contestation is ambiguous, and the availability of goods is varied; moreover, the eligibility 
to negotiate and to be discharged from coercion overrides concerns regarding due process 
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and rightful entitlements. 
 
In the following, I will first identify an intermediate political realm at the grassroots level 
that thrives under authoritarianism and marketisation. The institutional foundation for its 
existence is discussed alongside the political economy with respect to its resilience. Second, 
I will examine the mechanisms for providing public goods in urban villages and emphasise 
why these goods and services are available, which agencies account for their production 
and delivery, and how they reinforce the embedded power relationships at the grassroots 
level. Throughout the chapter, I explore how collaborative mechanisms are a form of 
commercialised politics that both govern the migrant enclaves through less coercive or 
predatory means and contest the boundaries between the state and civil society. 
 
 
INTERMEDIARY REALM AND MIGRANT GOVERNANCE 
 
China’s constitution (1982) refers to its lowest level of urban administration as the 
“grassroots regime” (jiceng zhengquan). Other pseudo-state or non-state agencies beneath 
this administrative division, although receiving government resources or being tied with 
the local state, are considered a self-governing “community” (shequ). Figure 5 illustrates 
the hierarchical relationships as well as the exclusive realm possessed by institutions and 
agencies at the local and grassroots level.  
 
Figure 5 Hierarchy of China’s Local State Apparatuses 
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First, city districts are the urban equivalent of county governments, which include a full 
range of departments and bureaus in their jurisdictions. Second, street offices (jiedao 
banshichu) are the urban equivalent of township governments, which enjoy relative limited 
authority and resources but arguably bear diverse expectations and additional 
responsibilities. Third, the lowest level of state agencies shares the responsibility of 
interacting with self-governing agencies, including resident committee (RC) in cities and 
village committees (VC) in the countryside. Subjected to urban sprawl and administrative 
reclassification, many villages have been absorbed into the jurisdiction of cities, thereby 
producing the third type of hybrid agency, the JCs. Although the literature reveals growing 
interest in grassroots politics and community governance, the enclosed realm and the 
extensive roles of JCs have not been fully recognised.283 
 
Devolution of Power and Responsibilities 
This intermediate realm has a historical-institutional foundation, and its expanded roles are 
reinforced by the market reforms. First, the grassroots regimes have long been more 
developed in rural areas. The people’s communes or production teams in Mao’s era were 
comprehensive grassroots agencies that made major decisions regarding political 
mobilisation, economic production and social activities. With the thrift of TVEs from the 
1980s to the mid-1990s, these units recaptured abundant resources and developed equally 
sophisticated internal structures.284 Being resourceful and indispensable allowed them to 
possess bargaining power and share common interests with the county and township 
governments. By contrast, the street offices in urban areas are detached agencies of the 
district and prefecture governments whose manpower and networks have long been 
restrained. Although each street office is entitled to only 3 to 9 cadres and 20 to 25 office 
workers, its responsibilities are actually more complex than those of rural county offices.285 
The street offices must therefore rely on the JCs, RCs and social organisations to complete 
their tasks.  
 
Why has this intermediate realm not been fully recognised? One main reason is that the 
literature tends to focus on the economic roles of TVEs in rural areas or the political-
economic impetuses of the shareholding reform in coastal areas. Another reason relates to 
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the cover-up in the administrative structure in the sense that the formal structure does not 
reflect the actual distribution of power and responsibilities. In theory, the RCs and JCs are 
of equal rank and are demarcated under the jurisdiction of street offices. However, owing 
to the differences in land systems, demographics and resources, the JCs have always 
possessed greater autonomy and bargaining power than the RCs have.286  
 
Certainly, the RCs are a dispatched governing unit that combines administrative officials 
appointed by the district governments and self-governing staff elected every three years 
among qualified residents. JCs, in contrast, are embedded in the private sector and 
grassroots society. However, two policy initiatives have generated the illusion that the state 
has substituted the enclosed realm of the JCs. In 2004, nearly all municipal governments in 
coastal China reclassified their RCs and JCs as “communities”, designating the latter as the 
only official grassroots regimes in the urban areas.287 In 2010, the Shenzhen government, 
as in many coastal cities, incorporated its rural counties into the urban districts, which 
effectively nationalised all of the rural land in Shenzhen into urban land.288 
 
However, although the nationalisation of land transformed land use rights, it did not 
transfer property rights concurrently. As discussed in Chapter 4, the JCs and native 
villagers have continued to own the buildings above the “land for housing”. Similarly, the 
community governance initiative has not assumed the power and roles of JCs. In fact, the 
majority of JCs in the Pearl River Delta have either duplicated the territorial jurisdiction of 
the RCs or shared personnel with them. Until 2001, the municipal governments allocated 
20,000 yuan to each RC annually, which sufficed to employ only approximately 3 to 4 
permanent cadres. In contrast, the more developed JCs spent around 15 to 20 million yuan 
in public facilities and services between 1992 and 2000.289 Although the RC’s allowance 
has increased several times over the years, this level of appropriation and manpower 
cannot be compared with the resources of the JCs, which have continued to invest millions 
of yuan in the urban villages annually and employed hundreds of staff.290 
 
Across the cities in Lingnan areas, including present-day Guangdong, Guangxi, Jiangxi 
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and Fujian provinces, the JC is the de facto supervisor of the RC if we consider the source 
of funding and the fabric of jurisdiction. First, because of limited state appropriation, each 
RC must recruit additional contract staff to fulfil its wide range of responsibilities. The JC 
must regularly subsidise the RC’s budget for those purposes.291 By controlling the payroll, 
the JC has nurtured the collaborative but asymmetric relationships with the RC. Second, 
each urban village typically contains approximately 60,000 people, whereas each RC has a 
maximum population of 20,000; hence, each JC actually contains approximately 2 to 3 
RCs. To enable coordinated policies and effective resolutions, the JCs often function as the 
first points of contact as well as the last resort in the urban villages. Figure 6 shows that the 
building of a JC has incorporated the office a RC, a phenomenon that has spread across all 
of the urban villages that we studied. This division between the legal institution and the 
enforcing agency resembles the classic “two units, same personnel” (yitao banzi, liangkuai 
paizi) structure, causing the realm and roles of the JC to be overlooked. 
 
 
Figure 6 The spatial cum political incorporation of the RC and the JC in Shi Village 
 
Why factors have sustained this intermediary in spite of the authoritarian context? The 
explanation lies in the contradictions in the course of administrative and fiscal 
decentralisation. First and foremost, the local state must absorb cheap labour to be 
competitive in the global market while alleviating migrant contestation for the sake of 
political stability. Additionally, the local state must solicit mandates based on urbanites’ 
increased demands for a wide range of goods and services, although such efforts are 
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restrained by the lack of authority and resources in the course of downscaling. In view of 
these contradictions, the urban governance system built upon danwei is considered 
obsolete. The devolution of responsibility to other intermediaries in the name of 
community governance has become necessary to fill the vacuum.292  
 
However, the need to standardise spatial forms and population control was compromised 
by the lack of financial capacity and communal authority. Local governance reform is thus 
dire in sunbelt cities such as Shenzhen, where the danwei system was disbanded while 
contestation was ever increasing. In 2005, the Shenzhen government announced that local 
governance must shift from vertical command (yitiao weizhu) to horizontal coordination 
(yikuai weizhu). While the government established an Office of Population Control under 
its Reform and Development Commission to coordinate and oversee population control 
policies, it concurrently delegated the associated authority and responsibilities to street 
offices and communities.293  The “government’s purchase of service” (zhengfu goumai 
fuwu) from the JCs and other social organisations is widely considered necessary to 
promote one-stop regulation and end-to-end service.294 
 
Meanwhile, the dynamics faced by gated communities (xiaoqu) under RCs differ from 
those encountered in the migrant enclaves under JCs. Compared with the middle-class 
complex, whose residents are spatially and economically confined to the cities, the rural 
migrants in urban villages are always floating as a result of the hukou system and land 
system. The divergence in demographics and assimilation levels suggests that although the 
rural migrants’ demands for goods and services are relatively low, their contestations on 
public goods provision and towards social order may be greater. The JCs and service 
providers in urban villages are thus delegated with the responsibilities of governing and 
producing, with the former overriding the latter. In other words, the urban village is a semi-
enclosed realm that contains certain features that are distinct from state-dominated 
community governance.  
 
Inclusiveness and Contestation in Urban Villages 
Figure 7 is a conceptual diagram that illustrates the ways in which an urban village is a 
                                                
292 Spire, 2011; Pieke, 2012. 
293 Shenzhen Government, 2005. 
294 Shenzhen Civil Affairs Bureau, 2012. 
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C
ontestation (eligibility to negotiate) 
negotiated but exclusive community. The diagram’s relationships are relative, and the RC 
is by no means an ideal type. The horizontal axis refers to the level of inclusiveness in an 
urban village. Inclusiveness is measured by 1) the entitlement to elect the JC leadership, 2) 
competitiveness during elections and 3) the effectiveness of influencing the JC’s decision 
making. Despite the shareholding reform, each JC is required by law to hold regular 
elections to choose its leadership every 5 years, but the law neither specifies the criteria for 
shareholders nor regulates the procedure for transferring shares, thereby creating ambiguity 
in determining the electorates. 295  In our field sites, only native villagers, including 
approximately 800 households, are entitled to become shareholders and hence members of 
local electorates. To secure the exclusiveness of the community, spouses and offspring are 
not entitled to become shareholders. To ensure internal checks and balances, the JC 
management is responsible for daily operations that include maintaining order, collecting 
rent, developing service networks and executing activities, whereas the shareholders decide 
on collective issues such as land sales, state projects and ritual functions.  
Figure 7   Classification of China’s Grassroots Regime 
  
 
 
 
 
 
        
 
 
This exclusive system interlocks communal authority and economic performance as the 
determining factors in the leadership contest. Once they are elected as the management of 
JC, local bosses use collective resources to satisfy their electorates and safeguard their 
loyalty. These service and communal networks eventually consolidate an enduring yet 
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accountable leadership. Three of the four JC chairmen whom we interviewed had held their 
positions since 1992, and two of them were former heads of VCs.296 The stability in the 
pseudo-state agency then fosters the development of networks and trust with the street-
level cadres, which is a precondition for the de facto political realm. 
 
The vertical axis in Figure 7 refers to the degree of contestation in an urban village. 
Contestation is measured by 1) the amount of public contestation, 2) the eligibility to 
negotiate for public goods, and 3) the resilience of dispute resolutions. Despite largely 
being orderly enclaves, public contestations are not uncommon in urban villages. Through 
formal and informal channels, stakeholders including cadres, goods and service providers, 
landlords and tenants have frequently promoted their agendas and regularised their claims. 
Essentially, the state agenda includes a set of benchmarks for crime rates, family planning, 
population management and health and safety regulations, whereas social demands vary 
among construction advice, demolition compensation, regular patrol and cultural activities. 
 
Contrary to popular expectations, the majority of inhabitants are eligible to express their 
discontent. Admittedly, the cadres, local bosses and native villagers, who are patrons and 
allies, have enjoyed privileged access to the grassroots regime. In contrast, rural migrants 
are not eligible to become the electorates of RC until 2012, and none of the surveyed urban 
villages have implemented the new national regulations or reached the interval to hold 
such an election. But the grievances of rural migrants who are tenants, workers or 
customers are not unattended despite of the absence of electoral machine and competition. 
The views of clan chiefs and migrant traders sometimes carry more weight than those of 
street offices and native villagers. This situation occurs not only because the relative 
mobility and business and service networks of clan chiefs and migrant entrepreneurs 
enhance their leverage in bargaining but also because contestation informs appropriate 
remedies that are ultimately conductive to local governance. Although the authority of 
pseudo- and non-state agencies comes from their state patrons, their utility to the state is 
vested in their ability to connect clients at the grassroots level. 
 
This type of self-recognition is vital to explain the uncertainty that arises during public 
contestations. To be certain, distance from the state apparatuses and the strengthen of clan 
                                                
296 Interviews, Shenzhen, 17-18 March 2012 and 28-30 September 2013. 
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networks have continued to nurture favouritism, in which the street-level cadres, local 
bosses and native villagers represent one end of a spectrum and the clan chiefs and rural 
migrants constitute the other end. However, if we consider what types of public goods are 
actually delivered as payoff and compensation, concentred demands tend to override 
standardised and rigid benchmarks. Hence, although they represent different classes and 
identities in the enclaves, native villagers and rural migrants are not always the losers in 
the process of negotiating with the state apparatuses or its social extensions. The 
citizenship and associated entitlements for rural migrants are perpetually denied, although 
their grievances, if vividly raised, will be transmitted to and addressed by the non-state 
agencies. These dynamic ruling mechanisms reflect the trade-off between entitlement and 
eligibility, which is the embedded nature of grassroots regimes. The trades and power 
relations in the enclaves along with the conflict and inter-subjectivity of different social 
groupings will be addressed in Chapter 7. 
 
 
THE COMMERCIALISATION OF GRASSROOTS POLITICS 
 
All of the JCs that we studied, regardless of their location and business model, have been 
committed to providing certain public goods that are essential to a community but that 
would not be available through the market because of the non-rivalrous and non-
excludable nature of such goods. Although district governments and street offices have 
been expected to address typical market failures, they have lacked the will and resources to 
intervene. Even when such authorities have taken action, priority has been designated to 
public infrastructure in industrial zones and the laid-off urbanites left behind by SOEs. The 
JCs have thus recaptured the responsibility of public goods provision along with their 
production chains in the context of market failure and government retreat.  
 
Certainly, the quality and quantity of public goods and the threshold to obtain them vary 
between the four urban villages. This variation can be explained by differences in wealth 
and demographics or structural factors and by variations in competence and authority or 
agency problems. These public goods are nonetheless available. According to an official 
survey, the 15 JCs in Futian district invested more than 800 million yuan to provide public 
infrastructure, water and sanitation systems, and public security facilities between 1992 
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and 2004.297 Similar levels of public goods provision have been witnessed in our field sites 
in recent years. For instance, Gong Village spent 30 million yuan to construct a 500 metre 
square recreational facility in 2008, Shi Village invested more than 60 million yuan in the 
early 2010s to construct a cultural centre (Figure 8), Shang Village installed a total of 520 
CCTV cameras along main roads and public facilities in 2010, and Nong Village joined 
hands with local governments to establish an art museum of 1.6 hectare in 2007. 
 
 
Figure 8 The collective-initiated and private-managed cultural centre 
 
Most importantly, each JC has established internal bureaus to align with respective social 
organisations to fulfil its responsibilities and to recruit powerful migrant clans to provide 
these goods and services. Although the local government occasionally provides matching 
grants for communal projects, these grants are far from sufficient to realise such goods, 
most of which are public goods whose consumption can scarcely be regulated and charged 
and are subject to heavy depreciation. In doing so, the JCs are consolidating their authority 
and networks in the enclaves and earning the trust and dependence of the state rather than 
being motivated by immediate monetary returns. Through these infrastructures and 
exchanges, the migrant enclaves have been integrated into the fabric of formal cities, 
                                                
297 Interviews, village bosses and clan chiefs, 17 March 2012, and 21 September 2013. 
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enabling interactions between outsiders and insiders. 
 
Provision of Public Goods to All 
Undoubtedly, the urban villages resemble slums to the extent that both are indicators of 
poverty, overcrowding and deviant activities. Because nearly 90 per cent of the inhabitants 
of urban villages are rural migrants, migrant enclaves are inevitably a hotbed of poverty. 
Official data suggested that the household incomes in a dozen random urban villages 
accounted for only two-thirds of the average income in the city in the last decade.298 
However, these data might have slightly exaggerated the poverty level, as migrant traders 
and entrepreneurs tend to underreport their incomes. Furthermore, the data did not account 
for the wealth and dividends received from native villagers. In addition to poverty, many 
urban village apartments are also considered illegal structures. As noted in Chapter 4, these 
apartments violated the building and safety regulations established by urban authorities in 
an attempt to be competitive in the migrants’ rental markets. As a result of the low income-
earning capacity of rural migrants and the high turnover rate under back-and-forth 
migration, landlords had little incentive to decorate apartments. Most urban village 
apartments were thus rented without furnishings and without electronic appliances.  
 
These features do not indicate that every urban village was a source of squalor or despair. 
On the contrary, the standard of living varied greatly between the guanwai pair and the 
guannei pair of urban villages and among different migrant groups. In most cases, the 
upper floors of urban village houses were rented to migrant workers to live in, and migrant 
entrepreneurs used the ground floors to conduct business. For the outskirts pair, the living 
environments are less congested because land contestation is relatively mild. Gong and 
Nong Villages, which are migrant worker residences, largely attracted individual practices 
and local brands. For the guannei pair of urban villages, global chains had either authorised 
retailers or opened stores directly to serve white-collar migrants and urbanites. Another 
indicator of the relative affluence of Shi and Shang Villages was the common problem of a 
lack of parking space caused by the inhabitants’ ever-increasing car ownership and 
corresponding with the wealth of migrant entrepreneurs and white-collar migrants. 
 
In addition, urban villages differ greatly from slums in terms of their spatial and physical 
                                                
298 Calculated from Shenzhen Statistics Bureau, 2005-2014b. 
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form. Certainly, overcrowding is a serious and issue in urban villages. The buildings are so 
packed with each other that they were referred as “kissing building” (jiewen lou). This 
generates fire hazards, pollution and privacy concerns. While the structure may be jammed 
and illegal, the building materials are not necessarily primitive and unsafe (Figure 8). On 
the contrary, most apartments in Shenzhen’s urban villages were built with durable 
materials by professional construction teams. Each house normally contained a foundation, 
windows, glazed tiles and roofing, along with shared kitchens and bathrooms. The 
apartments were often rented to several migrants from the same kin or subleased by an 
agency working on behalf of landlords. Second, durable materials were used because the 
housing was not a one-off purchase commodity but rather a financial asset that could 
generate regular dividends. Precedents suggested that although unsafe and hazardous 
buildings had been demolished, illegal or unauthorised structures in excess of 480 m2 or 
three storeys by regulation were discounted yet qualified for compensation during urban 
renewal. Relatively durable buildings would hence maximise the villagers’ claims for 
appropriate compensation. Third, because the affluent native villagers were once legally 
restricted and communally bonded to stay in their apartments, they had an incentive to 
maintain higher building standards. Finally, professional construction teams formed the 
service networks that aligned the JCs and powerful clans or the native villages and rural 
migrants, a subject that I will discuss later. 
 
 
Figure 9 Packed, illegal but durable “kissing buildings” 
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Furthermore, the urban village also distinguished itself in terms of the availability of public 
amenities. Pathways, parks, parking spaces, street lighting, schools, clinics, electricity and 
water supply, and sanitation systems were preserved or guaranteed. First, water, electricity 
and regulated parking spaces were private goods made available to those who could afford 
them. Second, concrete pathways, road signs, street lighting, parks and sanitation systems 
are examples of pure public goods that, once provided, can be consumed by every 
individual, and one person’s usage does not reduce availability to others, including local 
bosses, landlords, tenants and pedestrians. Third, education and medical services were 
excludable but non-rival club goods allocated to specific sectors of the communities. In 
general, scholarships were exclusively designated for native villagers, whereas clinical 
services were available to everyone at differentiated rates. Most schools were designated 
for the children of native villagers, but those that remained were open to everyone. For 
instance, the Teochew and Hakka clans, who have always been the largest commercial 
tenants and service providers in the guannei pair of urban villages, have enjoyed priority in 
the allocation and consumption of these club goods and services. 
 
Differentiation of Club Goods to a Few 
Elementary education, medical and sanitation services, and cultural and recreational 
activities constitute another type of public good that is primarily allocated and distributed 
by JCs. Because of these services’ non-rivalrous but excludable nature, they are also 
referred to as club goods in which consumer differentiation applies. The most important 
club goods are medical services. At least three clinics operated in each urban village, and 
most of them are managed by medical doctors, invested in by private companies and native 
villagers, and monitored by the JCs’ division of health. Such a division was typically led 
by a deputy JC chairman and was composed of several administrators and professionals. 
Other responsibilities included regulating family planning, reporting births and deaths, 
organising public health seminars, and adapting to changes in health policies.  
 
Customer differentiation is also notable in the domain of public education. The grassroots 
agencies previously spent millions of yuan to construct and operate kindergartens and 
primary schools. Comprehensive city planning in Shenzhen in 1998 required every school 
to be built on state-owned land and monitored by the local education bureau, which 
effectively removed education from the companies’ jurisdictions. As they obeyed the new 
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initiatives, the companies also negotiated with street offices to ensure that the schools were 
either relocated or built adjacent to their villages, which are entitled to native villagers’ 
holding either rural or urban hukou. Meanwhile, wealthy companies further awarded one 
million yuan in scholarship funds to the descendants of native villagers to study at 
prestigious universities in China or overseas, hoping that talented students would return to 
run the companies and their businesses.  
 
Furthermore, the JCs also organised cultural events on a regular basis and during holidays 
and festivals. Cultural activities can be costly, but the highest costs are always the costs of 
soliciting performers and venues. Through liaisons with party organs, street offices, and 
social organisations, celebrities, artists and dancers were recruited at discounted fees, or 
they performed on a pro bono basis. These negotiations were easy to accomplish for large 
urban villages whose united front value was obvious. Because the companies owned and 
administered the parks and halls, they either waived the rental fees or transferred the fees 
between different accounts. However, it was the potential political gain rather than the 
anticipated economic costs that motivated the companies to sponsor cultural activities:  
Cultural activities have lots of benefits [haochu]. One is to create a sense of 
community. Variety shows, singing contests, health classes, and ritual programmes are 
regularly conducted to transcend the boundaries between different clans as well as 
between landlords and tenants. Another is to get in touch with the masses [qunzhong]. 
People feel more comfortable talking in relaxed, social occasions; communal 
reception towards new initiatives can thus be gauged. Meanwhile, cultural projects are 
highly visible. One can always justify the bills [to the government] when you are 
delivering public welfare and promoting social cohesion.299 
Although the goods and services of the four urban villages vary, each village has specific 
teams and networks devoted to their provision and maintenance. The guannei pair of urban 
villages tended to excel in terms of quality and quantity compared with those in the 
outskirts. Of course, only the affluent urban villages could afford to provide 
comprehensive recreational and cultural facilities and financial awards. In Shi Village, an 
open-air cultural plaza the size of one football field was erected, and an underground car 
park sufficiently large to hold hundreds of cars was constructed beneath it. In Shang 
Village, tens of millions have been invested in education since the shareholding reform in 
1992. Scholarship awards given to the descendants of native villagers to study at 
prestigious Chinese or overseas universities in 2013 totalled one million yuan. However, 
                                                
299 Interviews, village boss, Shenzhen, 18 March 2012. 
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regardless of wealth and competence, none of the JCs has ever abandoned their ritual roles. 
According to the senior JC executives, nearly 90 per cent of the urban villages in Shenzhen 
have renovated or reinstalled their ancestral halls over the last decade.300 Frequently, the 
new JC office buildings were erected next to the ancestral halls, and they are now among 
the most dedicated structures in each urban village. The annual ancestral ritual serves as 
both a communal festival and an economic forum at which new capital is attracted for 
renewal projects. In other words, the goods and rituals are provided not only to nurture 
social cohesion but also to reinforce the communal authority of the intermediaries.  
 
 
OUTSOURCING, COERCION AND ORDER 
 
The Scale and Range of Orderliness 
Law and order are the basic public goods that not only indicate the reach and capacity of 
the pseudo-state agencies but also, as mentioned, are among the JCs’ primary roles. Of 
course, prostitution, gambling and drugs (huangdudu) are not uncommon in our field sites: 
the prostitutes and concubines (er nai) of Shang Village were notorious in the city, and 
Nong Village once functioned as a resale outlet for crystal meth in the outskirts. According 
to official data, 44 per cent of the crimes in Shenzhen in 2004 occurred in urban villages, 
and more than 80 per cent of the suspects were rural migrants who lived in the villages.301 
Although these data suggest that the majority of criminals are rural migrants, they do not 
prove that migrant enclaves have a high concentration of crime. Given that more than 7 
million people or nearly 50 per cent of the city’s population reside in urban villages, the 44 
per cent crime rate is disproportionately low. Since the introduction of community policing 
in 2005 and the installation of CCTV in some crime hotspots, the crime rate in urban 
villages has remained steady in recent years.302  
 
Moreover, the nature of crimes has largely been petty thief rather than organised crime. 
Robbery, forcible seizure and larceny (liangqiang yidao) constituted 82 to 87 per cent of 
the crimes in various urban villages in Shenzhen between 2005 and 2012. Homicides have 
                                                
300 Shenzhen Commercial Daily 22 April 2012; Interviews, village bosses, Shenzhen, 25 September 2013. 
301 Cited from Lau, 2010:64-65. 
302 Shenzhen Futian Community, 2004; Interviews, police officers, Shenzhen, 17-18 August 2012. 
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also remained at zero or in the single digits in each urban village.303 Furthermore, native 
villagers’ resistance during demolition and rural migrants’ protests over arrears of wages 
often contribute to the crime rate. Finally, the lack of coercive force also augments 
offences. A deputy of a local police station told me that the police deployment in urban 
village communities is roughly two-thirds of that of modern gated communities. 
Substitution from communal and private security forces can maintain structural order but 
not prevent daily occurrences of robbery and assault. The aforementioned intensity and 
pattern of crimes largely align with the results obtained by my colleagues at Sun Yat-sen 
University in several urban villages in Guangzhou. Thus, although the spatial boundaries 
of migrant enclaves might be a hotbed for certain illegal or disapproved activities, their 
residents are not contemplating political anarchy or organised violence.  
 
The popular perception of urban villages suggests otherwise for four reasons. First, the 
majority of crimes and contestations are related to rural migrants, who are regarded as 
alien subjects. However, as many migrant entrepreneurs and white-collars migrants 
revealed to me, they are often targeted as victims of crimes because of the relative 
affluence of their villages and of their personal wealth. This is particularly true for the 
guannei pair, which has motivated the JCs to install surveillance equipment and enabled 
the landlords to frame their enclaves as gated communities. Not only did this cause a 
higher rental prices, this also nurture the interplay of grassroots negotiation, a phenomenon 
that will be discussed later in chapter 6. 
 
Second, the media and the authorities have stereotyped urban villages as dangerous places. 
For instance, from my reading of the tens of the articles in Shenzhen Special Zone Herald 
and Southern Metropolitan Daily, the two most widely circulated newspapers in the city, 
the negative framing of urban villages had not changed much before and after the master 
renewal plan in 2005. Overall, the majority of the reports or analyses assigned negative 
words such as criminal (zui), disorder (luan), dirty (zhang), substandard (bu biaozhu) to 
describe urban villages. It was only in recent years that relatively neutral phrases such as 
transitional (guodu), affordable ([ke] fudan) and accessible (fangbian) have occasionally 
been used to endorse the utility of urban villages apartments when large-scale demolitions 
were not as feasible and efficient as they were once proposed. That said, rather than 
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reporting the disproportionate crime rate of 44 per cent, the media reported that 80 per cent 
of crimes were located in urban villages.304 However, the reality is not that 80 per cent of 
the crimes were concentrated in urban villages but that 80 per cent of the crimes were 
committed by rural migrants who lived in the urban villages.  
 
Third, urban villages tend to have higher crime rates because the police have always 
targeted migrant enclaves. In “strike-hard” (yanda) campaigns, the police would frequently 
devote their efforts to combatting crime in urban villages or deploying rural migrants who 
have criminal records to the rural counties.305 Subsequently, they would sit back and claim 
that the crime rate had decreased significantly. In other words, urban villages as enclaves 
are not ideal, but in terms of order and stability, they are comparable with other gated 
communities in the city.  
 
Fourth, the degree of orderliness is evidenced by the conduct of daily life and economic 
activities. During my stays at Shi and Gong Villages and my repeated visits to the four 
urban villages, it was safe to walk in the streets and to remain in parks in the evening and 
after midnight. I found plenty of elderly residents chatting, dancing or practising taichi, 
and the children were playing ball games unsupervised by their families. Expensive motor 
vehicles were often left on the streets. Urbanites are accustomed to passing through the 
urban villages as a shortcut. Moreover, many fast-food restaurants and convenience stores, 
including both domestic brands and foreign chains, operate 24 hours a day in the urban 
villages. Examples include Wal-Mart, Caffefour, 7-Eleven, FamilyMart, McDonalds, 
Yonghe King, and Zkungfu. Hundreds of chophouses, corner shops, saloons and hostels 
have also flourished to harvest new migrant entrepreneurs or the petty bourgeoisie. The 
presence of these large chains and small dealings along with their business models is 
evident that social order has been preserved in the migrant enclaves. In other words, 
although they are enclaves in terms of their distinct physical structure and demographics, 
they have been integrated into the fabric and logistics of the formal city. 
 
The Impetus for Restrained Orderliness  
Obviously, one could speculate that orderliness is largely regulated by the coercive state, 
whose primary concern is social stability. However, in reality, the police force is far from 
                                                
304 Weiwipao, 21 October 2004; Shenzhen Commercial Daily, 29 November 2005. 
305 See chapter 6 for the discriminative treatments of rural migrants during mega-events.  
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sufficient in monitoring migrant contestations and regulating the enclaves. In Shenzhen’s 
outskirts, there are an average of 140 police officers per 100 km2; in the city centre, the 
number is 160 per 100 km2. For instance, in 2005, Bo’an district had a total of 14,200 
communal police officers and private security guards, most of whom were managed by 
street offices but subcontracted to JCs or outsourced by dispatch service providers.306 
 
Aware of the increase in migrant contestations, the state and pseudo-state agencies have 
responded accordingly. Beginning in 2010, the JCs in the city-centre pair spent several 
million yuan to install and upgrade their CCTV in the urban villages. Although the 
guanwai pair of villages lacked the resources to introduce a high-tech surveillance system, 
they doubled their deployment of security guards in traffic arteries.307 In 2014, Shenzhen 
established a new institution known as the municipal police substation (zhixia paichusuo), 
each comprising approximately 40 police officers attached to their respective urban 
villages. However, although the total number of police officers has increased, the ratio of 
formal police to communal police has remained steady. Likewise, the RCs in partnership 
of the JCs also expanded their recruitment of unemployed or retired old ladies (dama) to 
serve as communal patrol in the urban villages. I was indeed approached by these old 
ladies several times, who own the time to monitor the strangers and the gift to trivialise 
disputes. This appended a soft but alarming element in the stability maintenance machine. 
Both formal and informal coercive units are essential to explaining why China’s migrant 
enclaves have not fallen into political anarchy or fallen under the control of gangs or clans, 
as is commonly observed in the slums and shantytowns in many developing countries. 
Instead, the JCs have formally subordinated themselves to the oversight of street offices 
while concurrently maintaining control over privatised coercive units in the migrant 
enclaves, paying their salaries and commanding their personnel.  
 
Figure 10 shows the doorplates of the JCs in Shi and Shang Villages. The Chinese words 
literally mean joint-stock company and armed force division (wuzhang bu) and security 
brigade and civil military team, indicating that the non-state agency and its coercive force 
share the same office and line of command. This type of physical alignment signifies 
administrative hierarchy and enables effective deployment, a feature that is also observed 
in street offices but not in RCs. Common to the four urban villages, every JC has a division 
                                                
306 Li, 2007:18.  
307 Fieldworks, Shenzhen, 17-23 March 2013. 
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of armed forces that is composed of a public security team (bao’an dui) and a collective 
security brigade (lianfang dadui). The public security team is responsible for managing 
ordinary public security, such as organising daily patrols, ensuring migrants’ periodic 
registration with the police, mobilising neighbourhood watches, issuing parking tickets and 
collecting fines. Such teams have been deposed in times of emergency to combat organised 
crime and to monitor large-scale demolitions. Aligning with substation police, urban 
management enforcement units (chengguan) and family planning officers in RCs, these 
privatised or collective coercive units record births and deaths, regulate floating 
populations, promote hygienic conditions and organise seminars on public health. Assisted 
by CCTV and informants, this privatised coercive force is on call 24 hours a day and will 
be ready for combat in time of emergency.  
 
Figure 10 The synergy of JCs and collective security teams 
 
The standard size of the coercive force varied from 80 to 200 in our field sites. However, 
the regular personnel routinely underestimated the size and function of the coercive force. 
Over time, temporary personnel were recruited to monitor housing demolitions and 
manage large-scale contestations in the urban villages. The budget for the coercive force 
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primarily came from the management fees paid by tenants and by district appropriations. 
Revenue from land sales and rent from collectives was periodically drawn to finance this 
extemporaneous yet persistent expense. A deputy chairman of Shang Village explained the 
incentives for regulating order and differentiating the treatment of native villagers and rural 
migrants as follows: 
Currently, the risky and nasty jobs will have to be handled by the temporarily 
employed security guards. Only the migrants are capable of handing the migrants, and 
only in this way could we fulfil the requirement of harmony [discourse]. 
Troublemakers must be taught a lesson. The villagers would not respect your authority 
if their requests for help were not properly addressed. How can we have the face to be 
greeted as chief and share a table with them in the ancestral hall? Chaos is not good 
for the rental business either.308 
 
Figure 11 Private security and community patrol 
 
Although some village bosses and clan chiefs were accused of concealing crimes, none of 
them brought anarchy to the enclaves by substituting for JCs or by excluding municipal 
intervention. A primary reason is that more organised migrant groups have been recruited 
by the JCs to serve as security guards, janitors, and construction workers. The Teochew 
and Hakka clans overwhelmingly serve as security guards in the guannei pair, as do the 
                                                
308 Interview, village boss, Shenzhen, 24 September 2013. 
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Hunan and Jiangxi clans in the guanwai pair (Figure 12). This mechanism has not only 
absorbed organised contestations into the grassroots regimes but also consumed the clan 
networks to resolve daily disputes.  
 
  
Figure 12 A privatised entrance to migrant enclave 
 
The maintenance of a collective security brigade largely composed of native villagers or 
their friends has ensured that the JCs remain in control of their coercive forces despite the 
absorption mechanisms. A symbolic structure involves the installation and management of 
electric gates at different entrances of the urban villages (Figure 12). The logic behind all 
of these settings is illustrated in the following statement from a security chief: “Our main 
task is not to combat crimes but to absorb the contentious elements and to be connected 
with the organised few”. 309  These communal coercive units are fully aware of their 
limitations, such as the lack of training, equipment and power to combat crimes. Their 
priority is given to enhance surveillance and induce threat. When serious and organised 
crimes occur, these units are bypassed by public security and armed police. Although 
communal coercive forces enjoy certain exclusive jurisdictions, their relationships with the 
                                                
309 Interview, chief of collective security brigade, Shenzhen, 16 March 2013. 
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formal police are complementary. In other words, outsourcing has enabled the division of 
labour between the official and communal security forces and between the collective 
security brigade and private security team, thereby supporting day-to-day conveyance of 
coercion an integral part of grassroots governance. 
 
 
CONTRADICTIONS BETWEEN LOCAL STATE AND GRASSROOTS REGIME 
 
What has motivated grassroots agencies to redress government retreat and market failure? 
Does the momentum of intermediaries signify a more dynamic and assertive civil society 
at the grassroots level? Since 2005, the party-state has propagated the idea of a service-
oriented government that envisions productive collaboration (xietong xiaoying) between 
the state and society. Although this is a contingency of the decentralisation and 
privatisation measures in the 1990s and 2000s, it also signifies the transition towards a 
regulatory state. A wide range of public services and government functions are contracted 
out to private and non-state service providers, which are considered more cost-effective 
and adaptive to the needs of clients such as urban homeowners and floating populations. 
The objectives of providing these services are not only to meet changes in social 
expectations but also to alleviate public contestation. The ranking cadres of street offices 
and JC chairpersons whom we interviewed fully acknowledged the changing dynamics of 
local governance and their respective roles. However, what are the mechanisms that enable 
them to contract out their authority and services to intermediaries while simultaneously 
ensuring compliance and managing their conflicts? Has this seemingly ordered space 
sounded apolitical and evaded the real tensions and conflicts between different social 
groups or classes? I will address the first question in the following section and leave the 
second question for Chapter 7, when we assess inhabitants’ interactions and perceptions of 
such social order. 
 
Negotiating the Boundary of Contestation 
Admittedly, the district governments seek to use regulatory frameworks and bureaucratic 
control to incorporate the pseudo-state agencies and social organisations. These strategies 
inform the intermediaries of the boundaries of contestation that have been established by 
the party-state without compromising the flexibility of daily operations. Establishing 
performance pledges and controlling funding sources are two frequently employed 
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strategies. First, formally introduced in the late 1990s, performance pledges have been 
rigorously applied since 2005, when Shenzhen competed for and then aimed to preserve 
the titles of “exemplary city” and “garden city”. Every village under a street office and 
every street office within a district were required to list their performance pledges at the 
beginning of the year and to be subsequently evaluated by the end of that year. Although 
the criteria and weighting vary slightly between districts and street offices, urban 
appearance (shirong) and social stability (shehui wending) have always been emphasised, 
and they have had a veto effect on overall performance rankings.310  Specifically, the 
guannei pair of urban villages were motivated to maintain these titles to retain their 
vanguard status, whereas the guanwai pair were pressured to discard their chaotic image.  
 
However, our observations and interviews suggested that the impetus for JCs to regularly 
invest hundreds of millions of yuan into the urban villages cannot be fully explained by 
bureaucratic control or direct pressure. On the contrary, the village bosses’ compliance is a 
function of how state recognition can serve to reinforce their communal authority and 
guarantee re-election. In village bosses’ offices, the numbers of official awards and 
pictures taken with ranking officials are often proportional to their length of service. 
Second, their compliance is better understood as an investment that can be cashed in when 
the performance pledge has been fulfilled or when their patrons have been promoted. As a 
JC deputy claimed, “compliance was caused by neither government pressure nor a sense of 
duty; rather, it was cultivated by bilateral trust in which long-term returns takes over 
immediate costs”.311  
 
Although state funding is presumably used to monitor the JCs, its application and 
evaluation criteria reflect a sense of interdependence. In 2010, the more affluent districts of 
Luohu and Futian clearly specified the extent of the district governments’ financial support 
for the JCs: 1) the JCs submit their applications each October, and the district governments 
approve an earmarked fund (zhuanxiang zijin) accordingly; 2) district governments provide 
100 per cent sponsorship only for water and electricity infrastructure; 3) the district 
governments and JCs share costs in the ratios of 40 to 60 or 49 to 51 to provide other 
public services such as cultural and recreational facilities, kindergartens and clinics, 
                                                
310 Interview, street-office cadre, Shenzhen, 22 July2013. See Yang et al. 2005, 76-77, 84-90 for similar 
assessment criteria on city management in Hangzhou.  
311 Interviews, local boss, Shenzhen, 15 May 2013. 
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pathways and parking spaces, and public security amenities; and 4) a feasibility plan is 
required only for funding in excess of 3 million yuan.312 
 
These ambiguous criteria suggest that the local governments need communal cooperation 
and resources from the JCs as much as the JCs need state authority and funding. In practice, 
the district governments and JCs have shared not only the budget but also the benefits of 
government projects. For example, in 2011, Luohu district spent 6.36 million yuan to 
conduct a water environment improvement project across several urban villages, and most 
of the components of the project were constructed by and managed by the JC subsidiaries. 
In 2012, Bao’an district allocated 7.21 million yuan to construct a green belt of 600 m2, 
dividing the project between an SOE and a JC.313  
 
Muddling through the Contingency of Contestation 
To fully appreciate the dynamics of grassroots negotiation, it is necessary to examine the 
process of dispute resolution in which the state and pseudo-state agencies interact. Along 
with the community governance initiative, a series of rationalisation projects has 
interdicted some domains of the JCs in terms of standardisation, cleanliness and 
orderliness. Public goods related to urban management, public health and education have 
gradually been municipalised. However, two salient events in Shenzhen illustrate that the 
collaborative mechanism relies on contingent cooperation in operations to minimise overt 
contention and the use of coercion.  
 
In 2010–2011, the municipal authority aimed to regulate illegal structures to make the city 
more presentable during the Summer Universidad Games. Aware of this policy, the native 
villagers built as many storeys as they could and as far as possible. The police and 
chengguan responded by guarding and blocking the entrances of various urban villages. 
However, their actions ultimately had little effect, as the landlords and construction teams 
bypassed the checkpoints and smuggled in the building materials at midnight or dawn. 
Worried about provoking mass incidents, the authority did not adopt coercive measures. A 
compromise was reached between the local government and native villagers through the 
intervention of the JCs. While the native villagers received permission to build one or two 
additional floors, the JCs and district governments shared the bill for adding rooftops and 
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standardising the colours of urban village buildings adjacent to the main avenues. Figure 
13 shows the renovated urban village buildings that, if viewed at a driving speed of 90 km2, 
appear similar to middle-class gated communities, which is the physical evidence of the 
outcome of the grassroots negotiation.314 
 
The outcome was that the local officials fulfilled their standardisation tasks, the JCs and 
their clients obtained a construction contract, and the migrants obtained jobs. The 
contractual arrangements contain subtler variations that reflect the status of different JCs. 
For the guannei pair, private providers or government subsidiaries that could deliver 
professional services at a reduced price won the contracts. For the guanwai pair, large 
migrant clans or the construction teams of JCs often monopolised the project contracts.  
Because of the sudden increase in the supply of apartments and the increase in jobs, many 
rural migrants either paid lower rents or were recruited. Thus, despite the emergence of the 
most comprehensive rationalisation project, the grassroots collaboration has ensured that 
nearly everyone has received a certain amount of payoffs for the time being. 
 
 
Figure 13 Standardized building outlook admitting illegal structure 
 
Another example concerns the regulation of public health services. In 2011, a China 
Network Television programme revealed that China consumed as many as 10.4 billion 
                                                
314 Shenzhen Urban Renewal Office 2006; Southern Weekly, 11 May 2011; Interviews, Shenzhen, 13 August 
2012. 
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bottles of intravenous fluids in 2009, averaging 8 bottles per person, exceeding the world 
average of 2.5 to 3.3 bottles per person.315 The People’s Daily simultaneously investigated 
the issue and accused local clinics of inadequate public health knowledge and irresponsible 
prescription as the reasons for this excessive consumption.316 As the issue emerged on a 
national level, the municipal government was forced to take action. Street offices 
immediately organised sessions to teach “the risk of intravenous infusion”, the JCs and 
RCs attracted new pharmacies in the urban villages to substitute infusions with generic 
drugs, and each clinic was required to monitor and record changes in consumption for 
regular inspection.317 
 
These procedures illustrate the state’s adaptations in response to social issues, but the 
overall results were complicated. Native villagers and white-collar migrants were addicted 
to the infusions and other expensive treatments, regarding them as a swift healing method, 
whereas blue-collar rural migrants typically preferred generic drugs to infusion treatments 
because the former were less costly in terms of money and time. Recognising the 
complexity of these issues, the JCs and RCs implemented the official policy selectively. 
The JCs and RCs provided rent discounts to attract new pharmacies to trade drugs for 
infusions, and they constructed two new clinics that decreased the average levels of 
infusions. As such, although the average number of infusions per clinic decreased in our 
field sites, the total consumption largely remained constant, as the reductions primarily 
resulted from the construction of new clinics and the substitution effects of new 
pharmacies. Indeed, the infusion treatment areas in our field sites were always full of 
patients; they were so crowded that some patients receiving intravenous injections were 
forced to sit outside of the clinics or forced to receive the treatments in their own 
apartments.318 The intervention of intermediaries thus diffused the consumption of medical 
services, complying with state initiatives while balancing the interests of the inhabitants.  
 
Intermediaries and social resilience 
In short, the mechanisms of local governance reflect resilient authoritarianism and state 
corporatism in several ways. The findings indicate the existence of an intermediate realm 
in China’s sunbelt that is neither a tool of the state nor the creation of society. Second, the 
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pseudo-state and non-state agencies in this realm, including the JCs, goods and service 
providers and social organisations, govern the enclave via less coercive, less predatory 
means. These institutions bargain with the state for “collective interests” to preserve their 
communal authority or private business. More importantly, these intermediaries contest the 
boundaries and functions between state and civil society, as they are engaging but not civil, 
resourceful but not independent, and exclusive rather than inclusive.  
 
Although many village bosses can be regarded as local bosses who have dominated the JCs 
since Mao’s era, their control over the companies is seldom a proxy for wealth or coercion. 
Instead, these chiefs must possess the talent and networks to serve the interests of their 
shareholders, to manage migrant contestations and to combine forces with the urban 
authorities; hence, although their power may be inherited, their mandate must be earned. 
Moreover, the JCs and other intermediaries are arguably extensions of the state, but they 
are also embedded in the grassroots society. This exclusive political realm has been 
preserved because of the transition of government status and governance priority in the 
course of market reforms. Obviously, their survival and thrift cannot be detached from the 
resources and authority of the state, yet they also own their exclusive networks and 
mandates, demonstrating the resilience of the grassroots agencies and actors.  
 
Thus, these mechanisms of control and exchange have ensured that the migrant enclaves 
are governed and substituted by pseudo-state actors whose authority will not challenge the 
state, regardless of how powerful these actors are. Although the rural migrants have the 
right to a certain degree of public contestation, only the JCs and native villagers are 
entitled to be represented in and to govern the migrant enclaves, which I referred to as the 
embeddedness of trading entitlement for eligibility. Do these collaborative mechanisms 
merely reinforce and advance the party-state, or do they contingently defend and empower 
the grassroots society? I will further address this question in the next two chapters by 
referring to the challenges towards the grassroots détente in the course of urban renewal 
and by exploring the subjective experience of native villagers and rural migrants.  
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6. Urban Renewal, Brokerage and Soft Enclaves 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter examines the changing pattern of grassroots state-society relations in the 
urban renewal context. It first examines the impetus for Shenzhen’s government to 
demolish migrant enclaves and their intermediaries, which previously served to assist in 
some of the local state’s political and social functions. The chapter then explains the payoff 
and patronage mechanisms under which JCs chose to engage in brokerage despite knowing 
that urban renewal would eventually deprive them of their space and their quality of life. 
Finally, the differentiated responses between certain native villagers and rural migrants, 
who adopt protest and exit strategies, respectively, are analysed. The interplay between 
socialist institutions and capitalist logic is emphasised as strongly as the dynamics of 
grassroots negotiations.    
 
After decades of reform, China’s municipal governments have increasingly treated urban 
planning as identical to the realisation of the exchange in the value of land on the 
market.319 Once the property market had been transformed into an indispensable growth 
engine, municipal governments’ bargaining power increased accordingly. Shenzhen’s 
urban renewal projects depend on the notion of being a vanguard city (xianfeng 
chengshi).320 Orderliness, cleanliness, efficiency and sustainability are identified both as 
essential components of Shenzhen’s identity and as prerequisites of maintaining its status 
as a vanguard city. In the midst of such modern developments, the urban village is 
regarded as economically ineffective, aesthetically undesirable, spatially incongruous and 
politically incorrect. 
 
More specifically, urban villages are portrayed as the “other” and have been identified as 
targets for elimination because they are considered not only the roots of urban decay but 
also a waste of land-use value and a symbol of backwardness.321  This rationalisation 
process has thrived through the co-optation of JCs, which assisted chenguagn and public 
security to enforce city regulations and brokered urban renewal projects on behalf of local 
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authorities and private developers. The aforementioned grassroots alliance among the local 
state, intermediary agencies, native villagers and migrant tenants has become fragmented 
in the face of redevelopment potentials and payoffs. Various macro-strategies and micro-
tactics involved in the process of brokerage are examined, revealing the informality of 
these negotiations in the context of a fading grassroots alliance and a rational urban-
planning regime.   
 
I argue that the elimination of urban villages and the rise of highly rational planning have 
enjoyed institutional and analytical support. With the advent of industrial upgrading and 
modern zoning, intermediaries have aligned to discourage migrants and the poor from 
inhabiting the area. This result would have fuelled on-going instability in the grassroots 
alliance if the land and hukou systems discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, respectively, had not 
offered exit strategies and nurtured disenfranchisement. Consequently, China’s migrant 
enclaves are under government control but are soft in the sense that the majority of migrant 
enclaves are fragile compared with the anarchic but longstanding slums in the developing 
world; but a few enclaves are quite resilient as a result of the brokerages by consolidated 
intermediaries. 322  These trajectories reveal as much about the socialist foundations of 
adaptive governance as its patterned manifestations during capital accumulation. 
 
 
IMPETUS FOR URBAN RENEWAL 
 
“Buy land, they’re not making any more of it,” said Mark Twain. However, the problem in 
contemporary China is not merely the lack of land per se but its immense contestation and 
redistribution in developed areas, especially within megacities. The questions of whom the 
land should be taken from and for what purpose are also disputed. Certainly, after decades 
of economic reforms, megacities have become the engine of economic growth and a hub 
for land contestation. Between 2003 and 2012, the commodity housing sector in China’s 
first-tier cities (yixianchengshi) – Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen – grew at a 
rate of 27.7 per cent per year, whereas China’s nominal GDP grew at 14.2 per cent in the 
same period. 323  The expanding urban middle class also demands a variety of public 
amenities, communal services and features of cosmopolitan life, all of which require 
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land. 324  To coordinate urban development and articulate new public demands, large 
municipalities have negotiated a greater degree of autonomy from the central government, 
which has infringed on the jurisdiction of county governments. Administrative willpower 
and socioeconomic forces have resulted in a regulatory but monopolistic urban planning 
administration. 
 
Regulating Land Resources  
Compared with the neoliberal Jiang-Zhu administration (1992-2002), the Hu-Wen 
administration (2003-2013) was initially more regulative in style. Between 2003 and 2013, 
the central government issued at least 43 macroeconomic adjustment policies to regulate 
the price of commodity housing. In addition to adjusting interest rates, limiting credit for 
property developers and controlling mortgages for second homebuyers, it was considered 
vital to control land supply and land transfers. Accordingly, 70 per cent of the 6,866 
development zones nationwide, most located in the peri-urban areas, were abolished in 
2004, and their 24,900 square kilometres of land were confiscated by the state – an 
example of early reform strategies.325 Since then, land conversion and transfers within city 
centres have been heavily monitored, requiring the approval of traffic, environmental and 
sustainability assessors. However, despite the policies of macroeconomic contraction, the 
commodity housing market in first- and second-tier cities has continued to grow rapidly, 
and real estate gambling ultimately peaked under the Hu-Wen regime. Similarly, the 
majority of confiscated land in peri-urban areas was used by the local government to 
develop other megaprojects. What motivated and enabled the urban authorities to respond 
to these centralised regulations? How have they affected urban villages and the living 
space of rural migrants? 
 
Specifically, the impetus to redevelop Shenzhen is driven by both anxiety and 
bottlenecking issues. The municipality is said to have been trapped fighting a two-front 
war: the tendency of global capital to converge in areas with lower production costs and 
the changing preference of central government policies to develop the Yangtze River Delta, 
Bohai Bay Rim and inner provinces. 326  Some SOEs have begun to relocate their 
headquarters; consequently, factory chains and transnational corporations no longer 
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consider Shenzhen the most viable landing zone in China. Reducing production costs and 
improving efficiency cannot fully address such structural challenges. Instead, the Shenzhen 
government decided that it needed to grow as a leader in extensive economic modes 
(cufangshi jingji). 327  One scheme involved developing the property market and its 
construction business as an alternate source of growth. Another method involved building 
a “cosmopolitan garden city” – a city distinguished from its fellow competitors and 
therefore conductive to nurturing a sense of belonging among its residents.328  
 
Waves of property growth have followed, producing new spatial forms ranging from 
global financial centres, skyscrapers, cultural centres and technological zones to shopping 
malls, suburban villas, university towns and public housing districts. These projects 
provided job opportunities and improved basic infrastructure as well as mirrored global 
aesthetic aspirations and metropolitan life. Rural migrants and urban villages, both vital to 
production for an export-oriented economy, either are increasingly marginalised during an 
industrial upgrade or become incongruous with the metropolis’s identity. 
 
Re-centralising Urban Planning Administration 
Taking advantage of regulation initiatives, large municipalities have infringed on the 
jurisdiction of county governments. For instance, Shanghai had had nine rural counties in 
1991; by 2005, only one remained – the others had been transformed into urban districts. 
Beijing’s eight rural counties in 1996 were reduced to two, and most were incorporated 
into enlarged urban districts. Similarly, in 2010, the Shenzhen municipal government 
absorbed its outer counties into one jurisdiction composed of ten urban districts. Although 
this change was tabled to offer open government and effective regulation, it was primarily 
aimed at legalising the unwarranted conscription of rural lands and urban village 
redevelopment.329 In 2013, Shenzhen government’s No. 1 Document declared that all land 
in the municipality, including that of the danwei and collectives, would be available for 
sale.330 This policy transferred and aligned land ownership and land use rights to the city 
government, thereby uniting the primary and secondary land markets. This effectively 
abolished the dual land tenure system and magnified the scope and capacity of the urban 
planning regime.  
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On par with this administrative re-centralisation was the reorganisation of large 
municipalities’ urban planning, property management and land resources bureaus into one 
unified apparatus. Before 2006, the Ministry of Land and Resources and the Ministry of 
Construction had different, often contrasting responsibilities and managed their own 
subdivisions. One directed the conservation of farmland and controlled land conversion, 
whereas the other was responsible for drafting growth plans and requisitioning land.331 
Differences in vertical xitong command and bureaucratic interests created persistent 
tensions. Reorganisation not only minimised internal conflicts and addressed inconsistent 
policies but also produced a state grant commission. Shortly after its formation, the 
Shenzhen Urban Planning, Land and Resources Commission published a blueprint entitled 
Transition Planning Guiding Urban Transition to establish its comprehensive, visionary 
urban future. 332  This rationalisation process can be summarised by the new planning 
administration’s synthesis and re-evaluation of three master plans, each approaching a 
more ambitious agenda and monopolistic planning.  
 
In the first Shenzhen Urban Master Plan (1986-2000), the city was expected to “develop an 
export-oriented industry and commercial centres, complemented by tourism and real estate 
development”. Although the new planning administration recognised that dualistic 
development “laid down the foundation for urban space and development”, it was 
criticised as overlooking the “dual contradictions between the city proper and rural areas”, 
with the latter considered unregulated and chaotic.333 The second Shenzhen Urban Master 
Plan (1996-2010) aimed to redress the shortcomings of the previous plan by focusing on 
spatial rearrangement and complementary zoning. Once again, however, the “lower 
planning hierarchy” and the “huge influx of cheap labour under the labour-intensive 
industry” were considered problematic. Shenzhen’s structural disadvantage – its export-
oriented economy – was held accountable for the city’s planning flaws. 334  The third 
Shenzhen Urban Master Plan (2006-2020) emphasised the need for a breakthrough in 
Shenzhen’s urban future to make it “efficient, global, secure, harmonious and sustainable”. 
The realisation of this vision relied on “deliberative planning and resolute and expeditious 
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enforcements”.335  
 
A confident and powerful planning administration that accepts the need for mastery of the 
environment to address urban sprawl and consumption growth has emerged. Central to this 
modernist doctrine is the use of functional zoning and megaprojects to promote the desired 
urban space and aesthetic values that help shape urban dwellers’ relationships with each 
other, the state and nature. Multifunctional terminals, spacious public squares, and blocks 
of apartments with efficient public transport systems on a monumental scale are expected 
to constitute the modern city, replacing the twisted, disordered and crowded physical 
environment inherited from the past.336 Once the urban space has been carved into multiple 
single-purposed zones, it becomes both cost-effective and easy to govern. James Scott 
argues that the overall aim of such high modernism is to replace a city of history with a 
city of science in which social order is defined by architectural order.337 
 
Urban villages have become the primary targets of elimination not only because they 
nurtured crimes and poverty but also because they represented land-use inefficiency and a 
sense of backwardness. In 2005, the Shenzhen government approved a master plan for 
urban village redevelopment that suggested demolishing as many as 8.9 square kilometres 
or approximately 10 per cent of the municipality’s urban villages over a five-year 
period.338 Dachong Village in the Nanshan district was a prime target, involving an area of 
0.684 square kilometres, the relocation of more than 70,000 people, and a budget of 20 
billion yuan. That project adopted a government-led model in which the government 
completed its acquisition and demolition and then auctioned the land to SOEs. In contrast, 
the redevelopment of Xiasha Village in the Futian district adopted a market-led model in 
which developers allocated shares to JCs in exchange for the latter’s land-use rights and 
cooperation.339  
 
In 2013, the Shenzhen government announced that it would invest 33 billion yuan over two 
years to redevelop 28 urban villages totalling 5.91 square kilometres.340 To coordinate the 
land requisition, credit arrangements and marketing strategies, the government advocated a 
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state-business partnership model. The impetus for escalating the pace of urban renewal can 
be summarised by a question articulated by a city planning official:  
Every square metre of an urban village apartment demolished will result in city 
housing that is at least three times more modern, advanced and environmentally 
friendly. Tell me why we shouldn’t do it. 341 
 
Megaprojects and High-modernism Urbanism 
Shenzhen’s government has executed countless megaprojects to promote the city’s 
progress and justify increased fiscal spending. In the 2000s, the city spent billions of yuan 
to earn and preserve the title of a “world garden city”. Beginning in the 2010s, Shenzhen’s 
urban landscape was massively transformed by hosting the 2011 Summer Universiade 
Games. The Shenzhen government argued that that when Beijing, Shanghai and 
Guangzhou served as host cities of the Olympic Games, the World Expo and the Asian 
Games, respectively, Shenzhen was the only first-tier city left behind and thus deserved the 
opportunity to “promote its characteristics and charms to the nation and the world” and to 
“renovate the city’s public infrastructure for industrial adjustment”.342 
 
These dual objectives dominated the megaproject’s investment plan and management style, 
creating a discrepancy between budget costs and complementary spending. According to 
the Shenzhen Auditing Bureau, the total direct cost of organising the 2011 Summer 
Universiade was 13.99 billion yuan, whereas the total income from that event was only 
1.22 billion yuan. 343  This figure has already discounted all the spending on public 
infrastructure and transportation, environmental and aesthetic improvements and city 
image promotion. One of the most expensive items on this list was the construction of 
metro spur lines linked to remotely located stadiums, extending the city’s metro coverage 
from 22 km to 178 km. Other extraordinary projects include spending 4.88 billion yuan in 
Ba’an district for city appearance upgrades and 7.52 billion yuan for new stadiums.344 If all 
these publicly funded items are included, the total cost amounts to 200 billion yuan, 
equalling 135 per cent of the city’s annual revenue in 2011.345  This figure was first 
released by a former auditor of the Games and was reported and verified by numerous 
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media sources in mainland China and Hong Kong. Some sources even arrived at an 
estimation of 300 billion yuan. To provide a comparative context, the Beijing Olympic 
Games in 2008 and the Shanghai Expo in 2010 respectively cost 260 and 340 billion yuan, 
whereas the London Olympic Games in 2012 and the Aichi Expo in 2005 respectively cost 
97 and 80 billion yuan.346 In other words, although Shenzhen’s budget exceeded that of the 
developed world, it did not deviate much from the national standard. 
 
Surveillance and gentrification measures dovetailed with these megaprojects. To promote 
an image of orderliness and cleanliness, rural migrants and migrant enclaves were targeted 
for eradication. Immediately before the event, as many as 80,000 rural migrants – primarily 
unemployed migrants and ex-offenders – were deployed to their places of origin. Real-
name registration was required to purchase and use a SIM card or to purchase a knife 
during the opening of the Games.347 Many urban villages had also become targets of 
control. For instance, the number of CCTV cameras in Shi and Shang Villages mentioned 
earlier almost doubled, any villagers who agreed to sell their apartments within the 
redevelopment zone of Nong Village before late 2010 were given 80,000 yuan and a 
service award as an additional incentive, and the oil painting and graffiti at the entrance of 
Gong Village were cleared or demolished.348 Hundreds of chengguan and police officers 
were also deployed in our field site villages to question pedestrians and enact obsolete 
regulations. Throughout the city, 500,000 communal patrol and social security volunteers 
were said to be enlisted during the Games, primarily with public funding. 
 
Reports and interview records suggest that none of these measures were caused by 
creditable security threats; instead, they largely resulted from an obsession with displaying 
the best of Shenzhen that was magnified by the nervous reactions of local government 
apparatuses. 349  However, the enormous spending required to host the event damaged 
Shenzhen’s fiscal status, transforming it from a surplus to a deficit for the first time since 
1978. Competition with other metropolises through the mega-event certainly added vitality 
for city officials. However, monopolising or vending public contracts through patronage or 
bribery offered greater incentives, as indicated by the audit report, media reports and my 
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informants. With this sub-provincial city, such reckless spending would not earn many 
credits in the eyes of provincial and national superiors; indeed, the mayor and the former 
deputy mayor responsible for the event were immediately charged with corruption. 
However, these efforts also reflect the adherence to high modernisation and outsourcing 
practice of the city planning officials, who desire to build a world-class city as quickly as 
possible in the hope of realising milieus of mass dreams and personal emblems.350 
 
Shenzhen’s numerous megaprojects reflect the use of spatial form to order social relations. 
According to renowned planner Le Corbusier, architecture must be functional, machine-
like, simple and capable of being mass produced. A visionary and harmonious city can be 
materialised only by those “who understand the science of urbanism”. Once formulated, Le 
Corbusier insists, a planner’s design must be implemented and “freed from pedestrian 
pressures and special interests”.351 The urban planning administration thus emphasises the 
requisite neutrality in enabling efficient spatial design and the introduction of 
technological progress. Although many modernist projects are scarcely realised, the ideas 
and methods of modernism have thrived along with global capitalism.352 The scientific 
urban planning ethos remains powerful and illuminative in promising a utopian form of 
modernity that can be standardised and applied by recent developers, such as China.353 
Newly independent nations and transitional administrations are particularly vulnerable to 
the adoption of Western development benchmarks. The erection of grand structures has the 
advantage of visualising national progress and displaying a degree of modernisation.354 
Naturally, the beneficiaries of a megaproject are thus both national and international. 
 
 
ENTREPRENEURIAL AND PROTECTIVE BROKERS 
 
The new urban planning administration has quickly and successfully reinvented an image 
of impartiality and professionalism, transcending the ambiguous roles of being both the 
participant and the regulator in local corporatism. However, informality and co-optation 
have continued to both influence the process of urban renewal and differentiate payoffs 
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among stakeholders in urban villages. Regardless of whether the redevelopment model is 
government-led or market-led or whether it is a state-business partnership, the brokering 
role of intermediaries is essential, infiltrating nearly every stage of urban renewal, 
including consultation, requisitioning, demolition, construction and property management. 
By intermediaries, I refer to the SOEs and JCs that connect or represent government xitong 
and urban villages, respectively. The search for value-added industry has aligned these 
intermediaries with both local authorities and private developers. However, the most 
distinguishing features of China’s urban renewal are not the coercive state or resourceful 
firms but the informality of co-optation among different segments of grassroots 
intermediaries.   
 
Co-optation among Different Intermediaries 
Emerging as the largest developers from Shenzhen’s economic boom, the SOEs are the 
best prepared to compete in the urban renewal process. Not only were they connected to 
respective government xitong in the provincial and central governments, they also 
managed the majority of public amenities and transport networks in the city and owned 
small but valuable land or buildings interlocking various development zones.355 In other 
words, the SOEs created a combination of financial resources and political networks. One 
prominent example concerns the Overseas China Town Group, a subsidiary of China’s 
State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission. In the city centre, the 
group built and managed the largest electronic goods wholesale centre and the largest 
theme park in South China. In the outer districts, the group owned contracts to build 
highways connecting the city to other coastal cities and concurrently developed gated 
communities and modern villas adjacent to highway exits.  
 
As of 2014, most land lease and redevelopment projects were determined by closed-door 
negotiations instead of an open bidding process. According to the municipality’s urban 
renewal report, SOEs were chosen as the primary developers in three-quarters of the 
projects under the government-led model. They were also frequently approached by private 
developers as partners or secondary developers in the state-business partnership model.356 
This recognition of the roles of SOEs does not mean that they have monopolised urban 
redevelopment; indeed, the local government and SOEs have had disagreements over the 
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pace, scale and model of redevelopment. Whereas the local government aims to 
standardise its regulatory framework and discipline its grassroots agencies, the SOEs prefer 
to work with ambiguous policies and expand their territorial power. The result is 
collaboration by contingency. 
 
In this regard, the JCs, as the de facto owners and rulers of large parcels of abundant and 
underdeveloped urban land, have leverage to negotiate. As mentioned in Chapter 4, each 
JC usually contains 20 to 40 per cent collective shares, suggesting that a significant 
proportion of apartments in urban villages are company property. These shareholders are 
legally prohibited from transferring their rural land shares, which are owned by the 
collective. Although a small number had transferred their rights to other native villagers, 
the number and parameter of stakeholders prepared for acquisition were controlled.357 
These stakeholders consolidated the veto power of JC, enough to block or accomplish any 
redevelopment deals.  
 
Although the JCs recognised that they owned the most valuable assets, they also viewed 
urban renewal as an opportunity to enter the value-added service industry.358 Hence, they 
agreed with the urban planning authority that informal migrant enclaves were neither 
economically sustainable nor aesthetically desirable. Sharing common interests or, more 
precisely, what are considered to be interests has motivated the state and intermediaries to 
collaborate and observe the boundaries of disputes. Negotiations can be lengthy and 
sometimes contentious, but they have rarely turned into violent conflicts that would 
jeopardise their mutual support. In the midst of the discourse of harmony and the 
supervision of the media, Shenzhen’s government has repeatedly avoided conflict. The 
police and chengguan have retreated from the demolition option unless necessary to 
control mass unrest. The judiciary has also repeatedly rejected developers’ appeal for a 
compulsory auction process despite the possibility that they may have already established a 
legal threshold; instead, they have depended on intermediaries. 
 
The city government’s renewal bureaus (chongjian ju) have since involved JCs in every 
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stage of policy consultation, drafting and implementation. In extreme cases, the urban 
renewal offices of district governments moved into and shared the same office building 
with the JCs. 359  This situation arose in Shang Village, where I conducted several 
interviews with village bosses and city planning officials. Likewise, in most cases, the JCs 
coordinated the sale and negotiated prices on behalf of landlords. When the JCs were also 
partners of private developers, they would make an offer directly. Because they act as 
secondary developers, the JCs are delegated the authority to decide who should be awarded 
construction contracts. The fact that the network of chiefs and secondary labour contractors 
(baogonftou) was embedded in the urban villages has rendered the latter ideal client-
service providers. Similar to other patron-client relationships, social ties are as important as 
economic efficiency in determining payoffs. The provision of urban renewal projects has 
thus reinforced the JCs’ dependence on the local state and large migrant clans’ reliance on 
the JCs, which, apart from protecting the enclaves, also supports the rentier class and 
makes urban renewal incredibly lengthy and expensive. 
 
Coordinated Macro-Policies 
To facilitate efficiency in the requisition and demolition of urban village apartments, 
numerous macro-policies have been implemented and adjusted. A ranking official in the 
municipal urban renewal office explained why the emphasis has gradually shifted from as 
quickly as possible to as safely as possible:    
Speed was our top priority in the past; hence, we standardised policies to let the street-
level agencies or private developers follow. But then we realised the costs of rigidity 
[taiguifan] and irregularity [buguifan]. Some landlords signed petitions, some took 
legal action, some appealed to CCTV, and some even blockaded our office. They were 
angry, and so were our bosses. Projects were often stopped despite full requisition. In 
the end, we let the professional brokers take the lead. 
Simply put, the transition has occurred in multiple stages; it has moved from process 
oriented to outcome oriented, from formal to informal. Professional brokers such as JCs, 
RCs, clan chiefs and client contractors have been delegated the responsibilities and 
flexibility to make deals.  
 
One result of grassroots coordination is the revision of redevelopment regulations. In 2012, 
the Shenzhen Urban Redevelopment Bureau tightened the regulations for initiating a 
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redevelopment project from the requisition of 80 per cent of property ownership in a 
proposed redevelopment zone to 90 per cent. 360  Although this harsh threshold was 
promoted as a way to protect individual property owners, it actually legitimised the sphere 
and role of the JCs and, at times, the RCs. Private developers could not complete a deal 
alone, and individual landlords could not ignore the advice of these intermediaries. During 
the redevelopment of Shang and Nong Villages, their JC offices were flooded with groups 
of landlords. Some explored the upper limit of compensation, and others formed alliances 
to negotiate. In addition to clarifying the policy, the redevelopment officers – who were 
either stationed in or patrolling the buildings – often convinced the landlords to take the 
deal. One village boss referred to this as “one-stop service”.361  
 
Another major policy change was to adjust the compensation ratio for urban village 
apartments, including both certified and non-certified floor spaces. 362  To do so, the 
government relaxed its standard ratio across the municipality to a flexible ratio determined 
by local circumstances. In general, the location and size of the redevelopment zone, its 
ratio of certified space to non-certified space, and its estimated dividends are all important 
evaluation criteria. In 2012, the Futian district government offered villagers a 
compensation ratio of 1:0.86 (i.e., compensated space was equal to 86 per cent of 
demolished certified floor spaces in the redevelopment of Gangxia Village).363 That ratio 
did not include non-certified floor spaces, which were compensated at 10 to 25 per cent 
although they were illegal structures. According to some provisional contracts, the actual 
compensation ratio was as high as 1:1 and 1:1.1 if non-certified floor space was included in 
the redevelopment of Shang. Hundreds of native villagers became millionaires overnight, 
and some large landlords obtained compensation as high as one hundred million yuan.364 
This handsome compensation greatly smoothed the redevelopment process and resulted in 
what one city-planning officer called a “win-win partnership”. Embedded in 
consequentialism, whether this amount of compensation is justified or whether the 
procedure is fair is of concern to neither the players nor the regulators. 
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However, in urban villages where redevelopment potential is high but JCs’ political assets 
are insufficient, negotiation can be lengthy. Rapid and ever-increasing real estate prices in 
Shang Village had required six years to complete the redevelopment project. If the 
conditions are reversed, which occurred in the outskirts village of Nong, the redevelopment 
project would have been stunted since 2006. Contrary to popular expectations, the 
dynamics and outcome of the renewal project were not merely the result of state 
intervention. The authoritarian administration did not resort to coercion to demolish urban 
villages, nor did local corporatism motivate the landlords to modify their property rights. 
Instead, the JCs functioned as the focal point for negotiation and contention, informing and 
revealing the subsequent move of the state and society. Overall, the JCs attempted to 
reinforce the image that they were not merely tools of the state but also protective brokers 
of the privatised collectives.365 When redevelopment or reconstruction was not a feasible 
option, the well-being of the landlords and tenants was tied to the general interests of the 
urban villages. A safe and governed enclave thus stabilised the rental value and 
monopolised the services in the villages, and also put the interventions from city 
apparatuses in check. From this perspective, the role of JCs has not changed much 
compared with the collectives in the pre-reform period; these companies have continued to 
serve as both producers and governors. 
 
A combination of vested interests and path dependence has motivated the JC management 
to continue to take care of the interests of the native villagers who now form a 
distinguished and enormously enriched group of landowners. One reason is that although 
the physical space of urban villages was demolished, the shares of native villagers have 
been preserved. In most cases, JCs were allocated the ownership of several blocks of 
commercial and residential buildings in the newly developed zone. Their subsidiaries were 
sometimes recruited as property-management companies for the community or buildings. 
Furthermore, although urban villages were demolished, the JCs’ renting and management 
businesses remained intact. Recognising that the native villagers lacked the expertise, 
knowledge and energy to act on and profit from other industries, the JCs aimed to negotiate 
deals that would enable the continuous flow of easy money. A deputy of Shang Village in 
charge of a redevelopment project referred to the trade-offs as enabling “a sustainable 
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future for the collective”.366 From this perspective, the local state, private developers, JCs 
and their grassroots clients understand the others’ needs and constraints, according to 
which appropriate payoffs were allocated to purchase one another’s compliance. Their 
contentions are not intended to challenge the nature of the collaborative order but largely 
aim to inform the amount of payoffs. 
 
Diversified Micro-Management 
To accelerate the demolition process and to minimise public contestation, many micro-
management tactics have been applied in our field sites. A JC chairman summarised the 
logistics of brokerage as follows: 
 
No doubt the cadres are concerned about growth, but they are ultimately constrained 
by an official target [zhibiao]; our concern is to bring wealth to our community. 
Tension is sometimes inevitable. Whereas land is identical to money for development, 
land also means social ties to our villagers. Yet as long as we share the goal of 
prosperity, there is lots of room for compromise.367 
 
Certainly, the authority, resources and manpower of the state, developers and migrant clans 
are structural features that affect how urban renewal is conducted. However, JCs’ priorities 
related to economic returns and social ties are often aimed at differentiated micro-
management tactics. In urban villages where social ties and deliberation are considered 
vital functions of urban renewal negotiations, the following tactics are often employed. 
First, some JCs repeatedly call meetings to articulate shareholders’ general will and bottom 
line. New and often better deals are then presented to demonstrate both their effort and 
loyalty to the community. This consultative measure is aimed at soliciting collective 
pressure to influence individual decisions. Second, JCs’ companies encourage native 
villagers to resort to litigation if necessary. Standard legal procedures and precedents 
related to unfiled claims are often introduced to the plaintiffs. This legalistic absorption 
measure informs landlords about the cost of litigation and is quite effective in achieving 
last-minute deals. Third, some JCs or private developers have paid off protest leaders when 
confronting serious, organised resistance. This divide-and-conquer tactic created distrust 
among the landlord protestors, dissolving collective resistance and promoting 
individualistic outcry.368   
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In villages in which economic returns and efficiency take precedence, the following tactics 
are employed. First, once the landlords or native villagers sign the agreement to transfer 
their land, the construction team immediately demolishes their buildings. This contingency 
strategy is aimed to preventing disputes with landlords following an increase in property 
prices. Second, some JCs redrew the original redevelopment site to exclude any landlords 
who refused to accept the third revised offer. This standardised precedent established a 
time limit on negotiations and informed the native villagers of the price of resistance.369 
Third, some JCs deliberately recruited temporary security guards to manage day-to-day 
work at the demolition sites. This practice of outsourcing not only accelerated the 
demolition process but also diffused the responsibility of the state and intermediaries to 
private service providers. However, the local authorities and JCs always discreetly monitor 
the entire demolition to enable a speedy response to any potential mass incidents.370 
 
These complex measures indicate the autonomous decision-making of the JCs or their 
leaders in the face of a rational urban planning administration and resourceful private 
developers. Each urban village has employed more than one measure in response to 
different scenarios. However, the choice among measures largely mirrors the various urban 
villages’ socioeconomic structures. One decisive factor is that media scrutiny tends to be 
more intense in outlying villages, partly because these villages have long been identified as 
sources of urban decay and partly because migrant clans in outlying areas are relatively 
independent and more contentious than their inner-city counterparts. Accordingly, 
contingency and coercive measures are adopted. Another reason is that property rights 
ownership is highly concentrated in inner-city urban villages; hence, the JCs can easily 
reach a deal when there is consensus among shareholders. Thus, consultative and 
absorption measures are preferred. Although the agendas of their contention vary, their 
methods and brokerage agency are similar. The JCs first explore the time limit set by the 
state and the compensation limit agreed to by the developers. They then deliberate with the 
landlords and solicit concessions for them. Sometimes the negotiations break down and 
more coercive measures are adopted. However, this back-and-forth practice indicates the 
embedded nature of informal politics in which the JCs articulate grassroots interests and 
absorb political pressure through contentious but contained action.371  
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INDIVIDUALISTIC RESISTANCE AND COLLECTIVE COMPLIANCE 
 
In the course of abrupt spatial changes, one may dispute the assumption that the 
relationships between village bosses and native villagers remain collaborative. Indeed, 
although JCs can serve as primary developers and property managers, individual landlords 
can trade their dividend-earning assets for compensation only once. Moreover, it is rational 
to expect resistance from rural migrants, whose living space in the city has been 
demolished. However, constrained by political institutions such as the hukou and land 
systems and informed by the precedents of state coercion, most stakeholders in urban 
villages have tended to practise individualised resistance and collective compliance rather 
than engaging in collective action. 
 
The Precedents of Contention and Conformity 
Despite the sensitive and targeted tactics of the aforementioned dispute resolution, not all 
redevelopment projects underwent negotiation. Instead, various forms of contention were 
employed by the landlords and tenants. First, some native villagers resorted to litigation, 
either because they considered their grievances more personal and legitimate than others’ 
grievances or because they were more comfortable contesting the state within established 
boundaries. However, the process and outcome of formal engagement were generally 
unsatisfactory. Litigation was often lengthy because the burden of proof always fell on the 
plaintiffs; the landlords could rarely justify their claims because the law was not designed 
to protect informal settlements. Indeed, most urban village apartments possessed only a 
certificate of “small property housing” prohibited from being traded in the market, thus 
making it difficult to determine the property’s true market value. The illegal structure of 
urban village apartments also resulted in a relatively low compensation ratio when non-
certified spaces were discounted.  
 
Occasionally, native villagers realised that they needed to abandon individualised and legal 
actions. Some decided to use petitions (xinfang) to voice their discontent. In the half-
demolished Shang Village, a group of native villagers established informal protest groups 
to submit petition letters collectively or to regularly visit the Municipal Bureau for Letters 
and Visits. Others invited the mass media to visit the demolition sites or to film their 
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everyday lives. None of these hard or soft actions resulted in any concrete responses or 
immediate policy changes. While they commonly referred to a discourse of “rightful 
resistance”, one must distinguish between land struggles by peasants losing land and 
defending their land rights for farming and rentiers owning land and demanding additional 
compensation for their property and illegal structure.372  
 
I prefer to use the word “norm” rather than “law” to characterise the relatively informal 
dynamics of negotiations. Contentious actions have contested government policies or 
revealed malpractice, but they are always issue-based and have rarely diffused into greater 
political agenda such as fighting for citizenship or revealing the institutional sources of 
coercion, corruption and inequality. The landlords welcomed professional brokers or even 
spies from JCs and sometimes from RCs. Using a combination of pledges and threats to 
dissolve collective action, these brokers preferred informal, secret payoffs to avoid 
provoking similar action in the future. A professional activist who had assisted and 
organised similar collective actions emphasised the boundaries of resistance: 
If you don’t make your case heard, no one will dare to comfort you, but if you speak 
too loudly, you give up your own protection. It is often not the high-profile activists 
that are risk but the committed followers. This is a long process of give and take; we 
must be patient.373 
Figure 14 Collective security brigade regulating contestation 
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Hence, the main purpose of contention is not to exercise rights but to find solutions. 
Although there is no evidence to suggest that policy changes regarding urban renewal are 
the direct results of such contention and compliance, they are nonetheless among the 
contributing factors. Similarly, a cadre of street office and a member of RC concurred that 
they are keen on practicing what is known as three “wen” principles: to apply appropriate 
actions (wendang fangfa), ensure balanced procedures (wentuo buzhou) and secure stable 
outcomes (wending jieguo). 374  Although the principles sound vague, the insiders have 
acknowledged the hidden rules. While negotiation is preferred to conflict, unstable 
elements must also be dealt with. Apart from the use of payoffs, another frequently 
adopted tactic is to deploy or imprison loyal participants but not protest leaders. This aims 
to generate sufficient threats to deter future and large-scale participation while avoiding the 
public attention of punishing the leaders, who always act as a vital point of contact. 
 
Indeed, one can easily observe the alignment between the claims of serious protests and the 
direction of incremental reforms. For instance, not only did Shenzhen’s municipal 
compensation ratio for certified floor space increase from 1:0.7 to 1:0.8 from 2008 to 2012, 
but individual districts were also given the discretion to compensate the non-certified floor 
space.375 The issue of whether the relocated native villagers and tenants with urban hukou 
ought to be given priority in choosing subsidised housing has also been discussed. All of 
these subjects were salient points of contention associated with the 2005 Renewal Plan 
(Figure 14). A middle-ranked official in the Shenzhen Urban Planning, Land and 
Resources Commission admitted that these grassroots actions were necessary. They led to 
better estimations of demolition schedules and compensation amounts and justified a larger 
budget for informal liaisons.376 
 
Dingzihu and the Disobedient Footing 
Whereas contained contention is the norm, transgressive contention is an anomaly. The 
dynamics of urban protests also validate Kevin O’Brien’s thesis that China’s contentious 
politics are “boundary-spanning” based on rural protests. 377  In extreme cases, some 
landlords saw “nail households” (dingzihu), referring to the few residents who refused to 
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relocate to facilitate redevelopment. By occupying a physical space, these nail households 
disrupted the schedule of redevelopment projects or exposed bad practices by local 
authorities and private developers. Simultaneously, this form of personalised resistance has 
often solicited both media attention and public sympathy. Although nail households have 
for years typically been depicted by the mass media as victims of a coercive state or an 
inhumane planning regime, their causes are not always just.  
 
The grievances and courage of those who speak out are often beyond doubt; they risk 
marginalisation from their own communities and retaliation from the authoritarian state. 
However, such contention was not clearly divided along the spectrum of state versus 
society, nor were the enemies of the state always motivated by passion and justified by 
valid claims. Instead, these protestors are as embedded in the mechanism of grassroots 
negotiation as professional brokers are. One common feature shared by many dingzihu in 
Shi and Shang Villages is that they are either Hong Kong residents or foreign nationals.378 
Their unique citizenship statuses allowed them the right to request assistance from state 
apparatuses such as the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office or the Hong Kong and Macau 
Affairs Office in the municipality. Whereas those xitong are certainly not committed to 
handling these appeals, they nonetheless are required to follow procedures and fulfil their 
function. When interdepartmental politics unfold, local authorities and developers have 
greater incentives to settle.379  Therefore, what distinguished these dingzihu from other 
obedient landlords is not only wealth but also access to various state apparatuses that have 
propagated their grievances and solicited settlements.  
 
The dingzihu also claim that they are deprived of the right to reside in their traditional 
communities. To illustrate the contrast between a nostalgic past and a materialistic present, 
the mass media was committed to thoroughly reporting their stories. Whereas certain 
indigenous communities might be justified in making such claims, urban villages, as 
temporary migrant enclaves, are not. According to village bosses and estate agents, more 
than two-thirds of native villagers moved away from their urban villages, and the village 
bosses and landlords even delegated middlemen to collect rent. The native villagers 
returned to the urban villages mainly for ritual or business functions. The scene of the 
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destruction of old village houses and the building of a new ancestral hall went hand in hand 
during the urban renewal of Shang Village (Figure 15). I was puzzled as to how the 
villagers could rationalise this contrasting treatment of their heritage. However, several 
native villagers reconciled the contradictions by genuinely insisting that “prosperity is the 
best way to greet our ancestors.” Although JCs, obedient native villagers and dingzihu 
might disagree about their attachment to the community, they agreed that preserving an 
heritage or lifestyle is largely a pretext to seek a better deal. 
 
Figure 15 New ancestor hall erected from wrecked heritage houses 
 
Despite their limited numbers, the dingzihu received widespread attention because their 
“grievances” matched the current privatisation trend. Neoliberal commentators have 
argued that native villagers are discriminated against in the sense that the current 
compensation formula includes only property value, not land value.380 Land ownership 
must be privatised to prevent the state from predating people’s assets and the market value 
of land. However, such arguments are normally and consequentially unsound. First, the 
ownership of land belongs to the collective and individual villagers, who possess only land 
use rights. Thus, the latter should be paid the market value of the land. Moreover, such 
compensation measures would either require government revenue to subsidise the 
dividend-earning classes or to increase the cost of requisition by private companies, which 
                                                
380 Zhou, 2004; Hao et al., 2011; Wu, 2013. 
161 
 
would redistribute public money to private individuals and increase the price of newly 
developed commodity housing, respectively. Many native villagers had already obtained 
millions of yuan in compensation during urban renewal; such reform would increase rather 
than decrease inequality. 
 
 
Figure 16 The demolition and reconstruction of an urban village, 2012-2015 
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Most important, contrary to neoliberal doctrine, this type of land privatisation measure 
actually institutionalised the collaboration between the landed rentier class and the 
corporatist local state, which neither enhances the transparency of public finance nor 
protects the property rights of individuals. As such, the rural migrants have been expelled 
from the migrant enclaves, while native villagers, private developers and corrupted 
officials have captured a large portion of the rent. The transaction costs have not been 
reduced but have instead been redistributed to the majority of the public who did not 
consent but are required to pay tax to fund the high compensation and build supplementary 
public infrastructure (Figure 15). Although these investment projects are increasingly 
inefficient and unsustainable, they are still encouraged for their ability to boost GDP and 
return income to the managers and officials. More wealthy urbanites are left with the 
option to purchase the expensive gated communities to catch up with the compound 
interest. Gradually, those who owned real estate and those who could not afford to do so 
formed two distinct classes, with the former becoming the collaborators in the commodity 
market, earning compound interests, advocating privatisation measures and supporting the 
existing order. 
 
Multiple Exit Points and Silent Rural Migrants 
Compared with the disproportionate attention on the dingzihu, the voices of rural migrants, 
who represent the majority of the inhabitants of urban villages, were silenced. Although 
scholars have repeatedly stated that urban renewal should consider the enormous number 
of tenants without property rights and should aim for communal rather than machine-like 
spaces, this view has never been taken seriously by either the planning administration or 
the mass media. 381  Lacking urban hukou, rural migrants are not entitled to receive 
relocation subsidies and are not placed in public housing. Because they are neither property 
owners nor citizens, rural migrants are deprived of the right to receive compensation or 
earn public sympathy.  
 
However, the land and hukou systems have discriminated against rural migrants as much as 
helped them, providing two exit points following the redevelopment projects. The first exit 
point is to retreat to the urban villages in the outskirts that continue to provide temporary, 
affordable accommodation. According to the JCs in Nong and Gong Villages, their urban 
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villages have expanded by least 30 per cent since 2005 because of the influx of new 
migrant tenants from the city centre. Government data show that between 2006 and 2013, 
at least 400,000 rural migrants moved from inner-city urban villages to urban villages in 
outlying areas.382 The municipal government has deliberatively left these outer districts 
untouched not only because of their lower development value but also because they aim to 
provide a transition space to absorb this massive scale of intra-city displacement. While 
migrant workers remain ineligible to apply for low-cost housing provided by the state, they 
again face the necessity of renting the relatively affordable apartments supplied by the 
native villagers.  
 
Another exit point involves relocating to the countryside. Conditioned by the hukou system 
and responding to market situations, the rural migrants alternately move between their 
original county and other cities. Official data suggest that the average rural migrant lives in 
the city for only 2.3 years.383 Subjected to relatively unstable jobs compared with the jobs 
of factory workers, many migrants in urban villages might not even achieve that length of 
residence. Although many rural migrants were expelled from the city because they had 
only partial citizenship under the hukou system, the collective land system in the 
countryside lured them back. Land is a substantial asset through which the rural migrants 
were allocated exit points. Thus, although the demolition of urban villages removed the 
migrants’ living space and their implicit social contract with the intermediate agencies, 
most chose to exit rather than protest. However, this exit strategy is not without costs; the 
low supply of cheap and skilled labour had already been evident since 2010 and 
compromised the labour-intensive and exported-oriented manufacturing sector in the Pearl 
River Delta. Although local governments have conducted some piecemeal adjustments to 
attract the necessary labour force, as suggested in tables 8 and 10, none of them effected 
systemic changes in the social and civil entitlements of migrants. 
 
The combination of institutional exclusion and exit points effectively prohibited any 
organised resistance on behalf of the rural migrants and thus defined the soft nature of the 
migrant enclaves in China’s sunbelt. Following these interventions, organised resistance 
and violent conflict decreased. Attachment to the community and the absence of exit points 
also explain why farmers in rural areas and homeowners in high-rises, rather than rural 
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migrants, were China’s most contentious groups.384 The next chapter will explore whether 
an exit point significantly influences stability and compliance among second-generation 
rural migrants who do not own collective land.  
 
Informality at threat 
The above analysis reveals the contradictions of rational urban planning and informal 
grassroots politics in China’s sunbelt. On the one hand, Shenzhen has deliberately 
attempted to depart from its urban past, as it is increasingly dissatisfied with remaining part 
of the assembly line of global capitalism, which tends to result in attracting rural migrants 
and increasing environmental hazards. Public infrastructure has expanded, and urban space 
has been restructured to prepare for industrial upgrading. Instead of weakening the state, 
neoliberalism along with high urbanism has assisted with and justified the spread of 
megaprojects to eliminate others. Shocks such as protests from landlords and 
displacements of migrants are considered unavoidable but necessary to enable both 
efficient land use and the transformation of Shenzhen into a sustainable, global city. 
 
Nevertheless, it has become imperative to reveal the irony of Shenzhen urban renewal, in 
which intermediaries have absorbed contestation only through hearing the voices of 
privileged landlords, whereas the socialist systems used to protect disadvantaged tenants 
only facilitated exit strategies. The migrant workers and working poor were effectively 
excluded from negotiating for the living spaces that that they had helped create. Clearly, 
this contained protest reveals the informality of negotiation and the limits of coercive state 
power at the grassroots level. Contrary to popular expectation, it was not the coercive state 
but the active intermediaries – along with micro-management tactics – that resolved 
tensions and solicited deals. However, the level of remedy or, more precisely, the ability to 
receive payoffs is a proxy for one’s alignment with the neoliberal doctrines and one’s 
distance from the state, reinforcing inequality not only between private developers and 
individual owners but also between native villagers and rural migrants. 
 
Shenzhen’s urban trajectory also indicates why a megacity and its slums do not constitute 
the urban space of typical Chinese cities. I am not denying the cultural power of 
cleanliness, orderliness, and healthiness – common desires that would probably unify the 
                                                
384 Cf. Cai, 2010: 21-42; Read, 2012: 168-207. 
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greatest number of city governments and urban dwellers. Nor am I objecting to every 
rational principle and redevelopment effort in search of a more sustainable urban future. 
However, Shenzhen’s urban renewal process does not simply resemble the Western 
benchmark: it has attempted a form of disenfranchisement and gentrification as an ideal 
that not even advanced developers could comprehend. In this way, “development without 
slums” in China’s sunbelt is not only a record of past practices but also a blueprint for the 
future endorsed by the urban planning regime. 
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7. Brokers of Locality and Satisfiers from Afar 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter examines the micro-mechanisms that maintain the socio-political order in 
urban villages along with their dwellers’ experience and assessment of that order. Based on 
60 semi-structured interviews conducted the four urban villages, I first identify the primary 
brokers and their socioeconomic ties. Although I do not claim that this small set of data is 
statistically significant, it nonetheless reflects the pattern of engagements as well as the 
political psychology in the migrant enclaves in South China. I then compare the native 
villagers and rural migrants’ evolving roles in and attitudes towards the internal 
characteristics of these enclaves. In doing so, I avoid treating urban villages as purely self-
contained, self-sufficient and static entities—a position often assumed by students of 
informal communities—but instead focus on the “dynamics of the social process and of 
change”.385  
 
By giving voice to the subalterns, I reveal the source of China’s local plutocracy and the 
boundaries of its grassroots order. I contest the notion that attributes rural migrants’ 
economic hardship and political conformity to deep-rooted cultural factors. But I also find 
explanations based on kinship ties and generalised reciprocity to be inadequate. Instead, I 
demonstrate how the divergence in trade and class, the timing and locality of settlement, 
and the division of outsider and insider serve to nurture collusion, segregation, and 
“personalised reciprocity” among different social actors in urban villages.386 Brokers 
I use the term brokers to refer to the village bosses, landlords and clan chiefs who are 
earlier settlers interdependent upon and collaborative with each other to reinforce the 
insider and outsider boundaries between them and the temporary migrants. Although only 
the village bosses and landlords are native villagers, the clan chiefs are also 
considered ’insiders’ due to their ability to deliver goods and services, provide protection 
and cultivate network with rural migrants. They are thus constantly mediating the interests 
between the state and society and among different players in the grassroots society.  
                                                
385 Leeds, 1994:234-235. 
386 See Newton, 2003 and Steinhardt, 2012 for a discussion of general trust and personal trust in China and 
elsewhere. 
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Although the internal power structure and external political access still favour local bosses, 
native villagers and clan chiefs, most dwellers benefit from the diversity in everyday trades 
and secure their respective territories; hence, their levels of appreciation or toleration of the 
embedded order vary. 
 
Nevertheless, the absence of overt contention should not be interpreted as migrants’ 
approval of the regulated space, and it does not explain their silence or lack of organized 
resistance during the demolition of their living space. Rather, migrants’ considerations are 
complex, flexible and sometimes contradictory. Borrowing the idea of bounded rationality 
developed by Herbert Simon and others, I infer that the majority of migrants are aware of 
the persistent deprivation and discrimination in the enclaves but choose to adapt to and 
profit from those provisions. They thus become satisfiers rather than maximisers. 387 
Certain demographic and structural changes that might alter this order are also discussed. 
 
 
BEYOND CULTURAL AND STRUCTURAL EXPLANATIONS 
 
China’s rural migrants are known for their toleration of economic hardship, social injustice 
and political disenfranchisement. Despite the institutional discrimination in the land and 
hukou systems, the unequal provision of public goods in the urban villages and the 
demolition of their living space amidst urban renewal, these migrants rarely opt for 
organised resistance, and they rarely make new political claims. Rather, most migrants 
either rent a tiny bedroom in a remote suburban district and spend hours travelling to work 
every day or retreat to the countryside to await a favourable economic cycle in which their 
labour has higher market values.  
 
In the previous chapters, I explained this relative stability by referring to adaptive 
governance mechanisms at the grassroots level. JCs and RCs are rather affluent in that they 
can afford to provide cheap shelter, control crimes and buy off grievances. The public and 
private security guards are also quite effective in that contention in urban China has 
typically been resolved within one or two weeks on average.388 Notwithstanding the effects 
                                                
387 Simon, 1982; Gigerenzer and Selten, 2002. 
388 Interview, public security officer, 15 August 2013; See also Yang, 2004; Lee and Zhang, 2013 for the 
adaptation at both institutional and grassroots levels.  
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of the intermediaries’ provision of public goods and the state’s stability maintenance 
mechanism, it is legitimate to ask whether this widespread toleration and compliance 
reflect deeper cultural and structural causes transcending age, gender, class, geography and 
institutions. 
 
The idea of cultural anomaly has not disappeared in the literature, and it is arguably 
embedded in local government propaganda and mass media reports. Borrowing usage from 
their post-Soviet partners, some commentators have proclaimed that China’s migrants are 
embedded in the political culture of “endless patience”. 389  Others suggest that these 
migrants are self-restrained by the “culture of poverty” compared with the poor residing in 
Latin America’s ghettoes, shantytowns and squatters and whose habits and values are 
obstacles to their own socioeconomic progress.390 Even those who are more sympathetic to 
the rural migrants consider “eating bitterness” deeply rooted in peasants’ psyche, and this 
view explains why so many injustices have been tolerated and repeated from one 
generation to another.391  
 
Equally influential is a set of structural explanations that treats China’s migrant 
communities as unique and detached from the city at large. Kinship has long been 
identified as the primary ties that accounts for the behaviours and livelihoods of 
migrants.392 Ancestry, lineage, descent and dialect are givens in the countryside but are 
arguably more vital in an alien host city located hundreds or thousands of miles from one’s 
native place. This real or perceived identity not only reinforces the obligation of fellow 
townsmen but also enables dwellers of migrant enclaves to broaden social connections, 
search for jobs in the market, exchange goods and favours, and develop solidarity between 
strangers. In this view, despite the perceived depravity, defects and deficiency of urban 
villages, their dwellers have managed to form a networked socioeconomic structure that is 
sufficient to protect and advance their interests. These types of “dense networks of 
reciprocal exchange” are considered both a means to alleviate the dwellers’ material 
predicament and a process to generate a sense of local community.393 
 
                                                
389 Ashwin, 1998. 
390 Lewis, 2011. 
391 Loyalka, 2012. 
392 Ma and Xiang, 1998; Li, 2001. 
393 Rodgers, 2014:128-129.  
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Although these explanations are not entirely inaccurate or purely mythic, they are either 
incomplete or overly generalised. The cultural thesis cannot articulate the agency’s 
informed calculations, and it does not pay sufficient attention to the variation in resistance 
and claims between different localities. Why, despite sharing a similar political culture, did 
peasants in the native country and workers in factory dormitories become more contentious 
than migrants in urban villages? Similarly, the structural thesis tends to underplay the 
influence of socio-political institutions along with the agency’s adaptations. Migrant 
enclaves are regarded as all but self-limiting, self-reproducing or static entities, without 
acknowledging their connections to the formal city and their external relations with the 
local government as well as the political consequences. Many related studies concern 
highly homogenous villages in North China where kinships are given and cohesion is 
relatively easy to nurture. But in South China, most of the urban villages are more 
heterogeneous, in which migrants of different clans or lineages compete with one another 
for power and resources. Some of them even occupy different corners or streets in each 
village, and for historical and institutional reasons, they have different levels of political 
access. In effect, migrants’ toleration or inaction is arguably a proxy of their incapacity. In 
a post-socialist condition of shifted state position from allying labour to capital, 
independent union organisation is by default censored and NGOs for migrants are 
repeatedly supressed. These institutional constraints nonetheless provide the space for the 
practices of informal politics.   
 
 
BROKERS AND THE LOCALITY 
 
Despite the favourable conditions for the emergence of conflicts, why has contention 
between different social groups rarely been observed or speedily managed? By contention, 
I refer not only to the overt conflicts occurring during the appropriation of land but also to 
the relative absence of rightful claims or resistance on behalf of the rural migrants who 
outnumber the native villagers by at least 300 to 1 in each urban village. This issue 
demands a detailed description of the brokers’ trades and politics along with the dwellers’ 
ties and experience in the localities. I adopt the term “locality” instead of “community” for 
two reasons. First of all, community has become an official and overloaded term that 
considers state penetration and kinship ties to be the structure of social order. This 
understanding gives too much attention to or provides false expectations for the common 
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values, nuclear interconnectedness and reciprocal obligations within social entities. In 
contrast, locality refers to the distinct loci of interactions in which personalised and 
impersonal relations, resources and power, and formal and informal institutions shape one 
another. This definition offers a more accurate and nuanced understanding of the 
ambiguous, flexible, adaptive and yet patterned grassroots politics in the migrant 
enclaves.394 
 
In each urban village, I can further classify dwellers into four groups based on their power 
and resources: 1) members of JCs and RCs who are producers and rulers, 2) native 
villagers who are landlords and investors, 3) clan chiefs who are contractors and brokers, 
and 4) rural migrants who are tenants and workers. Groups 1 and 3 are what we refer to as 
intermediaries respectively connecting the state (local governments and self-ruling 
communities) and society (native villagers and rural migrants). Although the functions of 
JCs and RCs have been deliberated in previous chapters, the roles of clan heads have not 
been fully examined. I use the term clan to refer to all these lineage, kinship and business 
networks whose membership and roles are similar to the clan associations among overseas 
Chinese. Their major difference is that they did not form a formal hierarchy that has been 
encroached upon and possessed by the JC.395 Rather than examining how these brokers 
broker deals, allocate jobs and guarantee exchanges, we aim to more generally explore 
how native villagers and rural migrants feel about engaging with these brokers, their forms 
of participation and their attitude towards the socio-political constitution of urban villages. 
 
Initial Contacts and Economic ties 
When asked why local bosses and clan heads have existed and flourished along with the 
urban villages, the dwellers described their initial contacts, daily necessities and reciprocal 
exchanges with these informal actors. Once the rural migrants moved into a host city or left 
a factory, their first point of contact, apart from their relatives and friends, was the 
municipal or district human resource market (some renamed service centres). Each day, 
thousands of migrants gathered outside these government buildings from 8am to 6pm, 
while recruitment agencies and private contractors deployed their assistants and surrogates 
to offer jobs and make recruits directly. Construction and sanitary work, for instance, is 
                                                
394 Cf. Li, 2001; Xiang, 2005; Wu, 2010. 
395 Cheng and Ma, 2014:625-627. 
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relatively well paid, but unfulfilled payment is also extremely common.396 Clan networks 
thus help to expedite recruitment and reduce uncertainty in an era of outsourcing.  
 
Once recruited, rural migrants work and live as a team under different contractors 
(chengbaoshang) and subcontractors (pantou). Thus, when rural migrants moved into the 
urban villages, some of them rented apartments collectively. The standard size of urban 
village apartments is actually too large for rural migrants who do not have a family in the 
city. Hence, migrants often save money by renting apartments together in groups of four or 
five. One of these migrants gradually emerged as an informal leader or developed clan or 
business ties. One probable cause is that although migrants greatly enjoy freedom from 
surveillance and control after leaving the factory dormitory, they are also rather 
accustomed to listening to an authority or subcontractor after years of training and 
discipline in the sweatshops. Furthermore, clan networks prefer to employ numerous 
subcontractors to extend their networks while reducing operating expenses. In this regard, 
clan and business networks blend profession and protection. 
 
 
Figure 17 Self-service apartment listings  
 
To the native villagers, delegation is increasingly vital for running their business and 
forming a buffer zone. Huang, one of the largest landlords in Shang village, internalised 
the services from clan chiefs or local bosses. 
                                                
396 National Health and Family Planning Commission, 2012, 35; 2013:96. 
172 
 
In the past, we did everything ourselves. We wanted to know who rented our 
apartments. We wanted to close the deal and conduct regular inspections. I even 
brought my son with me so that he could learn about how to do business. But now we 
have 54 apartments; it is simply impossible to do it the old way [laofangfa]. We need 
help from those we trust. 
Thus, some large, established clans that were often earlier migrant settlers became trusted 
proxies. The apartments in the four urban villages that I surveyed were almost 
monopolised by these proxies and their surrogates. In addition to testimonies, another 
proof of their monopoly is that professional real estate firms and their agents rarely existed 
and conducted business in the urban villages, which did not enter this informal market as 
they did in other gated communities (Figure 16). This is partly a result of relative low 
profit margins and the lack of social connections. When I interviewed two clan chiefs who 
rented and outsourced hundreds of apartments in three urban villages, they continually 
answered business calls from potential and current tenants as well as from landlords and 
their relatives. The content of these calls ranged from renting enquiries, construction 
delays, safety regulations, and evacuation assistance to procedures for handling fire 
department inspections and guidance in applying for permits. They are thus not merely 
functioned to reduce transition costs but also connecting strangers to different localities.   
 
Daily Necessities and Territorialised Branding 
These types of proxies not only are limited to outsourcing residential apartments but have 
also been extended to renting street-level shops, selecting building contractors, recruiting 
private security guards and producing cultural and recreational activities. A web of 
patronage has thus emerged. Although the proxies facilitated collusion between the patrons 
and clients, they also contributed to a flattened social order in Shenzhen’s migrant 
enclaves. One of the deputies of JC who is also a major landlord in Shi village discussed 
his strange encounter with various clan networks: 
 
You can never compete with the Teowchewese. They form dense supply chains and 
efficient logistic networks. They are so protective. As fellow townsmen, they enjoy a 
3-month interest-free grace period. What did we get? One week! We locals are not 
passive. But earning dividends is our best option. There were already many dead 
bodies (sishang zhenjie). [The dead bodies refer to the bankrupted companies of the 
native villagers that used to compete with the strong clans.] 
 
A similar remark concerned the Hakka’s ability to combat harshness and perform 
unpleasant work, the Hokkienese’s commitment to establishing trade networks and 
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maintaining a frugal lifestyle, the Hunanese’s presence in the security and construction 
business and the Jiangxiese’s control of the drug and prostitution trades. These 
characterizations and categorizations certainly hold some truth. Except for the deviant 
Gong village, the Teochewese always occupied the main business streets, opening 
groceries, boutiques and restaurants, whereas the Hokkienese clustered in the electric 
market next to Shi village and the textile warehouse near Nong Village (Figure 18). The 
Hakka and Hunanese also largely monopolised construction and sanitary work that is 
rejected not only by urbanites but also by other migrant sects or clans. Meanwhile, workers 
from similar professions clustered near one another. White-collars workers and migrant 
traders tended to relocate to neighbourhoods with efficient transportation networks or 
modern equipped or newly renovated buildings, whereas blue-collar workers have to 
choose deteriorating apartments supported by cheap groceries and underdeveloped 
surveillance systems. Supported by the clan networks and their micro-finances, the small 
business is allowed to develop. Not only did this provide cheaper goods and services, this 
also sustained a niche market in the enclaves. 
 
 
Figure 18 Prosperous but segregated commercial street 
 
Driven by the need for economies of scale, the quest for protection, and the desire for 
better living standards, these spatial relocation processes have been practised consistently 
in several villages since the mid-1990s. With the endorsement and assistance of village 
bosses and native villagers, who either believed in this division of labour or aimed to avoid 
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potential conflicts among different social and ethnic groups, a number of main avenues or 
streets were divided and associated apartments rented out to clans. These steady relocation 
processes did not result in a sharp distinction between spatially distinct groups 
subordinated to a particular gang or boss, but each community’s internal solidarity and 
informal chiefship were nonetheless consolidated. Occasionally, the dwellers were 
informed of who the chiefs, brokers and troublemakers were. Each locality also reinforced 
its own identity: some areas were safer than others, and some were freer than others. 
Although the stereotype of each locality has been institutionalised, their reliance on 
intermediaries and their business networks has also been strengthened. Thus, the 
continuous exchange of goods and favours exclusively between particular clan members or 
among its business extensions is vital to maintain the territorialisation of politics in each 
migrant enclave. Locality rather than community is a more accurate description of the 
dynamics of the spatial order.  
 
Certainly, some migrants are not construction workers, traders or entrepreneurs; many are 
salary-earning professionals or clerical staff. Many single, young, single-child family 
migrants are living from paycheck to paycheck and are fairly isolated from one another. 
Undoubtedly, they constitute the most disenfranchised and apathetic migrant groups and 
sources of vice and crime. However, regardless of class or profession, these migrants share 
certain patterns of consumption and accumulation. When asked how they would spend 
their profit or salary, many migrants indicated that their income was divided into several 
categories: 1) personal expenses, including food, clothing, income rent, transportation and 
entertainment; 2) official or unofficial fees, contributions and bribes; 3) remittances for 
their family; and 4) savings or investment. Despite that categories 1 and 2 normally 
constitute two-thirds of the income of wage-earning rural migrants, the existence and 
consciousness of separating consumption, saving, investment and ultimately planning 
caught me by surprise. Undoubtedly, not everyone is that disciplined, but the older and 
wealthier rural migrants are increasingly adapting to the idea of financial planning, which 
exhibits how they make use of the advantages of their sojourn for their life agenda. Wei, 
who runs a small restaurant, suggested that alternative ways of saving are essential: 
 
As migrants, it’s difficult for us to get loans from banks. We also lack savings. But 
kinship unites people. It allows us to borrow money at reasonable rates or to save 
money to earn interest. Thus, we can collect money to cover urgent family needs, raise 
capital to start a small restaurant, or meet the deposit to bid for a construction 
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contract.397 
 
Although such micro-finance is largely created and maintained by the brokers, it would be 
an exaggeration to consider this type of interdependence purely the result of social 
bonding. First of all, although these micro-finance cooperatives diversified in terms of 
ownership and management style, they are primarily aimed at profits. Basically, these 
cooperatives are divided between the credit cooperatives managed by the JCs and the usury 
outlets financed by clan chiefs or native villagers. Established to safeguard regular interests 
for the collective fund and for the management of the urban villages, the former are 
mechanically bounded by public opinion, and hence more regulated and less predatory. In 
contrast, sustained by private financers who took the risks of illegal lending, the latter 
always aim at high and quick returns, and hence more predatory and coercive. Whether or 
not one can receive instant access to liquidity and favourable interest rate from the shadow 
banking system is not only conditioned by his or her business track records but also his or 
her personal connections and overall utility in particular enclave. 398  These compound 
criteria thus concurrently create tensions between different social groups and warrant the 
dependence of the dwellers to the intermediaries. 
 
Second, what constitutes kinship is rather contingent and ambiguous in the urban villages. 
It is contingent because the Hakka, the Teochewese and the Cantonese all belong to the 
province of Guangdong, yet their geographical advantage made them the earlier brokers 
and, subsequently, the strongest clans. It is ambiguous because these three perceived 
“locals” are allowed to claim their unique identity while simultaneously being united as a 
whole. In contrast, nearly all other clans are divided according to provincial identity rather 
than ancestry, lineage, dialect or township. For example, although the Hokkienese and the 
Teochewese share the same lineage and speak nearly identical dialects, kinship per se does 
not entail cohesion or trust between them. On the contrary, the Hakka, the Teochewese and 
the Cantonese were traditionally rivals and could communicate only through Putonghua. 
However, despite their competition and difference, they have united as the locals and 
formed the inner circle of the urban villages in the hope of defending their interests and 
customs against outsiders. From this perspective, the interplay between the timing of 
settlement and constructed local identity is more important than actual kinship ties. 
                                                
397 Interview, migrant traders, Shenzhen, 17 March 2013. 
398 Interview, village bosses and clan chiefs, Shenzhen, 25 and 27 September 2013. 
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In addition, the internal purity within each clan has been exaggerated. Several clan chiefs 
stated that although their management cores remain largely composed of people from the 
same township or those speaking a similar dialect, migrants from different provinces are 
also encouraged to join their clan and business networks.399 Hence, kinship is largely 
relevant during family gatherings, rituals and festivals and can and must be distinguished 
and detached from everyday life and trade. During daily operations and interactions, clan 
primary served as a “symbol” for consolidating their brand, extending organisational 
networks and securing clients and surrogates.  Because I speak Hakka and Teochew, I was 
surprised to learn how rarely these dialects were used in daily and business 
communications. A Hakka clan leader in Shi village told me that the dialects were used 
rarely because nearly 70 per cent of the employees of their companies came from different 
kinships. A Teochewese clan leader in Shang village also estimated that “outsiders” now 
constituted the overwhelming majority of their companies and networks. They welcome 
and promote stereotypes by the native villagers or the media primarily aimed at 
transforming social bonding into commercial capital. After years of exchange and 
evolution, the relevant issue is not whether their clan members are really hardworking or 
frugal but whether respective clans have earned trust and established networks to make 
them convenient and indispensable to their patrons.  
 
Exchanges, Assurance and Habitus 
According to the JCs and native villagers, dependence on clan chiefs also results from 
security threats. Landlords repeatedly told us that their friends and relatives were robbed 
and assaulted by migrants during rental viewing or contract signing. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, the crime rate in urban villages is not particularly high and is comparable to the 
rest of the city. In addition to this average figure, robbery and assault have been 
concentrated in the neighbourhoods of the native villagers and wealthier white-collar 
migrants. Nevertheless, the native villagers are well informed that such security threats 
have been exaggerated in order to seek additional funding for public security enhancement. 
Crimes do occur in urban villages, but such crimes are not sufficiently serious or frequent 
to prevent the landlords from conducting business.  
 
                                                
399 Interviews, clan chiefs, Shenzhen, 21 and 22 April 2013. 
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On the contrary, the growing legal consequences of conducting business in the urban 
villages are the real threats to landlords. These consequences include renting apartments to 
rural migrants who do not possess necessary documentation, providing sponsorship to clan 
companies that are conducting illicit business and charging illegal interest rates to 
contactors or dwellers. For a long time, no one was concerned. However, in view of the 
local authority’s city appearance upgrading projects and public security improvement 
campaigns, the cost of participating in illegal or unorthodox activities has increased 
rapidly. When the native villagers became wealthier and ascended the social ladder, they no 
longer wanted to take risks. Thus, they counted on clan chiefs or their professional 
surrogates to serve as buffers, to shift the responsibility while continuing to receive 
dividends.  
 
After examining the logic and considerations of the brokers and migrants during initial and 
daily contacts, I suggest that their relations are better understood from the perspective of 
“mutual assurance” rather than mutual trust. For the villagers, dividing clan chiefs into 
different circles and relocating the village into different zones were good strategies for 
rental business and for social stability. However, these practices did not mean that the 
native villagers had established close and hierarchical patron and client networks as did 
their counterparts in ghettos or slums. As proxies, they served to guarantee a constant 
supply of qualified migrants whose skills and abilities fit the needs of the trades and 
development of the enclaves. Flexibility and short contracts rather than loyalty and 
permanent obligation are the optimal ways to meet the changing needs of the enclaves. 
Although the situation seems insecure, these types of temporary but consistent jobs are 
preferred by many migrants, not only because fellow countrymen serve as better assurance 
for migrants who have often experienced the problem of unpaid wages but also because 
this arrangement allows them to fluctuate according to the business cycle and save 
money.400 An idiom frequently used by both clan chiefs and rural migrants is that “the 
monk can run away, but the temple won’t (paodele heshang paobuliao miao)”. In the midst 
of increasingly privatised enclaves, informed calculations override structural conditions or 
cultural imprints to rule the collective behaviours of different social groups.  
 
In this regard, the embeddedness of kinship ties must be assessed in accord to the evolving 
                                                
400 Pai, 2012: 15-40, 164-206. 
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boundaries of goods and favours. When asked what are the principles and motivations for 
them to maintain stability and enhance trades in the migrant enclaves, a village boss and a 
clan chief make the following claims: 
 
We must obey the CCP. That’s the foundation of our society. We must also make 
profits for the villagers. For they form our ancestry. But beyond those limits, we must 
also raise our concerns to the local governments and be attentive to all the dwellers.   
 
Some money is dirty; some is not. In the past, we earned whatever money presented to 
us in order to survive. But now, our position and public opinions hold us back to make 
selection. 401 
 
Although Huang and Ye, respectively a chairman of JC who is also a delegate of local 
people’s congress and a migrant entrepreneur who is also a head of major clan, seemed to 
be speaking in tongues, the messages they conveyed are discretionary and evolutionary. 
First, in the absence of electoral politics, the village bosses’ authority in the migrant 
enclaves is not only delegated but is also earned. Products of the socialist era and winners 
of the marker reforms, some chairmen of the JC recognized the boundaries of contestation 
with the local state and demonstrated their commitments to various public functions. 
Maintaining a slightly differentiated but not largely consistent set of regulations and norms 
serves to manage the dwellers’ expectations, inform their actions, and solicit their 
compliance. Second, the migrant entrepreneurs’ alignment with clan chiefs and their 
business networks is not only economically driven but also a form of “natural selection” 
consistent with the path of modernisation. Employing professional mediators to engage 
with rural migrants serves as an indicator of the progression and gentrification of the native 
villagers. During my interviews, these landlords discussed the advantages of distancing 
themselves from the old business and from dealings with rural migrants, who were 
considered not merely minor subjects but also deceptive and dangerous. Undoubtedly, the 
security threats from and the cost of engaging with rural migrants are more perceived than 
real. The native villagers are indeed among the key players in consolidating these vices and 
crimes.  
 
By delegating everyday trades to the mediators and creating a buffer between the landlords 
and tenants, the native villagers not only enjoyed more leisure time to develop other trades 
and hobbies but also succeeded in constructing a local and urban identity distinguished 
                                                
401 Interview, rural migrant, Shenzhen, 21 April 2013. 
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from the subalterns. Considering the following statements, which were conveyed to me 
first by two JC chairmen after I introduced myself: 
 
The London School of Economics is good, [but] my son and nephew went to 
Cambridge and the Imperial College…Our village provides full scholarships to our 
fellow villagers. They can choose to go anywhere. But we prefer them to go to the top 
schools in the US and in the UK.402 
 
Whether the LSE is at the same rank as Oxbridge and Imperial is certainly debateable. But 
this conversation is thought to be restricted to particular professions and circles that are 
normally closed to the urbanites in the developed world and are supposedly irrelevant to 
peasants in a developing country who lack either the appetite or finances. However, the 
reality is that the horizon and habitus of some villagers—proxies of their resources and 
power—have reached a level that is beyond our imagination. Although the rural migrants 
are still working hard for basic food and clothing and feel grateful when their children are 
admitted to local schools, the native villagers, who also used to belong to the peasantry, 
have lived a fundamentally different life and have begun to accumulate economic, political 
and cultural capital for the next generation. How has this enormous inequality been 
tolerated and cultivated between the two social groups in the same locality? Why did the 
rural migrants, who maintain close contact with the native villagers, not sense and contest 
this absolute and relative deprivation?  
 
 
LOCALITY AND SEGREGATED ENGAGEMENTS 
 
One way to answer these questions is to examine the pattern and boundaries of engagement 
between these supposedly closely connected groups. When asked how often they 
participated in communal activities during the past year, the patterns of native villagers and 
rural migrants differed substantially. By communal activities, we refer to a variety of 
social, cultural and recreational functions and events in the urban villages. These activities 
include occasions that are exclusively for native villagers, such as ritual ceremonies, 
festival banquets and medical examinations. Other gatherings, such as singing shows, 
sports competitions, calligraphic workshops, and health and family planning seminars, are 
available to all dwellers.  
                                                
402 Interview, native villager, Shenzhen, 25 September 2013. 
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Table 8 reveals the pattern of engagement in China’s migrant enclaves. However, one must 
consider that the variety of activities available to the two groups differs. First, contrary to 
popular perceptions, the native villagers are actually more detached from their villages 
than the migrants are. Although one-tenth of the rural migrants had never participated in 
any local activities, those who participated were much more active than the villagers. 
Although rural migrants are still essentially dependent on free goods and are attracted to 
popular activities within the enclaves, the villagers are not; the latter are highly mobile and 
aim for better quality of services and products outside the impoverished enclaves. During 
my residence in the Shi and Shang villages, although the open-space concerts sponsored by 
the intermediaries were always well attended, the native villagers almost exclusively 
considered them overcrowded or not aligned with their tastes. Hence, the degree of 
participation reflects the residents’ resources and orientations towards the locality.  
Table 8 Residents’ Participation in Local Activities 
 Native Villagers Rural Migrants 
 Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
Never  0 0 4 11.42 
Once or Twice  8 32.00 5 14.29 
Occasionally  13 52.00 14 40.00 
Many Times  3 12.00 9 25.71 
Frequently  2 16.00 3 8.57 
Total  25 100.00 35 100.00 
 
Second, the native villagers and rural migrants did not simply consume but also 
volunteered in these activities. In 2009 and 2010, the Shi and Shang villages, respectively, 
initiated fundraising campaigns for CCTV installation. Although the installations were 
related to harmonious community initiatives endorsed by the street office and implemented 
by the RC, there were some contingent causes. In both villages, the JC actively joined the 
initiatives because of the presence of public security threats attributed to the workers laid 
off as a result of the 2008 financial crisis and the return flow of rural migrants following 
China’s stimulus package. Surprisingly, money was donated not only by the native 
villagers but also by a significant number of migrant entrepreneurs, traders and white-
collar workers.  
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Eventually, the Shi and Shang villages managed to install 250 and 580 CCTV cameras, 
respectively, through the combination of the street office’s community enhancement 
budget, JC management fee redistributions and fundraising campaigns.403 In addition to 
economic and security concerns, the wealthier migrants clearly aimed to seize the 
opportunity to visualise their roles and residence in the urban villages. When asked about 
the goal of contributing to public infrastructure in an enclave that they would soon leave,404 
the migrants gave a variety of reasons. Some clan chiefs referred to “giving hands to the 
village bosses”, clearly aiming for reciprocal exchanges of goods and favours in the future. 
However, some migrant traders claimed that their donation was “for the benefit of their 
place” or “motivated by the conflicts with the locals”, whereas some migrant entrepreneurs 
explained that they simply wanted to show that “migrants could also contribute” or that 
“we are not the source of disorder; we also want order”.  
 
The latter two groups obviously did not free ride but instead voluntarily contributed to the 
provision of certain public goods. From this perspective, I use the term locality instead of 
community to describe the flexible, complex yet ordered pattern of engagement in the 
migrant enclaves. In some localities where social mobility is slow and segregation is 
serious, the insider and outsider division has also developed into a class division between 
the rentiers and labours. This type of voluntarism is spatially confined rather than 
cohesively produced; it is seldom motivated by a sense of brotherhood or communal ties. 
On the contrary, dwellers aimed to show their distinction from one another in the form of 
wealth, authority or identity, but their donations were attached to the loci of interactions 
and social needs that were unique to each enclave or to the specifics of the field. 
 
Duration of residence and perceived brokers 
In table 9, which shows the perceived brokers in urban villages, the responses from native 
villagers and rural migrants are clearly distinguished. By brokers, we refer to persons or 
institutions that either address the enquiries of clients or find ways to resolve their 
problems. For villagers, the JC is their most trusted broker, followed by clan networks. The 
remaining brokers are largely insignificant. For migrants, the priority is given to clan 
networks and is then diffused among the JC, NGOs, self-help and the RC. For both groups, 
                                                
403 Annual Reports of the JCs in Shi Village and Shang Village. 
404 As indicated in Chapter 5, migrants’ normal duration of residence in each host city was 3.2 years in 2011. 
The rural migrants in my pair study resided several months longer than this national average.   
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government authorities are ranked the lowest. First, the choice of perceived brokers is 
highly correlated with accessibility from the client perspective. The villagers directly 
access the JC because they come from the same family or ancestry and regularly share the 
profits of the same company. The villagers are also connected with clan chiefs, but the clan 
chiefs are less convenient or less effective. For the migrants, their first point of contact is 
clan chiefs or their surrogates. The multifaceted composition of migrants, including 
entrepreneurs, traders, clerks, salespeople and workers, also explains the varying 
perceptions of the second tier of brokers.  
 
Table 9 Perceived Brokers in Urban Villages  
 Native Villagers Rural Migrants 
 Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
Joint-stock company 14 56.00 5 14.28 
Lineage or clan 7 28.00 17 48.57 
Government authorities  0 0 1 2.86 
NGOs or social workers  1 4.00 5 14.28 
Resident committee 2 8.00 3 8.57 
Self-help 1 4.00 4 11.43 
Total  25 100.00 35 100.00 
 
Second, my in-depth interviews suggest that the dwellers approached different types of 
brokers according to the nature of the problems encountered. In general, both villagers and 
migrants considered the JC to be the most reliable and effective in resolving disputes 
between different clans, securing construction and service contracts or trading commercial 
licences or registration quotas. On the one hand, rural migrants considered clan networks 
essential for finding jobs, seeking micro-finance or fulfilling the requirements of 
government inspections. They opted for NGOs in handling financial disputes with their 
employers or transferring their social security contribution from the authority. On the other 
hand, whereas villagers praised the ability of JCs to secure their land tenure, check street-
level bureaucrats’ intervention and broker urban redevelopment, they opted for clan 
networks to handle business deals and resolve everyday conflicts. In addressing personal 
problems or individual advancements, they approached clan networks for assistance; when 
they were dealing with public issues or rightful claims, they turned to the JC and RC for 
support.  
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Third, the longer the respondents remained in urban villages, the more likely they were to 
choose the JC or clan networks as their most trusted partners in conveying claims or 
resolving disputes. Time and observation rather than ties or habits better reveal the power 
structure in urban villages. In other words, the JC and clan networks have earned their 
reputation as reliable and effective brokers through the regular and reciprocal delivery of 
goods and services. This personalised reciprocity covers economic and material realms 
such as job security, public security and everyday trades and extends to ceremonial and 
intangible realms including the sharing of guidance to manage law and regulations, the 
delivery of money and messages to one’s native place, or consolidation of ties for friends 
and relatives of the same kinship. As such, the sense of subordination or exploitation is 
minimised while loyalty and trust are socialised. Likewise, the dwellers’ choice of 
perceived brokers is largely independent of whether the subject is the ultimate decision 
maker. Although government authorities such as street offices and public security stations 
remain the most coercive and effective agencies in the migrant enclaves, many dwellers do 
not trust these formal but unfamiliar institutions. From their perspectives, disputes are 
resolved not based on appeals to the most powerful boss but based on whether that boss 
would take appropriate action. Another major concern is whether the boss’s appetite would 
be too large. Government authorities were often not approached because they failed to 
meet these criteria. 
 
Exclusive political access 
Despite dwellers’ enduring distrust and indifference to formal and external authorities, the 
migrant enclaves are spatially and politically tied to the city at large. In addition to the 
institutional and economic networks presented in Chapters 5 and 6, I use two salient but 
regular trades to illustrate how urban villages’ exclusivity and cohesion are structured by 
external political access and informal adaptation.   
 
The first scenario concerns the illegal trade of permits and licences between urbanites and 
villagers and between villagers and migrants. Since 2003, Shenzhen’s health, industry and 
commerce, environment, taxation and public security bureaus have increased the difficulty 
for migrant workers applying for permits to enter into several service sectors or have 
created new barriers to renewing licences.405 Although these policies were conducted in the 
                                                
405 Interview, rural migrant, Shenzhen, 20 April 2013. 
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name of rationalisation and standardisation, they produced a set of unrealistic and, most 
importantly, discriminative privileges and quotas. The hidden policy aims were to protect 
the privilege of the urbanites, enhance the growth of chain stores and promote the growth 
of national or regional brands.  
 
In effect, migrant traders and entrepreneurs found it almost impossible to fulfil these 
criteria and obtain permits through normal channels. However, the grievances and sources 
of instability were quickly absorbed by the resale of permits and quotas on the black 
market. In principle, every urbanite can apply for and obtain these permits; in practice, 
however, the endorsement of landlords and clan chiefs is needed to start and operate 
businesses. Rent was thus largely sought by the local bosses who enjoyed exclusive 
territorial power and socioeconomic resources. Once again, these powerful individuals did 
not operate businesses but profited from them. Although the migrants despised this 
arrangement, they accepted it as the logic of collusion. A migrant entrepreneur who had run 
restaurants, opened hardware stores and maintained a construction team discussed his 
collaboration and compliance by referring to the “depth of the water” (shuihenshen): 
 
The rents, permit charges, management fees and protection rackets increase once your 
business grows and expands. It makes no difference if you are bidding contracts. 
Normally, we [contractors] only receive 30 to 40 per cent of the approved budget. 
That’s the gross income, excluding payoffs, salaries and production costs. So of course 
the relations are unfair and abusive. But then the JCs are also required to pay all kinds 
of bribes and fees. Those at the top also exploit them. 406 
 
Consequentialism instead of procedural justice is their main concerns. This is the structural 
cause why eligibility for goods and services is complimented but not rightful entitlements 
in the migrant enclaves. Knowing that I am doing a comparative study of local governance 
in developing countries, a deputy of street office further rationalised the endemic 
corruption at the grassroots level: 
Corruption is everywhere. In China, you paid the extra, the factory is built and the 
road is built. But in Africa or India, you paid the bribes, and you got nothing. As long 
as the deal is honoured, the masses of the people also benefited.407 
 
The second scenario concerns an impromptu but routinized event. In 2007, the Civic 
Affairs Bureau of Shenzhen initiated a citywide charity campaign that aimed to promote 
                                                
406 Interview, clan chief, Shenzhen, 20 March 2013. 
407 Interview, government official, Shenzhen, 25 March 2013. 
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philanthropic culture and voluntarism. The authority knew in advance that the internal 
target (zhibiao) of raising 150 million yuan could never be achieved by voluntary donation. 
408 Dozens of large SOEs and JCs were thus solicited to make voluntary contributions. 
Each of the participating JCs was assigned a donation amount that was a proxy of their 
wealth and status. A first-tier JC such as Shi village donated 260,000 yuan; a second-tier 
JC, such as Shang and Nong village, donated 150,000 yuan; a third-tier JC such as Gong 
donated 80,000 yuan; and the amount donated by the others varied.  
 
According to several village bosses, coordination is limited to the third tier because their 
informal chamber did not accept members beyond that. This chamber is primitive or guild-
like and is admissible only to the JC heads or deputies. The elder chairmen were addressed 
as “the venerable” (gong). This honorific title is inherited from the gentry, indicating 
respect for one another as well as equal status. When they aimed for collective action, one 
of these gongs would call a meeting. Most of these actions concerned resisting government 
initiatives, obtaining a more favourable plot ratio, securing a large redevelopment contract, 
enhancing villagers’ personal quality (suzhi) and promoting indigenous heritage. However, 
the purpose of this formation was not organised resistance. On the contrary, collective 
actions or informal lobbying was used to demonstrate the interdependence of the JCs and 
their indispensability to the state. Their weaknesses and merits were depicted in a matrix. 
“We know the boundary”, said one of the gongs. In this regard, they not only occupied a 
position in the state’s united front framework but also preserved a certain degree of 
autonomy and their vested interests in the urban villages. 409 Through consolidating the 
business networks in each locality and cultivating the external connection with the local 
state, these village bosses and clan chiefs, respectively and concurrently, resemble the 
features of Prasenjit Duara’s protective and entrepreneurial brokerages.410  
 
 
TOILERS, TRADERS, TRANSIENTS AND CITIZENSHIP FROM AFAR 
 
Was the migrants’ compliance in the micro order extended to or intruded upon by the 
macro order? Migrants have benefited from some reforms in recent years. The Labour Law 
                                                
408 Interview, government official, Shenzhen, 28 September 2013. 
409 Shenzhen Civil Affairs Bureau, 2007. 
410 Duara, 1988:43-44, 55-57. 
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in 2008, although selectively and ambiguously implemented, provided more protections for 
migrants, such as minimal wages and overtime allowances. In coastal China, the lack of 
labour supply since 2009 also led to a substantial increase in salaries. Official data suggest 
that the average income of migrants increased by 15.3 per cent between 2010 and 2013. 411 
To further reduce their burdens in the host cities, municipal governments have gradually 
included migrants in their social security nets. The children of migrants, for instance, are 
covered by free primary education in Shenzhen once the migrants make social security 
contributions for more than three months.    
 
However, these changes are incremental and attempt to neither redress the enduring 
institutional discrimination against migrants nor encourage their empowerment. The 
following are statements from two white-collar migrants who shared an apartment with me 
for two weeks. The first statement is from an old migrant named Guang who resided in the 
city for more than a decade and who has been working as a mid-level contractor. The 
second statement is from a young migrant named Ming who arrived in the city in 2010 and 
has already changed jobs six times and lived in three urban villages. 
I built more than one hundred apartments in Shenzhen, none of which will be my 
home. It sounds absurd (kexiao) or pathetic (keilian). But what can I do? My options 
are limited. I gave up returning to the countryside, because I will soon get married. 
Some of my younger colleagues rallied to fight for collective bargaining. I appreciated 
their efforts, but those are too remote and costly for me. I will focus on earning money 
and raising my quality of life, I will soon satisfy the criteria of the point-scheme and 
then transfer my hukou. 
I envy those with normal, yellow skin colour. Being too dark like me indicates that I 
am an outsider. With our clothing, work and education, we are looked down upon by 
the urban dwellers. We will never be admitted into [urban] society. What can I do? I 
very much enjoyed serving as a volunteer for a NGO working to empower rural 
migrants. I spent a lot of my free time on this work; they informed me about my rights, 
and then I can share this information with my fellow workers. 412 
This anxiety that accumulates in the workplace and in everyday contact suggests that 
migrants are saddened, puzzled and angry that they are regarded as an inferior subject. 
They are considered either toilers who accepted the work that is left by the urbanites or 
transients who were denied the opportunity to assimilate in the cities. In the course of 
                                                
411 National Bureau of Statistics, 2014a. 
412 Fieldwork, 12-25 July 2013. 
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economic liberalisation, migrants are encouraged to use self-help concerning welfare 
provisions and personal quality (suzhi) perfection, which are framed by the government as 
the prerequisites for their eligibility for the social and economic benefits that are associated 
with citizenship.413 However, age, which is both a variable of itself and a proxy of future 
income and taste, has contested the effectiveness of this policy. Young migrants have 
increasingly considered the city their ideal home. This perspective arises not only because 
young migrants enjoy a cosmopolitan lifestyle but also because they are attracted to the 
variety of civic and cyber cultures, which cannot be detached from the city. Wealthy or 
talented migrants are largely allowed to reside in the cities permanently and are absorbed 
as members of urban society. However, the hukou system and the urban renewal process 
have continued to marginalise the majority of migrants and treat them as a means of 
production or as permanent transients.  
 
In addition to these personal reflections, hard evidence reveals the hearts and minds of the 
new generation of migrants who increasingly desire to live in cities. First, the gradual 
decrease in remittances from the new migrants serves as a good indicator of their intention 
to not return to their native places. Remittances have been identified as a key source of 
manifold changes in the economy and society in rural China. An estimated US$ 30 billion 
was transferred from urban to rural China in 2005.414 Older migrants frequently shared 
with me both the difficulty and the joy of sending money back home: the long queue 
outside the postal office, the anxiety about asking township fellows to bring their money 
back home, and the first time making bank transfers, among others. However, the queues 
disappeared and memory faded for the new migrants. Due to the youth’s preference and 
associated demographic changes, remittances per capita have steadily decreased in recent 
years. It became doubtful if this level of remittances would be sufficient for basic 
consumption, let alone productive consumption and investment in the countryside.   
 
Second, excessive consumption is another side of the coin showing the migrants’ 
attachment to the cities along with their anxiety. During my brief residence, I repeatedly 
observed the phenomenon of many youth migrants becoming members of the “moonlight 
clan” (yueguangzu) who used their entire salaries before the end of each month. Many 
                                                
413 Keane, 2006; Murphy, 2004. 
414 Cheng and Zhong, 2005:5; Zhu et al. 2012:655. 
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factory and construction workers gambled or become alcoholics. Regardless of class and 
profession, these young migrants spent a large portion of their leisure and money on 
dating, buying electronic products or playing online games. Certainly, the proliferation of 
information technology and social media among the young migrants has enabled them not 
only to compare and contrast domestic and global affairs but also to better articulate and 
frame their hardships and grievances. However, recent studies contend previous optimism 
that interactions and criticisms in the public sphere would be sufficient to mobilize and to 
be transformed into organised collective actions.415 
 
This observation provides a clue as to how and why young migrants have casually and 
persistently engage in habits that brought them further from their goal of residing in cities. 
Undoubtedly, the migrants understood that they needed a saving plan and that their 
families in their native places needed their remittance support, and they probably needed to 
voice their demands. However, these migrants realised that their goal of citizenship was 
tightly restricted by the hukou system, their land rights in the native place had already been 
confiscated, and the price of real estate in the cities was rising at a rate several times faster 
than their salary increases.416 Given this dilemma, a rational individual tends to favour 
expressive consumption, aiming to enjoy the present rather than to plan for the future.  
 
Third, challenges also emerged from the institutional change in local political machines. In 
December 2011, the Ministry of Civil Affairs formulated a policy document to attempt to 
integrate rural migrants into the local community.417 This policy stipulated that migrants 
who lived in a legal apartment and resided in a community for more than one year were 
entitled to become electorates in the election of RC members. Because many provinces and 
cities have not yet implemented this national policy and because the tenure of many RCs in 
my surveyed villages had not expired, the impact of this policy on the territorialisation of 
politics remains unclear. Given the experiences of village elections in rural China and 
community elections of the RC, however, such changes would not be astonishing.418 This 
scale of expansion in the electorates would certainly create new procedures, produce 
deliberative effects or adaptive reasoning and most likely result in a reshuffling of power in 
the fragmented and localized patronage networks. 
                                                
415 Cf. Tai, 2006:287-292; King et al., 2013: 323-325. 
416 See Chapters 5 and 6 for details. 
417 Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2012. 
418 O’Brien and Li, 2000; Read, 2003; He and Warren, 2011. 
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Adaptive brokers and satisfiers 
As a form of informal communities, urban villages are inevitably embedded in and shaped 
by the wider socioeconomic structures, political institutions and historical precedents. The 
previous chapters have documented the overarching structures and changing dynamics in 
these migrant enclaves. The aim of this chapter was different: I aimed to give voice to the 
dwellers of the enclaves to understand their experiences and assessments of the socio-
political order in the urban villages, which, despite the clarifications made earlier, might 
still seem impoverished, unjust and alien to many. As migrant workers constitute not only 
the overwhelming majority of dwellers but also the underclass, they serve as the primary 
unit of analysis, although the views of the village bosses, landlords, and clan chiefs are also 
considered.   
 
I found that migrants are highly industrious, sensitive and adaptive. Rather than being the 
victims of their own making as the “culture of poverty” thesis infers, these migrants are 
expanding their trades through collaboration with the brokers and defending their realm via 
the territorialization of politics. In this sense, the thesis of kinship ties is also revisited. 
Kinship ties remain vital, but they do not naturally lead to social cohesion and generalised 
reciprocity; rather, the timing of settlement, the location of territory, class division and 
personalised linkage are relatively dynamic. Moreover, the presence of mutual assurance 
within clans and embedded discrimination between groups suggest that the dwellers of 
migrant enclaves are more flexible and adaptive than commonly assumed. Bounded and 
differentiated by the power relations within and political access outside of the migrant 
enclaves, most of the dwellers, including local bosses, clan chiefs, native villagers and 
migrant workers, chose to satisfy and empathise, thus accumulating diverse economic, 
social and cultural capital. In certain extreme cases, they returned to the countryside or 
moved to other cities. These informed adaptations form both the dynamics and the 
structural order in the enclaves.   
 
I further identified several structural and institutional changes among the migrants and in 
the urban villages. On the one hand, intermediaries such as village bosses and clan chiefs 
are both de-territorialised and de-authorised because of rapid urban renewal. On the other 
hand, young migrants increasingly desire to become settlers. These changes contest the 
applicability of the logic of exchanging entitlement to citizenship for eligibility of payoffs 
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and may invalidate the exit point mechanism that counts on migrants to oscillate between 
their native place and host cities. With the removal of intermediaries to provide welfare to 
the poor, as in the past, and in the absence of a populist machine to articulate grievances to 
migrants, as in third-world slums, could China’s grassroots governance continue to nurture 
collusion and maintain stability? I shall address this question, among others, in the 
concluding chapter. 
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8. Conclusion 
 
 
PARTICULAR MANIFESTATION OF PREVALENT TRANSFORMATION 
 
This thesis has examined the interplay of macro-institutions and micro-mechanisms in the 
making of China’s urban grassroots order during the post-1978 period. This episode of 
massive internal migration and urbanisation is almost unparalleled in human history. With 
the movement of more than 274 million rural migrants into cities and a 36 per cent increase 
in urbanisation in three and a half decades, 419 China has not only benefited from a cheap 
and constant supply of labour in becoming the world’s factory but also experienced 
extensive urban contestation in terms of land, lodging, employment, social security and 
citizenship. However, contrary to the records of most early and late developers, where 
development comes with slums, China’s great urban transformation has maintained fairly 
regulated, dynamic, less contentious and yet soft migrant enclaves.  
 
Although I found this deviant case interesting and puzzling, I realised that three groups of 
observers might not share my views for positive or normative reasons. The first group 
merely disputes the facts. One logical critique is that although development brings slums, 
China has not yet reached the critical threshold for slums to spread. By referring to the 
scale of China’s internal migration, the speed of its urbanisation and the hybridity of its 
migrant enclaves, Chapter 2 demonstrates why China’s urban contestation could only be 
greater, not lesser. Furthermore, the demolition of urban villages and the devotion to 
megaprojects discussed in Chapters 4 and 6 indicate that slums, urban villages or informal 
settlements will not define China’s urban future. Hence, the absence of slums is not only a 
present reality but also a future prospect for China. This development trajectory indicates 
the reshuffle of power and resources at the urban grassroots but also reflects the interests 
and ethos of the local state, xitong and grassroots regime. 
 
According to another line of positivist critique, many urban villages are indeed slum-like 
places where poverty, disorder and despair are cultivated. To the devotees of high 
modernism and neoliberalism, including many of the urban middle class and professional 
                                                
419 This number includes 106 million migrants who are engaged in non-agricultural work in their nearby 
townships and small cities. See fn11.  
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city planners, the very existence of informal settlements already constitutes an offence of 
taste or an exemplar of inefficiency. The fact that these enclaves are homes to tens of 
millions of rural migrants, commonly perceived as traditional, backward and dangerous, 
only multiplies the threat and affirms their prejudices. Certainly, crowdedness, poor 
hygiene, fire hazards and pollution are not uncommon in urban villages. However, I argue 
that a slum is not merely an index of such poverty-related problems; it also depicts the 
extent of political anarchy, entrenched inequality and a sense of place. After comparing the 
features of four urban villages against these objective and inter-subjective criteria, I insist 
that the enclaves in China are more governed, affluent, and vibrant yet soft than those in 
many developing countries.  
 
Nevertheless, whereas the spatial and political order of China’s urban grassroots shows 
distinguished trajectories and forms, it has also encountered contestation regarding state 
authority and public services that is common to developing countries along the orbit of 
global capitalism. This thesis aims to examine the conditions for China’s adaptive 
responses to such antagonism, the associated contradictions and the impacts on grassroots 
order and civic engagement. Although the case of Shenzhen cannot reflect all situations in 
China, the hukou and land systems are configuring national institutions, and JCs and clan 
networks are lively in the South. Thus, the patterns identified in China’s first SEZ and its 
sunbelt city are by no means unrelated to those found in other cities that may have faced 
less contestation but are modelled after this “vanguard” (xianfeng) city. The pair 
comparison of four urban villages in the sunbelt city with varied spatial, economic and 
demographic configurations helps to verify our findings and answer larger questions 
concerning the checks and balances laid down by surviving socialist institutions during 
market transitions, the interplay of despotic power and infrastructural power, and the 
boundaries between the authoritarian state and civil society in China. 
 
 
INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRADICTIONS 
 
The second group of observers, who might well observe the deviant phenomenon, draw 
conclusions from regime type. These individuals insist that the Chinese communist regime, 
whose capacity is thought to have markedly strengthened since the market reforms, cannot 
tolerate spatial irregularity or social disorder. Although I agree that the CCP – similarly to 
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any consolidated regime – is most concerned with order and stability, I must emphasise 
that it has largely transformed from “totalitarianism” into authoritarianism,420 i.e., from 
commanding people on “what to do” to regulating people on “what not to do”. The 
institutions delegated to fulfil these roles are thus facing new challenges and hidden 
contradictions during China’s multiple transitions. Contradiction in this sense is not 
opposition, but it arises when “two seemingly opposed forces are simultaneously present in 
an entity, a process or an event”.421 Contradiction is not necessarily bad, but it invites us to 
note incoherence and adaptation at the grassroots level that cannot be fully attributed to 
regime type. At least three contradictions have emerged in the rapid urban transformation 
that could have generated widespread instability, disorder and despair if not for the 
interventions from resilient institutions and resourceful intermediaries in China. 
 
The first contradiction concerns new market forces and old socialist institutions during 
socioeconomic transition and the early stage of capital accumulation.422  The need for 
migrants to provide a cheap and constant supply of labour to develop a labour-intensive 
and export-oriented economy for global capitalism is incongruous with the practices of 
administrative and fiscal decentralisation aiming to relieve local governments of the need 
to provide residual public services and a basic safety net. If neoliberal doctrines such as the 
maximisation of the exchange value of labour and the commodification of land ownership 
were rigorously and fully implemented, the needy but abandoned rural migrants – 
numbering hundreds of millions – would have built countless slums, a form of self-help 
settlement, from scratch in Chinese cities. 
 
However, three socialist institutions have mediated the expectations of migrants and 
shaped the length of their urban residence. Chapter 3 shows how the hukou system has 
institutionalised a targeted surveillance system aiming to regulate rural-urban migration, 
determine welfare entitlement and enforce social control. The fear of custody, repatriation 
and a legacy of bad records during the application and renewal of travel and residence 
permits has been internalised in the considerations of rural migrants, limiting their choices 
for overt contention, including building self-help housing and piloting rightful resistance. 
Furthermore, the constant adaptation of the hukou system has absorbed talented and rich 
                                                
420 Notwithstanding the controversy regarding the totalitarian framing of the communist regime, I borrow the 
concept to emphasise the changes in the regime despite the continuous ruling of the CCP.  
421 Harvey, 2014:6. 
422 See Goldman and MacFarquhar, 1999; Lin, 2006; Huang, 2008; Li and Ong, 2008. 
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migrants to stabilise these potentially contentious subgroups. Chapter 4 also explains 
situations in which the dualistic land system concurrently reduces migrants’ working and 
living costs in host cities by providing affordable and sufficient urban villages and granting 
exit points for migrants to adjust to the business cycle by securing land for farming, 
residence and family ties in the countryside. Moreover, the movement from controlled 
factory dormitory – a capitalist manifestation of the danwei system – to urban villages 
surprisingly offers a sense of liberalisation and improvement to many migrant workers. 
Regarding their combined effects, the contradiction between market forces and socialist 
institutions is controlled yet unresolved, thus preserving the grassroots order at minimal 
public expense.  
 
The second contradiction concerns the peasantry and working classes in the context of an 
urban-rural divide and back-and-forth migration. Under rapid and intensive urban sprawl, 
the locality of land rather than the size of land has profoundly triggered inequality within 
the peasantry and fundamentally altered the income and life chances of landed peasants 
and migrant workers. Compared with the rural migrants who were surplus farmers became 
cheap labourers in the global economy, the native villagers became landlords profited from 
their valuable land in the city centres. Likewise, while migrant workers transformed from 
temporary tenants into displaced persons during urban renewal, native villagers have lived 
on massive rental incomes, loan interest and commodity compensation during the 
formation and demolition of urban villages. By providing native villagers and their 
organisations (JCs) and surrogates (native clans) with payoffs and patronage, the local 
government colluded this stabilising force to produce public and private goods in the 
enclaves in the form of daily routines and to manage their personalised resistance during 
contentious episodes, as indicated in Chapters 6 and 7. 
 
In this regard, the tension between class and class relations is rather dialectical. With the 
systematic rural-urban divide, different rural migrants are always strangers to one another 
in their host cities, as they have varied identities and, over time, contradictory roles. These 
rural migrants are workers in cities but farmers in their native places; they are migrant 
tenants in urban villages but landed peasants in rural villages; they may be not only victims 
of land expropriation but also hatchet men during building demolition. Entitled with rural 
land as a form of dividend-generating assets but concurrently forced to become wage-
earning workers in cities, many rural migrants have been trapped in semi-
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proletarianisation, a process of diverse labour process, job content and chance of social 
mobility. This characterisation leads to a mechanically fragmented class structure that 
hinders the organised pursuit of class interests. While rural land provides a means of 
production and subsistence for returned migrants, which explains their high degree of 
toleration despite institutionalised discrimination and recurring displacement, this social 
safety valve also permits the capital accumulation of the foreign and domestic capitalists as 
well as rentier classes in the urban villages at a rate distinct from that of other developing 
countries. Contrary to popular belief, the land system – a form of socialist legacy – has 
offered the necessary conditions for both China’s exceptional growth and its structural 
stability. 423  
 
The third contradiction involves despotic power and infrastructural power at the urban 
grassroots level. According to Mann, despotic power is the state’s coercive power over 
society, while infrastructural power measures the state’s power to penetrate into civil 
society to enforce its decrees within its territory.424 Although these two forms of power 
always coexist, they are often in conflict with one another in an authoritarian context 
where the regime aims to maximise control over its subjects and realm. The trajectory of 
China, however, has demonstrated a synergy of these two powers that differs from this 
understanding. In the Republican era, the collapse of bureaucratic power and the spread of 
bandits exhausted the coercive authority and extraction capacity of the state, both centrally 
and locally. The gentry hence substituted for the role of the state and served either as 
entrepreneurial brokers or as protective brokers, but they were not an extension of the state. 
425 After the communist and socialist resolution, the despotic and infrastructural power of 
the People’s Republic grew synchronously and peaked at the time and territory of the 
people’s commune.  
 
However, continuous privatisation and decentralisation since the market reforms have 
created new dynamics to contest the synergy of strong despotic power and strong 
infrastructural power. One tension involves rivalry within the local state. Despite 
subordination to an increasingly high-modernist and neo-liberal regime, the tension and 
fragmentation between the municipal authority and grassroots regime remain strong. 
                                                
423 Lin, 2015:34. 
424 Mann, 2008. 
425 Billingsley, 1988; Duara, 1988. 
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Whereas city planners aimed to eliminate urban villages entirely to build a modern 
metropolis to drive economic growth, street-level cadres recognised the utility of informal 
settlements in terms of exchange and stability and hence bargained to protect them. 
Compared with municipal governments, which have numerous official and back channels 
to profit from public infrastructure deals and services, the grassroots regime is heavily 
dependent on everyday trades and bribes in informal settlements. Unpacking the local state 
reveals the reasons for tolerating or preserving a distinguished grassroots realm despite the 
repeated re-centralisation and gentrification policies of municipal governments discussed 
in Chapter 4. 
 
Another tension concerns the power and resources among different segments of the 
grassroots regime. Formally, the RC and the JC are respectively extensions or tools of the 
local state but informally, they perform unique roles and enjoy ample autonomy. Whereas 
the boundaries between despotic power and infrastructural power are constantly evoking, 
those between the definite agenda of the state and the informed tactics of society are 
always under contestation. This reveals the operational overlap in these two forms of 
grassroots agency. While the JC’s authority is partly delegated from street offices and its 
daily operation is dependent on the cooperation of the RC, it has stretched high autonomy 
within a bounded locality. As indicated in Chapters 5 and 6, the commercialisation of 
politics makes the JC indispensable to both patrons and clients. What makes China special 
is that both pseudo-state and non-state agencies possess infrastructural power. Because of 
the considerable resources processed by the former or its indispensable role during 
downscaling and outsourcing, policy initiatives and public goods must be channelled 
through and delivered by it. Hence, although market reform has structured inequality, it has 
also strengthened intermediaries, enabling them to govern the privatised collective and 
negotiate with the state on behalf of inhabitants. Further, the unpacking of China’s 
grassroots regime indicates a nuanced expression of power and resources in an open and 
resourceful yet exclusive enclave. Despite China’s authoritarian context, infrastructural 
power is not merely structured by despotic power; its constituents include both local 
governments and grassroots society through which the ingenuity and autonomy of the 
intermediaries are institutionalised and nurtured. 
 
 
INTERMEDIARIES IN DIFFERENT LOCALITIES  
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Beneath these structural contexts is the realm of intermediaries that execute local state 
decrees and articulate the interests of the grassroots population. Which micro-mechanisms 
have respectively sustained the provision of public goods and managed social discontent in 
the absence of a welfare state and electoral politics? The case studies of four urban villages 
in guannei and guanwai allow me to measure and verify the degree of 1) urban poverty, 2) 
entrenched inequality, 3) political anarchy and 4) inhabitants’ inter-subjectivity in China’s 
migrant enclaves. Essentially, I found more similarities than differences between the urban 
villages based on these criteria. This outcome either implies that the roles of intermediaries 
have overridden the difficulties of providing public goods in different socioeconomic and 
demographic contexts or reflects the effects of the institutions described to the extent that 
their configuration renders diverse villages as similar. By showing how effectively the 
intermediaries observed the boundaries set on the agenda while simultaneously pushing 
those boundaries on behalf of their constituents, I favour the second explanation.  
 
First, whether the urban village is a hotbed of poverty is difficult both to measure and to 
interpret because “hotbed” is a dynamic concept that requires process tracing. I thus 
revealed the monthly incomes of urban village inhabitants, compared their disposable 
income with the rest of the city, and distinguished the income sources of native villagers 
from those of rural migrants. Given that many migrants purposively minimised their 
expenses in the cities to invest in small businesses or send remittances to their families, 
income and consumption levels do not constitute a reliable index of poverty. Overall, 
income in the enclaves is approximately two-thirds of the city average, largely because the 
majority of inhabitants are migrants rather than urbanites. However, their disposable 
incomes are high because of affordable housing, inexpensive food and walkable commutes 
to their workplaces. As shown in Chapter 4, urban village apartments are regularly in short 
supply, and their occupation rate has always been higher than that of commodity housing. 
  
Despite being inexpensive, the apartments are not primitive. Compared with typical slums, 
Chinese urban villages have modern layouts with durable structures for construction, and 
each apartment is typically supplied with electricity, water and sanitation services. The 
guannei pair of villages even has air conditioning, Internet connections and cable 
television. Although one of these villages has been partially demolished while the other has 
been well preserved, they exhibit the similar logic of a privatised collective that values the 
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opinions of shareholders and consumers. For instance, the JC in Shang Village submitted 
itself to the urban planning regime and to an SOE to demolish nearly one-third of the 
village in the hopes of bringing “enduring prosperity to the villagers”.426 Convinced that 
the rental and loan incomes from its prime location are more valuable than apartment sales, 
the JC in Shi Village has invested tens of millions of yuan to provide public and club 
goods, thereby establishing personalised relations and soliciting support from rich 
migrants. Although these goods and networks are not forms of social security that can 
easily be converted into capacity, they have enriched the convenience, diversity and 
standard of living of the enclave, which are integral to urban life and highly valued by the 
migrants and the poor. 
 
Second, despite the extreme structural inequality in the urban villages, such inequality is 
arguably less entrenched and less severe than in factory dormitories where surveillance is 
routinized and exploitation is normalised. That said, such inequality is connected to the 
land system and further intensified by patronage. Land, as property and a means of 
production, significantly differentiates income and wealth between native villagers and 
rural migrants. During contentious episodes, the outcomes also benefit landlords while 
alienating tenants, as is evident in the sizeable compensation that villagers receive during 
urban renewal and the massive displacement of rural migrants during mega-events. In the 
absence of electoral politics, native villagers serve as patrons and constituents of both the 
JC and RC, whereas rural migrants, given their short residence and rural hukou status, are 
denied various civil rights. The intermediaries are thus mainly accountable to the former 
rather than the latter. More importantly, this structure results in the emergence of a rentier 
class that does not need to labour yet rapidly accumulates capital through rents and loans. 
In contrast, migrants have nurtured to become creative, adaptive and hardworking, thereby 
incorporating the wider structure into their social practices and intertwining the formal 
institutions to fit their personal goals.427 Apart from education and medical benefits, rural 
migrants have been rather indifferent to progressive issues such as environmental 
conservation, gender inequality and civil rights, which limit the reach of the NGOs and the 
linkage of their social grievances to wider political agenda.  
 
However, the migrant enclaves are more vibrant and open than is commonly assumed. 
                                                
426 Interview, village boss, 18 June 2014. 
427 Murphy, 2002: 217-219. 
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First, the four urban villages are self-sufficient in terms of consumption, with corner shops 
providing daily necessities that are affordable for migrants. Second, although the interests 
of native villagers and clan leaders carry more weight during resource distribution or 
public consultation, migrant entrepreneurs, traders and workers are not always the losers. 
In the guanwai pair, the semi-collective economy requires a team of skilled artisans and 
technicians who enjoy considerable bargaining power. In the guannei pair, the rental and 
trade model entails that migrant traders and mavens consider the enclaves for both working 
and living. Power and resources in the enclaves are certainly unfair and unequal, but their 
economic structure ensures that less predatory means of production and less coercive 
means of control are enforced. Given that the discriminatory hukou system and the 
exploitative Foxconn system are both national and wide-reaching, such informal locatives 
actually entail greater diversity and flexibility. As indicated in Chapter 7, the rural 
migrants generally approved of their transition from factory dormitories to urban villages 
and did not view the latter as enclaves of deprivation or despair. The exit point mechanism 
discussed in Chapter 5 also explains why various means of subsistence are provided to 
enable neighbourhood regeneration. When the third option, exodus, is offered, migrants no 
longer need to struggle between resistance and compliance once these options become 
offensive or unproductive. The lack of collective identity and organisational needs were 
the noticeable trade-off when migrants rated eligibility for favours over entitlement to 
rights. However, this observation also suggests that the relative order in China’s urban 
villages (compared with their counterparts in slums) can be explained by the diverse tools 
used to escape from their entrenchment. 
 
Third, the absence of political anarchy reflects the role of JCs in maintaining social order 
along with the extent of their territory. As discussed in Chapter 5, claims of disorderliness 
and irregularities in migrant enclaves are largely exaggerated. In fact, crime rates in urban 
villages are comparable to the rest of the city. Such images result from public security 
forces’ targeted surveillance and displacement campaigns and are consolidated by media 
reports of prostitution and drugs in selected urban villages. However, the presence of 
collective security brigades and private security teams draw the boundaries of the 
supposedly penetrative regime and reflect the strength of non-state agencies. A more 
symbolic structure involves the installation and management of electric gates at different 
entrances of the urban villages (except for the main avenues that connect to the rest of the 
city). Presented in three of the four villages, these gates regulate traffic and protect the 
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inhabitants as in middle-class gated communities. More importantly, guarded by privatised 
security teams, these gates draw the boundaries of the territory of urban villages and 
symbolise the JCs’ power and resources.  
 
Certainly, the JCs have relied heavily on clan networks and even gang members at times to 
maintain stability, offer protection, invent threats and resolve contention. In the absence of 
the electoral machines widely developed in Latin America and Southeast Asia, China’s 
intermediaries rely on the interplay among payoff, patronage and threat mechanisms to 
articulate the interests of rural migrants while satisfying the agenda of the local state. First, 
cheap lodging, adequate jobs and basic public goods are provided to all inhabitants, which 
reduces the attractiveness of becoming gang members and hence contains this tumour of 
disorder. Second, building contracts are allocated, business permits are dispensed, and 
committee appointments are solicited for clan leaders and migrant entrepreneurs to ensure 
compliance and solidify interpersonal networks. Third, sporadic forced displacement of 
contentious migrants or loyal protestors occurs to produce precedents, generate threats and 
eliminate dissenting elements before they become more sophisticated. Given the 
resourcefulness of the grassroots regime, payoff and negotiation are always preferred, and 
coercion is mainly used as a threat to induce political conformity.    
 
Despite lacking the uncontested authority of local despotism and the desire to contest 
political power, grassroots agencies and their partners and surrogates have remained 
powerful and semi-independent. Similar to bossism in the Philippines, these entities are 
merely subordinating rather than submitting to the state apparatus to protect their realm 
and secure their interests.428 Although the electoral machine is prohibited from developing 
under the one-party state, some elements of popular politics have emerged. Compared with 
the more independent and organised NGOs that are subjected to tight surveillance and 
recurring crackdowns, these intermediaries are always welcomed and tolerated for their 
public functions. However, this differential treatment implies that the state has never truly 
retreated from its social functions; instead, it has been eager to redraw distinctions between 
friends and enemies and between direct provisions and circuitous outsourcing. As such, the 
social capacity and organisational structure for civil empowerment, which are quite 
common in informal settlements in Latin America, Africa and Southeast Asia, are either 
                                                
428 Sidel, 1999:140-143. 
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restrained or substituted in China.  
 
In the overall picture, the quality of public goods and the ability to satisfy the state agenda 
clearly differs among the four urban villages. Two contingent variables are notable. One 
concerns the leadership of a village boss. Although the JC is informal yet influential, the 
JC leadership makes a great difference. This applies to the head of Shi Village, who has 
ruled since the shareholding reforms in 1995 and previously served as a production team 
leader. A product of the socialist era, he acknowledged the boundaries of negotiation with 
the local state and showed compassion towards his subjects within the privatised 
collectives. When more than 95 per cent of the JCs in Shenzhen had built new ancestral 
halls to record their success and prosperity, he used the budget to promote intangible 
values among the young villagers and to recruit talented migrants to join the company. He 
also holds authority and tenure that allow for trial and error, which is increasingly a luxury 
for the heads of other intermediaries and for local officials.   
 
Another point concerns the diffused interests of the inhabitants. Despite the heterogeneous 
nature of the urban villages, their inhabitants once shared some interests, making societal 
responses highly predictable and allowing the coercion, patronage and exit mechanisms to 
work effectively. Working hard to earn money and saving to send remittances to their 
families had long been the common goal for the majority of migrants, regardless of age, 
clan, locality or length of residence. However, new demands for consumption and 
citizenship have emerged among the young migrants and young villagers. Separating from 
the improvised villages and trades is on the agenda of the former, while volunteering at 
NGO seminars and in public works is increasingly normal for the latter. Thus, although I 
agree that the old migrants are “eating bitter fruit” or tend towards compliance, this attitude 
results not from culture but from the precedents, tastes and organisational deficiencies 
shared by the old generation. As revealed in Chapter 7, this tendency contrasts starkly with 
the suffering, grievances and ambitions of the new generation.  
 
As the village bosses and old migrants are both proxies for contradictions inherited from 
the socialist era and magnified under market reforms, it is unlikely that their political skills 
could be reproduced or that their next of kin share their ethos and beliefs. Hence, 
uncertainty abounds in the grassroots order. Together with the new policy that allows 
migrants to become electorates of RCs and the rapid demolition of JCs, we might observe 
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the rise and consolidation of pseudo-state agencies to replace non-state agencies. Although 
it is difficult to predict whether such development would enhance the penetration of 
despotic power into the grassroots level, the difference in grassroots politics between North 
and South China and between coastal and inland China will certainly be gradually 
minimised. Nevertheless, these structural changes remain in the early stages and are 
constrained by the aforementioned contradictions. However, benefitting from the declining 
state sector and the spread of privatisation, certain intermediaries in South China have 
become indispensable to the state and to society. Because of their interventions, public 
goods are delivered, individual pursuits are facilitated, and everyday conflicts are aired yet 
effectively managed. Through the commercialisation of state functions and the 
territorialisation of business networks, these intermediaries are relatively more autonomous 
than the theory of state corporatism assumes.  
 
In this way, E.P. Thompson’s idea that class formation is “an active process which owes as 
much to agency as to conditioning” may find a new resonance in contemporary China.429  
On the one hand, due to their temporary residence in heterogeneous urban villages, old 
migrant workers, as opposed to older generations of state sector workers, have missed the 
working class communities that are conducive for the making of class and class 
consciousness. On the other hand, effectively denied of land rights in rural areas and 
concurrently exposed to an increasingly exploitative but sophisticated global capitalism, 
young migrant workers may be habituated with the new socioeconomic structure to 
transform from semi-proletarianisation to proletarianisation.  
  
 
REGIME, AGENCY AND RECIPROCAL RESILIENCE 
 
Finally, the third group of observers might disagree with me for normative reasons. 
Because slums are widely considered negative externalities of neoliberalism yielding 
poverty, disorder, inequality and the like, development without slums must be a good thing. 
Accordingly, if China could produce economic growth and concurrently retard the 
undesired consequences, it might provide an alternative and preferred development model. 
However, would this view give too much credit to an authoritarian regime tolerating 
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203 
 
exploitation and inequalities and featuring elements of crony capitalism?   
 
Although this thesis is largely empirical in focus, I have attempted to address these 
challenges. By outlining the contradictions within the socialist institutions and the 
antagonism produced by market forces, I first identified the conditions that are essential to 
retarding the formation and spread of slums. I argue that certain surviving socialist 
institutions such as land tenure, hukou differentiation, privatised dormitories and 
collectives, and the internalised memory of both equity and coercion among the dwellers 
are vital to explain their favour over localised patronage and exit points. Socialist 
institutions must accordingly be unpacked, because some have preserved the form but not 
the substance. Some institutions are respectively or concurrently granting the means of 
production and subsistence to migrants and the poor, whereas other institutions are sources 
of inequality and disenfranchisement for these groups. By introducing the nuances and 
dynamics of ghettos, favelas and barrios in the West and in Latin America, I then 
deconstructed the standard perceptions that these informal settlements are merely hotbeds 
of poverty, crime, vice and despair. A more thorough analysis of the micro-mechanisms 
indicates that although the intermediaries rely on patronage, they are also ruling and 
producing using less coercive and predatory means.  
 
The assumption that rural migrants are impoverished and unaided may fail to account for 
the drawback of their struggles and creativity. By visualising the inequality in wealth and 
power in urban villages, I traced the process through which dominance is negotiated and 
inequality is remedied, albeit inadequately from a normative perspective. Similarly, 
considering gentrification and neoliberalism as the only path to accelerated growth and 
modernity is not only uncritical but also unimaginative. Generally, as Jane Jacob’s works 
and many studies of slums and informal neighbourhoods concur, the vitality of cities is 
seldom supported by skyscrapers, shopping malls, efficiency and order; rather, it is 
embodied in indigenous neighbourhoods, mixed land use, uncertainty and confusion. 
Specifically, China’s community governance and reckless urban renewal hardly represent a 
form of societal progress. These measures depoliticise migrant enclaves, destroy informal 
polity and destabilise small businesses, which restricts for rural migrants the access to the 
means of production that is adequate to engage in city life. Overall, the value-added from 
gentrification or city appearance upgrade and redevelopment or urban mega projects has 
rarely benefited the migrants and the poor. Instead, this model buys off the native villagers 
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transiently and redistributes power and resources to the municipal authority, the xitong and 
the real estate developers perpetually.  
 
Comparative cases suggest that the presence of resourceful intermediary associations and a 
networked rural community in the urban area may enable collective action and result in 
social instability. For example, the Red Shirts in Thailand, who largely represent and 
aggregate rural interests, challenged the incumbent government and widened social 
polarisation in the late 2000s.430 Why have China’s intermediaries not engaged in similar 
collective actions ? In addition to the bargaining and payoff mechanisms discussed above 
is China’s institutional precedent in the post-Mao era. Although there is a continuation of 
factional politics and increased tension between the central and local states and in the wake 
of decentralisation, the ruling regime, the CCP, has maintained its cohesion. With the 
discharge of the party’s general secretary, Zhao Ziyang, who was accused of promoting 
party division and seeking external reinforcement during the 1989 democratic movement, 
political struggle, no matter how serious it is, has been firmly contained within the party-
state. Despite achieving economic liberalisation, dissenters never had the opportunity to 
flourish. Before gaining a national footing or exercising credible threat, the dissenters had 
already been imprisoned or exiled. Simply put, there was no real alternative despite the 
multiple changes in the political structure. As elite cohesion has been regulated and 
maintained, the mobilisation capacity and horizontal networks of the grassroots 
associations remain latent. Compared to an ideal civil society, China’s resourceful 
intermediaries are rooted in mediating social and public interests with the state, rather than 
the autonomous or proactive agents who advocate for a wider political agenda. This 
confirms our thesis that the vigour of an intermediate realm must not be detached from the 
historical-sociological context that it breeds and that shapes its relations to the state. 
 
In short, I argue that urban China’s structural stability or regulated contestation cannot be 
fully attributed to “authoritarian resilience” but is also linked to “social resilience” 
involving intermediaries and grassroots society.431 In fact, if only one of the players, the 
state, is adaptive, then we should observe either the state penetrating and dominating the 
grassroots or the spread of structural instability and violent contention. However, neither of 
these trends is observed. Although formal institutions condition agency responses, they are, 
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in turn, shaped by them. By accepting the grassroots order and prioritising economic goals, 
the inhabitants, including village bosses, clan chiefs, native villagers and rural migrants, 
exhibit differentiated and diversified engagement patterns with highly separate identities 
and calculative mentalities that add nuances to the concept of communal or kinship ties. 
Nevertheless, what has been absent from these dynamic enclaves, resourceful 
intermediaries and convenient exit points are not the tools for individual advancement but 
the desire for collective empowerment. This subject is of vital importance for students of 
democratisation and global capitalism, yet it is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
The phenomenon of “development without slums” in China is thus better viewed as a 
particular manifestation of the prevalent social transformation in the early stages of 
urbanisation and capital accumulation. In this transformation, the contradictions between 
surviving socialist institutions and new market forces, between despotic and infrastructural 
power, and among different classes, localities and generations are deepened, bargained for 
and contained. On the one hand, China’s intensification of urbanisation and privatisation is 
associated with further restrictions on rural land rights, affordable shelters and adaptive 
intermediaries. On the other hand, electoral politics for rural migrants have formally been 
introduced, and the patterns of migration, residence and participation of new migrants are 
changing. In the midst of the structural changes, the aforesaid contradictions are likely to 
be preserved and novel intermediaries might well emerge. But whether their interplay will 
continue to satisfy the interests of grassroots actors who are in search of patronage and exit 
and the local state that is in need of growth and stability remain to be seen.  
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